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ABSTRACT 
This research analyses Russian industrial firms in the year 2000 with a focus on corporate 
governance (CG) in association with strategies relating to employee welfare and with firm 
performance. Privatised manufacturing industry in Russia represents a unique hybrid in 
terms of CG, with employees and managers as relational shareholders usually holding a 
majority of shares, but with an increasing proportion held by outsiders. While outside 
shareholders may be expected to promote strategies that raise shareholder value, other 
stakeholders introduce their own influences. Employees may seek higher wages, job 
security, social benefits, etc. in their roles as employees rather than shareholders. 
Managers may want income stability, continued employment, personal aggrandisement, 
growth of the firm, support in their political activities, etc. Thus, in a Governance - 
Strategy - Performance context, the following two research questions have been 
addressed: (1) do employees influence strategies concerning employee welfare and divert 
shareholder value towards their own immediate sources of welfare as employees and, 
subsequently, (2) are firms' strategic decisions concerning employee welfare associated 
with stronger or weaker performance? 
The results obtained provide a rich basis for discussion on employee welfare in Russia. 
Being quite new at a general level, this work, as a large-sample empirical study, has been 
able to identify some important associations between insider ownership and strategies 
concerning employee welfare, and has discovered some interesting associations between 
employee-favouring behaviour in the firms and insider ownership. In terms of Governance 
- Strategy, workers' ownership was generally found to be positively associated with 
welfare provisions, while managers are mostly negatively associated with various forms of 
benefit and training provision for employees. In terms of Strategy - Performance, the 
results are rather mixed and do not permit simple conclusions, although they show 
possible improvement in the overall situation in Russia. The Cost Minimisation strategic 
cluster was found to be negatively associated with insider ownership. In terms of Strategy 
- Performance relations, only the new Human Resource Investment strategy is broadly 
associated with positive performance outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction and Background 
This research analyses Russian industrial firms in the year 2000, and in particular focuses 
on their corporate governance (CG), on their strategies in relation to employee welfare and 
on firm performance. In this context, governancelstrategy1performance studies in the West 
have been constrained by the relatively narrow range of governance structures prevailing. 
In contrast, the former Soviet Union (FSU) provides a rich research environment for 
empirical studies of actual (as opposed to hypothetical) CG, where employees as 
stakeholders in firms often have majority shareholdings. In addition, ownership shares are 
often disclosed in surveys by firms in the FSU in detail unavailable for Western firms. 
CG has succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest to corporations and societies 
in general. However, the concept of CG is usually indistinctly defined, as it potentially 
covers a large number of different economic phenomena. As a result, different researchers 
present diverse definitions that basically reflect their special interests. For instance, 
Goldberg and Desai (1999, p. 42) define the term CG very broadly as "the entire system of 
rewards, sanctions, co-ordination and conflict-resolution mechanisms used to order and 
arbitrate the economic interests of shareholders, lenders, managers and employees". On 
the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) use CG in a narrow, shareholder- 
focused way and state that CG "deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investmenf', and relate CG to 
financial instruments. 
This thesis adopts the broad definition, proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD, 1999): "Corporate governance is the system by 
which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate 
affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance". On this 
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definition, CG is broadly defined in terms of the firm's relationship with stakeholders and 
society, while elsewhere it is narrowly defined as the relationship of a company with its 
shareholders and other suppliers of finance. 
Usually researchers distinguish two broad models of governance - the Anglo-American 
and European models, though Japan may be included in the latter. Anglo-American 
governance is characterised by dispersed ownership based on the liquidity and 
transparency of the stock market, with managerial decisions disciplined indirectly by share 
price movements. In contrast, with European governance, heavy external borrowing is 
combined with direct control and monitoring of investment decisions by lenders and other 
relational shareholders. The latter typically include banks, suppliers and competitors as 
shareholders, all with other relationships with the firms besides their shareholdings. In 
addition, other stakeholders (often without shares) may be represented on boards, e. g. 
employees. 
Such governance variations have to be considered in terms of the prevailing political and 
business environment in each country when particularly being influenced by budget 
constraints, business crises at all levels and especially cross-cultural CG systems. It also 
has to be remembered that after the failure of the FSU with its command-administrative 
economy, system of ministries, life-time employment, extensive social welfare provisions, 
etc., post-1991 Russian enterprises have been heavily involved in corporate restructuring, 
changing the composition of the firm's assets and its corporate strategies at the same time. 
Arguably, the core idea of Russian market reformers and their Western advisers was to 
produce open capital markets, based on the Anglo-American model and a narrow concept 
of CG. 
The give-away nature of the Russian mass privatisation programme (MPP) conveyed most 
property rights to enterprise insiders - managers and workers (Boycko et aL, 1995). In 
former socialist countries, privatisations that convey property rights to insiders are much 
easier to execute from a political point of view, as these programmes become politically 
more acceptable by the public. In this context, post-privatisation Russia's characteristics 
provide an interesting environment where managers and workers, as enterprise 
stakeholders, became major shareholders (Buck et aL, 1998; Frydman et aL, 1996a). In 
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other words, the Russian "giveaway" MPP produced an idiosyncratic form of ownership 
structure of "employee-owned, manager-controlled" firms (Earle and Estrin, 1996), which 
will be examined in more detail in Chapter Il. 
These circumstances raise two main groups of research questions, also discussed in detail 
in Chapter II, and addressed throughout this thesis: (a) as shareholders with an existing 
employee role within the firm, are managers or workers likely to divert shareholder value 
via human resource management (HRM) strategies towards their immediate sources of 
welfare (such as employment stability, wages, multiple social provisions), and, as a result, 
(b) are these strategies associated with stronger or weaker performance? 
In studying the implied Governance - Strategy - Performance relationships underlying 
these questions, this thesis focuses on ownership proportions and legal company forms as 
two governance elements associated with HRM strategy, and ignores the overall company 
strategy or other governance influences, such as technology, etc. It has been argued (Linz, 
1997) that the bulk of Russian manufacturing firms, that were part of the centralised 
("mass") privatisation programme, have physical assets and products that are unsuited to 
global product markets. This implies that labour is the only consistently valuable asset in 
Russian enterprises, what gives a crucial role to HRM strategies as a means of 
maintaining, and hopefully enhancing, this stock of human capital. Thus, this research 
focuses on HRM strategies as a key bundle of strategy parameters, significantly associated 
with firm performance, with implications for the ability of Russian firms to compete 
globally. These strategies in particular include various forms of training, benefits, welfare 
provisions, etc., and ignore more general strategies, such as marketing. The notion of a 
strategic "bundle" refers in this thesis to practices, which are interrelated and internally 
consistent with respect to their impact on performance (MacDuffie, 1995). 
To examine CG and HRM strategies in more detail, Western research is considered 
throughout Chapter III, the Literature Review and Hypotheses. In particular, the Strategic 
Management paradigm (Governance - Strategy - Performance) was adopted and justified 
for this Russian research, and particular HRM strategies, applied mostly in developed 
economies, were combined with strategies that are traditionally-specific for Russia. 
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Methodologically, the theoretical discussion in Chapter III suggests that the two main 
groups of research questions can be investigated using two types of statistical approach. 
The first uses correlation and regression analysis (OLS and LOGIT), while a second 
approach is based on the study of the three strategic HRM bundles, derived from Western 
theory. These bundles follow three broad alternative patterns of HRM strategies, identified 
here as: Traditional Social Wetfare (TSW), Cost Minimisation (CM), and Human Resource 
Investment (HRI). 
We argue that the TSW strategy represents a continuation of initial founders' Soviet-style 
template of the employment relations, and thus, according to the privatisation outcome, 
could be supported by firm insiders, particularly by workers. The resulting performance is 
expected to be strong, though this strategy is recognised as involving short-term costs for 
the company. In contrast with TSW, CM represents a radical strategy for restoring control 
over cash flows via all possible cost reductions. Due to its potentially damaging 
psychological impact on employee welfare, CM is likely to be opposed by employees as 
employees, and consequently would not result in any performance improvements. The last 
considered strategy - HRI - is a high commitment HRM strategy that provides 
investments in employees with guarantees concerning employment stability and insurance 
provisions as a result of high commitments from both sides: the firm and its employees. 
Although it is recognised as "hard" HRM strategy, it is believed that this form of welfare 
provision will be associated with improved performance, achieved though more cost- 
saving strategy than TSW. 
The theoretical discussion, presented in the Literature Review and Hypotheses Chapter, 
identifies important gaps in the literature in relation to the influences of governance on 
HRM strategies, and the consequences of these HRM strategies for firm performance in 
transition economies. We note that there has been no analysis of the inter-relations 
between governance, strategies and performance in Russia. Moreover, the three coherent 
HRM strategies (TSW, CM and HRI), interacting with various forms of share ownership 
inherited from the Russian privatisation programme, provide an extremely interesting 
laboratory for empirical research too. In this sense, the main objective of this thesis is to 
break new ground theoretically and empirically by studying employee welfare strategies in 
post-privatised Russia. It should also be noted that to date there was only one large-sample 
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empirical study by Buck et al. (2003) on the influence of governance forms on HRM 
strategies in the FSU, specifically Ukraine, and another research on Strategy - 
Performance examination of foreign subsidiaries operating in Russia, by Fey and 
Bj6rkman (2001). Our research extends the Buck et al. (2003) and Fey and Bj6rkman 
(2001) analyses by supplementing the Strategy - Performance approach of Fey and 
Bj6rkman (2001) with a consideration of associations between Governance - Strategy - 
Performance on a sample of indigenous industrial Russian firms; and, compared with 
Buck et al. (2003), by studying the most developed State, founded after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (EBRD, 2001), thus allowing to generalise the findings for the two FSU 
States afterwards. In addition, this study uses legal form governance variables, and 
alternative performance measures to the quantitative capacity utilisation and sales per 
employee measures used by Buck et al. (2003). Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) argue the case 
for subjective measures of performance. Our research endorses their view and extends it 
by using negative measures of performance (e. g. perceived bankruptcy threat). 
The choice of HRM practices, bundled together to produpe the three HRM constructs, 
together with relevant statistical models, is presented in Chapter IV on Data and 
Methodology. Besides, as this Chapter's heading suggests, it also presents a discussion of 
the unique sample of data used in this research, survey methodology, and introduces the 
main independent and dependent variables, bundles of clusters, controls, and statistical 
models. The design and application of negative performance indicators, used for the first 
time in this kind of study, are a novel aspect of this research. 
Subsequently, Chapter V on Results and Statistical Inference provides answers to the main 
research questions, examined via statistical testing of the hypothesised associations 
between governance, strategy and performance parameters. Without going into detail of 
these results here, this Chapter summarises the findings, that either support of oppose the 
hypothesised associations. The discussion of these results is provided in greater length in 
the concluding Chapter (Discussion and Future Work). 
Finally, two Appendices - one presenting the questionnaire used for data collection, and 
another, providing details of cluster analysis - close this thesis. 
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Associated Questions. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Two governance systems can be said to have dominated the 201h century - capitalist and 
socialist. The socialist system persisted for quite a long, and still exists to some extent in 
the world's most populous county, China (Kornai, 2000). During this time, the socialist 
system has deeply influenced the realities, society, politics, economy, culture and life of 
people living in these countries. This is particularly true for all the now-independent 
states, created from the fifteen republics comprising the FSU, plus the countries of the 
East-European Socialist Bloc, and other developing economies, previously supported 
heavily but forced by the Soviet Union to implement the Russian model of management. 
Following Kornai (2000), the model of the socialist system is characterised by a dominant 
state and quasi-state ownership, soft budget constraints, weak responsiveness to prices, 
plan bargaining and low quality of goods, a chronic shortage economy with vast state 
subsidies for poorly-performing sectors. In contrast, the capitalist (Western) system is 
characterised by the dominant position of private property, hard budget constraints, and 
strong responsiveness to prices. Countries changing from socialism to capitalism differ 
according to when these changes began, the economic and rational-choice prerequisites, 
and which path the country's economic advisors follow. 
The Russian reform programme had four key elements: the elimination of price controls 
on most goods; the weakening of central planning for the supply, production and 
distribution systems; a focus on balancing the national budget and a start on the 
privatisation of state enterprises (Vlachoutsicos and Lawrence, 1996). With the main focus 
of this thesis on CG in Russian post-privatised firms, and a particular interest in questions 
concerning Governance - Strategy and subsequently Strategy - Performance mechanisms, 
we start this Chapter with a discussion on the History and Outcomes of Russian 
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Privatisation (Section 2.2), which ultimately informs the derivation of research questions 
and hypotheses. 
It will be explained that privatised manufacturing industry in Russia represents a unique 
hybrid in terms of CG, with employees and managers as relational shareholders usually 
holding a majority of shares, but with an increasing proportion held by outsiders. It should 
be remembered however that there remains ambiguity over property rights, illiquidity of 
asset markets, ineffectiveness of bankruptcy laws, together with large shareholdings of 
banks in their role as strategic investors, typical of the European model. To look more 
closely on past studies of international privatisations of state-owned enterprise, Section 2.3 
takes an insight into privatisations and CG models in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Following the discussion on privatisations and their outcomes, Section 2.4 explores 
specific HRM policies, and identifies the most representative model for Russian 
manufacturing industry. This Section introduces a number of models, recognised in the 
Western literature, and argues the relevance of certain models for Russia-focused research. 
Following the discussion on privatisations and their implications for company employees, 
Section 2.5 defines the two main Research Questions which will be examined during this 
study. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 HiSTORY AND OUTCOMES OF RUSSIAN PRIVATISATION 
The literature on privatisation identifies many motives. They include: improving the 
financial performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); raising finances for government 
spending; widening ownership through capital markets; improving service delivery; 
responding to pressures from external agencies (like the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development or the World Bank); replacing central planning with a 
market economy, etc. (De Castro et aL, 1996; Ernst & Young, 1992; Bishop and 
Thompson, 1993). However, in most cases the privatisation of SOEs represents a transfer 
of firm's ownership from the State (government) to private hands (Vickers and Yarrow, 
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1988). This has become an important tool of economic restructuring policies, especially in 
less-developed countries and former socialist regimes. 
The first privatisation of SOEs dates from the policy initiative of the Thatcher 
Government in Britain in the early 1980s, and continued in many Western countries (like 
Japan, West Germany, Canada, etc. ) in subsequent years. In the late 1980s many 
developing countries also made privatisation a part of their reforms (Young, 1987). The 
process continued through the 1990s, accelerated by the collapse of the socialist regimes 
in CEE, with subsequent transition towards free markets (De Castro et aL, 1996). 
Following Estrin and Wright (1999), countries in transition may be divided into two 
groups. The first comprises countries of Central Europe, which have restored GDP and 
productivity growth, brought inflation under control and developed private sectors through 
privatisation. The second group includes much of the FSU's economies, which seldom 
achieved economic growth or control over inflation, and often appeared to have done little 
for enterpriseý restructuring. While the effectiveness and performance of privatised SOEs 
in CEE countries will be addressed in the next Section, this Section pays attention to 
privatisation reforms in the FSU, particularly Russia, in order to establish the theoretical 
basis for the subsequent analysis. 
The Russian voucher mass privatisation programme (MPP), carried out between late 1992 
and 1994 for most manufacturing firms, can be best described as insider privatisation 
which rapidly created the largest sector of insider-owned and controlled enterprises in 
almost any economy. In this period some 122,000 companies that produce up to 40% of 
GDP in Russia changed from State to private hands (Blasi et aL, 1997). According to the 
programme, every Russian citizen was granted a privatisation cheque -a voucher - that 
could be both invested in privatised enterprises at voucher auctions and traded. As a 
matter of fact, voucher privatisations in Eastern Europe and the FSU has attracted the 
greatest interest of researches and practitioners (see Boycko et al., 1994). 
Under the Russian MPP, the State offered three different scheme "variants" of 
privatisation for "large" enterprises - i. e. those with more than 1,000 employees and 
capital assets more than 50 million roubles on I January 1992. With the first variant, 
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employees were granted 25% of total shares and were also allowed to buy up to 10% of 
equity shares on preferential terms. Senior managers were granted 5% of equity, 29% was 
sold at voucher auctions and the remaining 31% remained in State hands, with a 
possibility of subsequent auction sales. With the third variant of MPP, 20% of equity 
shares were sold tý) those employees who took responsibility for enterprise restructuring. 
Another 20% were sold to all employees on preferential terms (at book value), 29% were 
sold at voucher auctions and the rest (31%) remained in State hands for subsequent 
auction. However, in most cases employees chose the second variant, giving them 51% of 
the shares on highly preferential terms (Blasi et al., 1997; Boycko et al., 1995). Only 29% 
of the capital of privatised companies was sold at voucher auctions, where employees and 
managers could increase their holdings up to 65% in 1994 (Blasi et al., 1997). Remaining 
shares were retained by the State for subsequent auction. 
Nevertheless, outside investors in the form of investment funds collected some of the 
vouchers and obtained 5.7% of the shares of privatised enterprises (Frydman et al., 
1996b). However, the regulation of voucher investment funds was generally weak, with 
low capital requirements, and no obligations for individuals to have financial 
qualifications and licences, so around 80% of 630 investment funds registered by 1994 
were reported to belong to chief directors or managers of recently privatised enterprises. In 
subsequent years the shares left with the State were partially sold in auctions, mostly to 
management-affiliated companies or outside blockholders (Golubkov, 1999). 
The choice of privatisation variant had to be approved by employees before I October 
1992 by a simple 2/3d' majority vote otherwise the first method was automatically 
applied. For small enterprises (with less than 200 employees or capital assets less than I 
million roubles) there was only one scheme of privatisation - sale at voucher or share 
auctions. All other enterprises that could not be identified as either large or small were 
able to choose between the three MPP variants and auction sale. Thus, 75% of large 
enterprises were privatised by the second variant of MPP, 24% by the first and only 1% by 
the third (Golubkov, 1999). 
Also a lease-buyout method under the provision of the 1989 legislation was used outside 
the MPP. Leasing accounted for 25% of completed privatisations between 1993 and 1995 
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(Earle and Estrin, 1996). In this case, firms' assets, leased in 1990-1992, were acquired by 
employees at book value, and, as a result, insider ownership from the lease-buyout method 
was even higher than from the three MPP variants (Sprenger, 2002). Filatotchev et aL 
(1994) have criticised the ethics of redistribution through management buyouts. The 
authors argue that in buyouts of privatised SOEs, managers tended to receive all the rights 
of private entrepreneurs without many of the responsibilities, including the absence of a 
significant possibility of failure. Besides, the authors further argue that voucher schemes 
present problems involving the "divorce" of ownership and control in firms with 
diversified ownership, and that income redistribution in favour of managers and workers 
represents a huge expense for society. However, the Government did nothing to control 
the process (Black et aL, 2000). 
The privatisation of nationally "strategic" firms from the military complex, transport, 
utilities, mineral extraction, oil, gas, telecommunications industries, etc. followed a 
different scenario, though a few primary producers were partly included in voucher 
privatisation. Among the most scandalous and criticised takeovers of the strategic 
enterprises was a loans-for-share scheme, elaborated and implemented by one of former 
Government vice premiers. By this scheme, five of the largest oil companies, monopolistic 
nickel producer Norilsk Nickel, and two metallurgy giants changed from State hands to 
private between 1995 and 1997, being firstly sold as part of a loans-for-share scheme with 
subsequent transfer of shares to affiliated commercial banks, as a guarantee for loans to 
the State budget. Once the Government defaulted on the loans later, the same banks 
bought these shares in non-transparent and poorly contested auctions (Johnson, 1997; 
Sprenger, 2002). However, the State still has controlling shares in many of the nationally 
44strategic" firms, like Unified Energy Systems or Gazprom (bundled into holding 
companies after the 1995-1997 privatisations), and in the defence-orientated industries. 
Generally speaking, privatisation programs that convey property rights to enterprise 
insiders are much easier to execute from a political point of view, and in almost all 
transition economies, preferential treatment has been given to managers and workers in 
privatised enterprises to make these programs politically more acceptable. However, the 
resulting ownership proportions are difficult to calculate, at least in Russia. Offshore firms 
and holding companies provide vast opportunities for share dilution (accompanied by 
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extensive tax evasion), so it is almost impossible to identify both actual owners of the 
fiMs and the levels of profits. Nevertheless, Russian privatisation has favoured "insiders" 
(Boycko et aL, 1995), i. e. private ownership has mainly settled in the hands of managers 
and workers, or both. The term "insider ownership" applies to individuals or entities that 
own 10% or more of a company's shares. In this work, managers and workers together 
will be referred to as insiders, thus denoting that both types of owners are included, and 
the terms "worker" or "employee" will denote workers only. 
Table I surnmarises available data on the distribution of ownership shares in Russian 
enterprises for a number of years. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the Ownership Structures (%) of Russian Industry 
(Various Surveys) 
Ownership Structures 
World Bank 
Survey 1 
(1994) 
Nottingham 
Survey 2 
(1995/1996) 
Blasi " 
(1996) 
Russian 
Economic 
Barometer 
Survey 4 
(1997) 
INSIDERS 66.1 59.6 58 52.1 
" Managers 19.6 14.0 18 15.1 
" Workers 46.2 45.6 40 37.0 
OUTSIDERS 18.9 29.3 32.1 38.8 
" Individuals 5.9 6.5 6 13.9 
" Non-Financial Firms 6.7 10.3 15.3 14.6 
" Banks 1.0 1.5 1.6 0.9 
" Investment Funds 4.5 4.6 5 4.3 
" Foreigners 0.4 1.0 1.6 1.8 
" Holding/Investment 
Companies - 
5.4 2.6 3.3 
STA TE 15.0 9.3 9 7.4 
OTHERS - 1.8 0.9 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Sample Size 235 314 357 135 
Data sources: 1 Earle and Estrin (1996); 2 Filatotchev et aL (1999); 3 Blasi et aL 
(1997); 4 Aukutsionek et aL (1998) 
According to the first - World Bank (1994) - survey, insider holdings after privatisation 
were as high as 66.1 % of shares, divided between workers with 46.2% and managers with 
19.6%, while all outsiders held only 18.9% of shares. In subsequent years, insiders' 
shareholdings decreased, as also did the State ownership. On the other hand, outsiders' 
ownership almost doubled within 1993-1997, and still continues to grow. 
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Among Russian insiders, managers are arguably the most powerful group, with their own 
share ownership and almost unlimited opportunities for hidden actions. Such hidden 
actions can include share dilution, self-dealing transactions in the form of asset stripping 
and transfer pricing, ability to pursue pet projects, delayed dividend payments, hiding of 
cash-flows from minority shareholders, workers, creditors, tax authorities and local 
governments, etc. If managers are linked to large stakeholders, they often use their power 
to expropriate minority shareholders, especially workers, who have more control over 
operational, work-related issues, than over strategic matter, and never reach a level of joint 
decision-making. Thus, managers are able to threaten workers with dismissals, decline in 
wages, cuts in the use of social facilities, etc., and may establish barriers to the selling of 
shares to outsiders (Sprenger, 2002). 
The distinguishing feature of the Russian companies after the privatisation, that conveyed 
property rights to the insiders, was a large number of small owners. These owners, i. e. the 
shareholders, even though they have (ultimate) residual control rights in the form of votes, 
were too small and numerous to exercise this control on a day-to-day basis (Berle and 
Means, 1932). Therefore, they delegated day-to-day control to a board of directors 
(Filatotchev et aL, 1996a). In ideal circumstances, this board of directors would provide a 
check on management, ostensibly elected by shareholders to protect their interests. In 
some extreme cases, when shareholders are about to exhaust their trust to the managers, 
the board may replace the chief executive of the firm, or any other member of the 
management team (Hart, 1995). 
44 
However in the case of Russia, evidence suggests that although employees may have 
significant equity stakes, their involvement in boards of directors and other control 
mechanisms is generally very low (Filatotchev et al., 1996a). Thus, the introduction of 
different fonns of ownership and boards of directors has essentially delegated all control 
to managers. This has separated control and ownership and made workers representatives 
on boards rare or ineffective (Blasi and Shleifer, 1996). The resulting companies have 
been described as "employee-owned, manager-controlled" companies (Earle and Estrin, 
1996), and the impact of employee ownership on strategic decisions may be weaker than 
expected from ownership proportions, since it is important to recognise and distinguish the 
difference between ownership and control. Nevertheless, managers are likely to be 
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influenced by employees to some extent, and this influence can be expected to vary with 
their holdings of shares. 
The recent collapse of the FSU and the massive scale of Russia's indebtedness to the West 
arguably led to the "occupation" of Russia by Western creditors and economic advisors. 
These creditors were able to demand the most drastic political and economic changes, 
many reflecting US institutions of political democracy, company laws, capital markets and 
price liberalisation. Some of these regulatory changes, made partly under some Western 
influence and partly under the "new market economy" focus of the Government, had only 
temporal, weak or insignificant effect, and some had insidious and long term ones. Among 
these important and long term effects was foreign ownership in Russian enterprises, which 
accounted for 0.4% in 1904 (World Bank Survey), 1.0% in 1995 (Nottingham Survey), 
1.6% in 1996 (Blasi) and 1.8% in 1997 (Russian Economic Barometer Survey). Although 
these levels may seem negligible (in comparison with the total of insiders' or outsiders' 
ownership for example), it has to be remembered that foreign ownership last existed 
before 1917. 
Besides providing a weak regulatory environment for capital markets and share dealing, 
the generally weak role of the State as the outside owner within Russian privatised firms 
should be noted more specifically. Any State representatives on company boards are 
usually non-professionals and exercise little control. As shareholders, local governments 
take a position somewhere between insiders and outsiders, and are often very close to the 
management of the enterprises, providing some support to their decisions (Sprenger, 
2002). Although usually the objectives of the State are not clearly identified, one of their 
main interests, however, is focused on the provision of public goods (e. g. social facilities) 
(Fox and Heller, 1999). 
Initial ownership in many cases was not necessarily the most efficient one, because among 
the goals of privatisation program in Russia was a goal to complete privatisation quickly, 
so that all imperfections would be later corrected on secondary markets. 
Since privatisation, workers' ownership has declined from 46.2% in 1994 to 31.5% in 
1999, but still remains at a high level, while total outside ownership has increased from 
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18.9% to 42.4% (Kapelyushnikov, 2000). During the survey, conducted in 1999, 
ownership proportions for the year 2000 were predicted to reach 45.5% for insiders (with 
18.2% hold by managers and 27.2% by workers), 44.9% for outsiders and drop down to 
6.4% for the State. So, any expectations of a quick and dramatic sell-off by employees to 
outsiders, such as occurred for example in Japan in the post-war period (Aoki and Kim, 
1995), did not occur. Nonetheless, Table 2 shows that insider ownership in Russia is 
falling over time, albeit slowly. Shifts in the ownership distribution have led to a gain in 
outside ownership, while workers and the State have lost. 
Table 2. Estimated Ownership Distribution in Russian Industry, (%) 
Ownership Structures 1995 1997 1999 20011 
INSIDERS 54.8 52.1 46.2 45.5 
" Managers 11.2 15.1 14.7 18.2 
" Workers 43.6 37.0 31.5 27.2 
OUTSIDERS 35.2 38.8 42.4 44.9 
" Non-Financial Outsiders 25.9 28.5 32.0 31.9 
- Individuals 10.9 13.9 18.5 16.9 
- Non-Financial Firms 15.0 14.6 13.5 13.5 
" Financial Outsiders 9.3 10.3 10.4 13.0 
STATE 9.1 7.4 7.1 6.4 
OTHERS 0.9 1.6 4.3 3.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Sample Size 136 135 156 94 
Data source: Russian Economic Barometer, 1995-1999 Surveys (Kapelyushnikov, 
2000); 1 anticipated ownership during the 1999 survey. 
According to Boycko et aL (1995), Russian privatisation has favoured insiders. This 
contrasts with some of the CEE countries (e. g. East Germany and Hungary), where direct 
sales and voucher privatisations to outside owners were predominant (De Castro et al., 
1996; EBRD, 1998; Estrin, 1994). Most analysts argue that the introduction of powerful 
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outside owners in Russia would have a positive influence upon enterprise CG, 
performance and restructuring (Earle and Estrin, 1997). In particular, this improvement is 
supposed to occur through improved monitoring of insiders, particularly of managers. 
However, despite all shifts in ownership within last years, it is clear that, on average, 
insiders are majority owners of Russian privatised manufacturing enterprises, where 
managers alone hold around the fifth of shares. Thus, the role of outside owners in insider- 
controlled firms may pose difficulties (Wright et aL, 1998a). 
At the same time, outside owners brought new rules. In the Soviet era, firms (with no 
outside investors or owners) had many difficulties laying off workers, even for 
disciplinary reasons, but since transition began, this process has become easier. Now a 
reason for layoff could be a low skill level, low productivity or a disciplinary violation, 
although (Hoskisson et al., 1994, p. 1207) "-strategically laying off employees during 
times of economic stress" has also to be considered. Workers with low productivity or low 
skill levels could be easily replaced from the pool of unemployed. Among those who 
quitted voluntarily were typically those with the highest skills, who could receive 
significantly higher wages in the private sector. Mass layoffs occurred in the areas of 
technical support, in the social benefits sphere and in administration. It is therefore not 
surprising that among the unemployed are either the least productive workers or those 
with skills that are not in demand (Brown, 1998). 
According to different surveys (Commander et aL, 1996; Dornbusch and Fisher, 1990; 
Russian Economic Barometer, 1996) managers often retain excess labour in the old Soviet 
style, hoping for an increase in demand and output. This seemed reasonable because firms 
could hoard workers since the expected costs of hiring replacement workers exceeded the 
benefit of layoffs. If firms released excess productive workers, then the cost of hiring 
productive workers from the pool of unemployed could fall to the level where releasing 
excess productive workers would be profitable, but unless hiring costs are generally high, 
firms could dismiss workers and hire them later, once production recovers (Brown, 1998). 
Also it is recognised that employees with general-purpose skills and knowledge can leave 
the firm and be replaced without productive loss to either the worker or the finn (if 
efficient labour markets exist). Alternatively, employees with skills that are uniquely 
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tailored (specialised) to the requirements of the particular firm cannot leave without 
bearing substantial exit costs, and this fact often also stops managers from making mass 
layoffs. 
Due to the high risk associated with a job change, most workers may now prefer to receive 
a lower wage paid reliably than to receive a higher wage from a firm whose stability is 
less clear (Brown, 1998). According to Morvant (1995), workers were owed eight trillion 
roubles ($1.8 billion) in unpaid wages. Any delay in payment together with double-digit 
inflation significantly reduces the real value of wages, and therefore workers may have 
looked for high risk premia during job change or preferred to stay with an old employer. 
Employee ownership may therefore encourage excess labour retention and could be 
associated with workers' reluctance to shed labour. Since workers are relational 
shareholders, some conflict of interest may be expected, and may extend beyond labour 
retention to higher wages and to the social welfare policies of the finn in general. But 
workers in Russia often have little bargaining power and influence over wage and 
employment decisions (despite their dominant share ownership of the firm) and may 
accept cuts in real wages in just exchange for fewer layoffs (Wright el aL, 1998b). 
Besides, managers may wish to support many workers substantially, because firms with 
larger employment are more likely to receive State subsidies, so State support may be a 
powerful incentive for managers to promote employees' interests. However, high levels of 
labour hoarding and associated difficulties with accessing capital, slow restructuring, low 
levels of investment, etc. imply that one of the strategies to improve performance and find 
the way out of "business turnaround" situation could be cost-cutting and enterprise 
downsizing (in the short-term at least) (Filatotchev et aL, 2000). 
This conclusion of Filatotchev et aL (2000) corresponds with a "hard" human resource 
management (HRM) strategy, identified in the Western literature as Cost Minimisation 
(CM) (Baron et aL, 1996; Beer and Nohria, 2000; Hannan et aL, 1996). This specific 
HRM strategy is characterised by extensive hiring/firing, instead of labour retention, with 
the aim to improve performance through cost reduction (Luthans and Sommer, 1999), to 
be described in Section 2.4 below, and then thoroughly examined in Chapter III of this 
thesis, together with two alternative HRM strategies. Here, we would only like to stress 
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that although CM could be introduced as the starting point for restructuring, employees (in 
their roles as employees rather than as shareholders) may feel that they will personally 
suffer from this strategy, and thus oppose it. 
It was noted above, that the radical, CM strategy is recognised by Western theorists and 
practitioners, and was applied in a number of countries of the former CEE Socialist Bloc. 
The next Section provides a discussion of privatisation outcomes in a number of transition 
economies with some comparisons with Russia and the FSU countries. 
2.3 OUTCOMES OF PRIVATISATIONS IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
With the end of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and transformation of 
the regions' economies, governments there began privatisation of SOEs in large numbers 
(Meyer, 2002; Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 2000). One of the major objectives of economic 
reforms in these countries was to increase the efficiency of production of formerly 
centrally-planned enterprises, making the output competitive on world markets 
(Filatotchev et al., 2000). The reality, however, was different. Price liberalisation and the 
elimination of State control and central planning resulted in deep economic recession, 
accompanied by substantial investment declines in most of the countries, although 
theoretical perspectives of price liberalisation were quite the opposite (Blanchard et al., 
1993; Fisher and Gleb, 1991; Sachs, 1993). 
Many CEE governments (such as Poland, the Czech Republic, etc. ) opted to privatise their 
firms through the use of mass equity distribution among its employees, thus minimising 
social impact and public dissonance. However, one of the key issues in effective CG is the 
centralisation of ownership in outside hands. Thus, countries like East Germany and 
Hungary focused on wealth creation by selling SOEs to private investors, seen to be most 
likely to transform these enterprises into strong competitors (De Castro et aL, 1996; 
Freudenberg and Bird, 1991). 
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There is much evidence that firms from different countries tend to follow distinctive 
strategies, forced mostly by national institutional environments, which often predetermine 
strategic opportunities for business and limit the applicability of Western business 
strategies and organisational concepts (Erramilli, 1996; Hoskisson et aL, 2000; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Peng, 2000). This implies that strategies 
observed in transition economies are different from those in developed economies. 
Moreover, successful adaptation in one country does not necessarily imply that this 
strategy will be equally successful in another country or environment (Brewster, 2002). 
Leaving a discussion of cultural differences beyond the research interests of this study, we 
nevertheless could provide a number of examples in support of the above statement. For 
instance, when organising country-specific aid programmes for developing economies, 
such powerful organisations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) acknowledge the differences 
among countries (Licht, 2001). By doing this, these organisations try to prevent the 
implementation of a unique CG model worldwide, although they do not provide any 
guidance to how to distinguish country-specific environments - Russian versus Central 
European for example. 
However, it was noted that properties of the old socialist system in modem CEE 
economies compare interestingly with Russia's characteristics, and echoes of the old 
system remain. In other words, "mentally" cultivated Soviet managerial practices and 
attitudes still exist to a considerable degree in many of CEE countries (Aguilar et aL, 
1994) together with Soviet institutional embeddedness and strategic inertia (Gooderham et 
aL, 1999). For instance, in Hungary, which pioneered the market reforms in countries of 
the former Socialist Bloc, and where the transformation of state property to private hands 
has been achieved through a mass privatisation program (Stark, 2001; Stark and Bruszt, 
1998), privately-owned firms still resemble the ministerial structures of former central 
planning system, with many of the old enterprise policies left (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). 
After more than a decade in transition, Russia's economic performance is still 
disappointing when compared with such leading CEE economies as Poland, Hungary or 
the Czech Republic (Bevan et aL, 2001). In particular, the authors stress the lagging of 
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such major indicators of economic performance as life expectancy, enterprise 
restructuring, labour productivity, stabilisation of inflation and GDP growth. However, the 
economic and strategic implications of ownership changes and resulting performance are 
often still not clear, and there remains a considerable debate on the effects of privatisation 
on enterprise restructuring and performance that make such cross-country comparisons 
rather unreliable, if not misleading. For example, in a study of 61 companies from 18 
countries (6 developing and 13 industrialised), privatised through initial public offerings, 
Megginson et aL (1994) show that most companies experienced increases in employment 
and sales after privatisation. In a later study of 85 full or partially privatised companies 
from 28 countries (13 developing and 15 industrialised) D'Souza and Megginson (1999) 
also show significant increases in profitability, real sales, operating efficiency and 
dividend payments. However, these studies were mostly based on enterprises from the 
financial sector (with only 30% manufacturing firms), and did not include any FSU firms, 
where public offerings of new shares were generally infeasible. Besides, among the 
enterprises studied, more than a third still had the State as a major shareholder, which 
could imply either hidden or open subsidisation (Filatotchev et aL, 2000). Thus, 
Megginson with his colleagues arguably gave misleading impressions of the impacts of 
privatisation in some transition economies (Filatotchev et aL, 2000). 
Among other studies on privatisations in transition is Claessens et aL (1997), examining 
the cross-sectional determinants of performance improvements during 1992-1995 in a 
sample of 706 Czech firms involved in mass privatisation, 1991-1992. Using Tobin's Q1 
measure, the authors conclude that privatised firms do prosper, primarily because of 
concentrated ownership. Frydman et aL (1998,1999) compare the performance of the 
Czech, Hungarian and Polish firins in a sample of 128 privatised and 90 state firms in the 
period between 1990 and 1993. The authors find that while average performance has 
increased after privatisation, the most significant increases in revenues and productivity 
occurred in firms privatised to outside owners. In addition, Pohl et aL (1997) compare the 
degree of restructuring achieved by over 6,300 state-owned and private enterprises in 
1 Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm's assets (as measured by the market value of its 
outstanding stock and debt) to the replacement cost of the firm's assets (Tobin, 1969). 
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seven CEE economies during 1992-1995, and conclude that privatisation increases the 
probability of restructuring and the probability of its success. 
Spenner et aL (1998) researched Bulgarian SOEs. It is known, that Bulgaria resembled a 
smaller version of the Soviet economy during the Communist era, with almost a complete 
lack of political pluralism (Lampe, 1986). The first gradual Government reforms in 1990 
were widely judged as a complete failure. The next - February 1991 "shock-therapy" 
reforin, directed by the IMF and World Bank - included price liberalisation, trade policy 
refonn, income policy reform, and fiscal and monetary policy reform. By 1993 this 
"shock-therapy" resulted in State crisis, substantial GDP decline, outstanding inflation and 
substantial unemployment - all major problems that Russia has been also faced with 
during the first years of privatisation. After examining the factors affecting the 
performance of Bulgarian SOEs during transition, Spenner et aL (1998) concluded that: 
(a) changes that had a market impact on performance were harmful if they involved core 
organisational changes, but, at the same time, (b) performance was significantly improving 
when these changes were consistent with environmental demands and did not require the 
development of new competencies and routines. 
De Castro and Uhlenbruck (1997) examined how country characteristics affect 
governance and, in turn, firm strategy. More precisely, the authors studied 467 worldwide 
privatised firms in 1989-1992 with a particular interest in whether different country 
environments affect government approaches to privatisation, and whether country 
characteristics affect firm strategies. The findings suggest that there are differences for 
former Communist, less-developed and developed countries, and it is not possible to 
thoroughly generalise Western concepts across countries. 
These results for CEE countries support the views of Erramilli, 1996; Hoskisson et A, 
2000; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; and Peng, 2000, that firms 
from different countries tend to achieve different results (when applying distinctive 
strategies), caused mostly by different national institutional environments and limited 
ability to implement a unique CG model, even within Europe. Nevertheless, despite some 
ambiguity, in CEE there is evidence that the transformation of property rights away from 
the State to private hands results in shifts in performance, although often the origins of 
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these shifts are rather unclear. Thus, it has to be remembered that there are no universal 
solutions and ways out of "business turnaround" situations, and all restructuring policies 
and strategies have to be applied cautiously, taking into account country-specific 
environments and traditions. 
This conclusion particularly applies to HRM strategies. 
2.4 INTERNATIONAL AND RuSSIAN HRM STRATEGIES 
A number of studies have described substantial differences in organisational structure, 
management and human resource policies between Western economies, CEE countries of 
the former Socialist Bloc, and Russia and the FSU (Filatotchev et al., 1996; Uhlenbruck 
and De Castro, 2000). 
Each country offers local idiosyncrasies in ways HRM is conducted. For example, 
American firms behave systematically differently from German or Japanese firms even 
though they compete on common global markets. The development of HRM strategies in 
the USA tends to be based on American individualism (Brewster, 1995,2002; Guest, 
1990), therefore, the US strategies do not thoroughly match the European or Russian 
reality. 
A number of attempts have been made to identify country groupings within Europe. 
Gooderham et aL (1999) distinguish countries where the State has a limited role in 
industrial relations - UK, Ireland, Nordic countries, and countries where the State plays a 
key role in industrial relations - Roman-Germanic countries like Spain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Greece. Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) focus on the 
presence/absence of communitarian infrastructures in the form of trust, reciprocity, strong 
social bonds and co-operation among economic actors, essential for successful production. 
The role of country-specific factors in HRM strategy were recognised by Porter (1990), 
arguing that the host county's environment is the main source of comPetitive advantage. 
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Later, Nelson (1993) and Soskice (1997) identified elements of countries' national 
innovation systems that assisted this process. Subsequently, many studies of differences 
across HRM strategies have used Hofstede's (1980,1993) five cultural dimensions, that 
can be adopted here to examine the fit between Russian and Western HRM policies. 
Hofstede's (199 1) five dimensions in Russia show high power distance, high uncertainty 
avoidance, high collectivism, high femininity and high short-term orientation (Elenkov, 
1998, Puffer and Shekshnia, 1996). Summarising Hofstede (1980), power distance 
indicates the extent to which society accepts that power in organisations and institutions is 
distributed unequally; uncertainty avoidance indicates the extent to which people feel 
threatened by uncertain and ambiguous situations; collectivism refers to a tight social 
framework where people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups, expecting their 
in-group (a firm, network or relatives) to look after them in exchange for loyalty to the 
group; andjemininity refers to the value of caring for others, quality of life, and people. 
In contrast with Russia, the United States has been characterised as having low power 
distance, low uncertainty avoidance, high individualism, high masculinity, and high short- 
term orientation (Hofstede, 1993), where individualism refers to people taking care of 
themselves and their families only (as opposed to collectivism), and masculinity refers to 
the extent to which assertiveness, money and things have dominant values for people 
(Hofstede, 1980). 
These estimates of how Russia might rank on each cultural dimension and compare with 
the USA were later generally confirmed by Hofstede's (2003) recent estimates. These 
national cultural features may be argued to impact on national institutions and corporate 
strategies. 
The strategic FIRM literature generally supports the view that each firm should follow the 
type of the strategy that aligns with the primary business strategy (Sonnenfeld and Peiperl, 
1988). According to an institutionalist perspective, organisational choice is limited by 
institutional pressure, including State and regulatory structures, interest groups, public 
opinions and norms (Oliver, 1991). Of course, the old FSU system involved various 
ministries mixed with regional authorities and top ("Soviet-style") firms' management 
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represented one of the most hierarchical and concrete forms of vertical control. This strict 
system of centrally-imposed vertical control in the FSU was also accompanied by 
Communist ethics, controlled by the Party leaders at all levels. Russia, as the main 
descendant of the FSU, is also generally viewed as a country that traditionally emphasises 
values of solidarity and close personal relationships (Elenkov, 1998; Stark and Bruszt, 
1998), and where institutions seek to create security to reduce risks (Bollinger, 1994). This 
system may be expected to resist any attempts at reform in large industrial firms (Kornai, 
2000), placing high priority on protecting past results rather than on taking risks in an 
uncertain future. 
Labour management in the FSU was politically manipulated on a wide scale (Bendix, 
1956) so official unemployment almost never existed and production levels were high. In 
particular, trade unions together with labour management were supporting all central 
HRM policies, which included tight work norms and subsequent individual performance 
payments, amounting to an extreme form of Taylorism, itself a variant on what has 
become known as the Factory Model in the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies 
(SPEC) literature (Baron et al., 1996), discusses thoroughly in Section 3.3. 
It has already been noted that Russia has generally been identified as having a national 
culture exhibiting high levels of collectivism (Elenkov, 1998), and thus a majority of firm- 
level social welfare provisions amounted to "high commitment" HRM policies Thus, 
employment relationships were effectively based on lifetime employment and enterprises 
provided many of the social needs of both current and retired employees. The range of 
these benefits and other Soviet-style HRM provisions will be described below, and is 
referred to here as a Traditional Social Weýfare (TSW) strategy. Here it should be noted 
that this TSW strategy corresponds with the paternalistic HR strategy in some British 
industrial firms in the I 9th Century, but which has by now become a rather unfashionable 
business strategy in the West (Wray, 1996). Today, TSW slowly becomes old-fashioned 
for Russia too, where many of joint ventures of Western investors do not provide 
traditional Soviet-style welfare provisions for employees, mainly because firms cannot 
afford this costly form of HR commitment. However in some CEE economies (e. g. 
Bulgaria) TSW still exists, providing employees with job security and signalling a long- 
standing commitment to their workforce (Spenner et al., 1998). 
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Of course, high-commitment work practices and social welfare provisions are also a 
feature of many Asian, especially Japanese, firms, though it is unclear whether the 
resulting system on balance benefits employees or exploits them. For example, Japanese 
HRM has been praised as comprising paternalistic, non-calculative, team-based relations 
(Gooderham et al., 1998), while elsewhere an allegedly darker side to lean production, 
continuous improvement, quality circles, etc, has been identified (Legge, 1995). 
Following the outcome of the Russian MPP, that conveyed most property rights to 
enterprise insiders, and taking into account the fact that paternalism towards workers was 
generally a consistent feature of enterprise behaviour in the context of the FSU, we will be 
considering non-Western Traditional Social Welfare as one of the main HRM strategies 
for Russian post-privatised privately-owned industrial firms, related to enterprise 
wellbeing in Russia, and resulting in improved performance. (It must also be remembered 
that substantial welfare provisions to company employees also implies costs for 
shareholders. ) 
At the same time, Western literature in nowadays is concentrated on HRM strategies, 
different from those described by the Factory Model or corresponding to the TSW 
template. The question of identification of these specific HRM practices confronts most 
Western HRM research, including studies by Baron et al. (1996,1999), Hannan et al. 
(1996), MacDuffie (1995), Osterman (1999,2000), Spenner et al. (1998), etc. Besides the 
Factory Model explained already, these authors also introduce the Autocracy, 
Bureaucrac , Commitment, Engineering and 
Star Models (see Section 3.3 for a formal y 
description of these models). Some of them are quite distinctive in presenting business 
strategies and the resulting methods of employee relations, others are much alike. 
A discussion below (see Section 3.3) provides a comparison between the models, 
presented by Baron et aL (1996,1999), Hannan et aL (1996), MacDuffie (1995), 
Osterman (1999,2000), and Spenner et aL (1998), and others used in the FSU, for 
example, by Buck et aL (2003) or Fey and Bj6rkman (2001). As a result of this discussion, 
two other distinctive HRM strategic models - Cost Minimisation (CM) and Human 
Resource Investment (HRI) - have been chosen to represent the key HRM strategies for 
this Governance - Strategy - Performance study of Russian enterprises. 
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The CM strategy has been already briefly introduced in Section 2.2 above as radical 
("hard") HRM strategy, departing most decisively from the antecedent traditional Soviet- 
style TSW , and designed to improve performance through cost reduction (Luthans and 
Sommer, 1999). Besides the Autocracy or Bureaucracy Models (Baron et al., 1999) and 
the Factory Model (Baron et al., 1996; Hannan et al., 1996), Western literature also 
identifies a CM strategy as "Theory E" (Beer and Nohria, 2000). Following these authors, 
CM is common among restructuring US companies (in particular, it was examined in high 
technology US firms), where it is focused on the maximisation of shareholder value and is 
achieved through financial incentives mostly. 
For Russian national culture and philosophy, this strategy is fairly likely to result in 
reduced performance as it does not resemble established views on welfare provision, and 
thus considered by company employees to be damaging. As shareholders, employees 
could win, but as employees they are more likely to lose, as found to be in Ukraine (Buck 
et A, 2003). 
The third recognised HRM strategy for Russia is Human Resource Investment, which 
itself is quite different to TSW, but, as opposed to CM, involves high commitment 
investments in employees with the purpose of raising performance and productivity in an 
attempt to establish a "psychological contract" between workers and their firms (Guest, 
1998). This HRM strategy is identified by Baron et al. (1996,1999), Hannan et al. (1996), 
MacDuffie (1995), Osterman (1999,2000) as the high Commitment Model, or as "Theory 
0" by Beer and Nohria (2000). 
According to HRI, employees are provided with informal guarantees concerning 
employment stability, training, education, provision of benefits in exchange for their 
commitment to the enterprises, i. e. pay as fair exchange. While the social contracts theory 
of business ethics, proposed by Donaldson and Dunfee (1994), recognises the difference 
between cultures accepting corporate paternalism (like Russian) and cultures with highly 
individualistic, non-paternalistic beliefs (e. g. American), recent studies by Buck et aL 
(2003) and Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) empirically support the theoretical expectation of 
strong efficiency gains from high-commitment "psychological contracts" for enterprise 
performance, and suggest that, although being recognised as a Western HR strategy, HRI 
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could result in productivity, quality and perfonnance gains in post-privatised enterprises of 
the FSU. 
High-involvement HRM strategies (like HRI) start with management philosophies and 
core values that emphasise the significance of employees as a source of competitive 
advantage (Bae and Lawler, 2000). To develop this resource, close cooperation between 
Russian managers and other enterprise employees is needed. As was noted in Section 2.2, 
to large extent this closeness was itself reflected in the 1992 privatisation schemes of the 
Russian Government, which gave priority to workers' rights of ownership and 
representation (Blasi and Kruse, 1992). 
This suggests two main sets of research questions, one that addresses Governance - 
Strategy relations, and another that is concerned with whether the strategies chosen are 
indeed associated with costs or benefits in terms of performance outcomes. To examine 
these relations, the next Section addresses the Research Questions. 
2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The above discussion presented an introduction to privatisation in Russia, and in some 
FSU and Central and East-European countries. It was noted that, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, a Russian mass privatisation programme (MPP) using vouchers, carried out 
for most manufacturing firms between 1992 and 1994, produced an idiosyncratic form of 
ownership structure of "employee-owned, manager-controlled" firins (Earle and Estrin, 
1996). This outcome to large extent resulted from the give-away nature of the MPP, which 
conveyed most property rights to enterprise insiders - managers and workers (Boycko et 
aL, 1995). The reason why the Russian Government decided to distribute State property 
through equity allocation among its employees was more politically rather than 
economically driven. 
Some of the CEE economies also followed this path of equity distribution during their 
SOE privatisations (e. g. Poland or the Czech Republic). Other countries (like East 
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Germany or Hungary) focused on wealth-creating methods of privatisation, and started 
selling their SOEs to potential outside investors (De Castro et aL, 1996; EBRD, 1998; 
Estrin, 1994; Freudenberg and Bird, 1991). They recognised that privatisation to outsiders 
represented opportunities to achieve increases in revenues and productivity, as it has 
occurred in Czech, Hungarian and Polish privatised firms (Frydman et aL, 1998,1999). 
For Russia, most analysts also argue that the introduction of powerful outside owners 
could have a positive influence upon enterprise CG, performance and restructuring (Earle 
and Estrin, 1997). However, it has to be remembered that one of the initial goals was to 
complete privatisation quickly, so that all imperfections would be later corrected on 
secondary markets: recent changes in ownership proportions suggest (see Tables I and 2), 
that total outside ownership was increasing during recent years, while the total of insiders' 
has declined (though, at the same time, managers' shareholdings were increasing) 
(Kapelyushnikov, 2000). 
It was noted that strategies in transition economies vary a lot, being often heavily 
influenced by a need for social legitimacy; diverse national cultures and business systems; 
institutional and legislative factors; managerial development and career structures, the 
degree of competence of HR specialists, etc. While outside shareholders may usually be 
expected to promote strategies that raise shareholder value and nothing else, other 
stakeholders may introduce their own influences. For example, workers may seek higher 
wages, job security, social benefits, etc. (in their roles as employees rather than as 
shareholders), and managers may want income stability, continued employment, personal 
aggrandisement, growth of the firm, support in their political activities, etc. (possibly at 
the expense of shareholder value). 
Among other studies on possible forms of association between governance, strategies, and 
performance in the FSU, CEE and other transition economies, this thesis extends the 
singular Russian Strategy - Performance analysis of Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), with a 
consideration of the associations between CG - in the form of corporate ownership 
structures and legal company forms - and different HRM strategies. In particular, by 
addressing Governance - Strategy relations in Russian "employee-owned, manager- 
controlled" post-privatised firms, we are interested if the opportunistic concerns of 
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employee-owners prevail over shareholder value, i. e. do employees influence strategies 
concerning employee welfare and divert shareholder value towards their own immediate 
sources of welfare as employees? Subsequently, another concern of this study is 
represented by the second research question on whether the chosen strategies are indeed 
associated with costs or benefits in terms of performance outcomes, i. e. with stronger or 
weaker performance. 
To summarise, the two main groups of research questions will be addressed concerning: 
(a) Governance - Strategies. Through their influence on managerial strategic 
decisions, does employee ownership influence strategies concerning employee 
welfare, and divert shareholder value towards their own immediate sources of 
welfare as employee (employment, wages, social benefits, etc. )? 
(b) Strategies - Performance. Subsequently, are firms' strategic decisions, directed to 
some extent at short-term employee welfare, associated with stronger or weaker 
performance? As a mirror-image of this question, are employees as shareholders 
associated with shareholder value? 
These two main groups of questions will be examined during the remainder of this thesis 
within two types of approach used for this research. The first approach uses correlation 
and regression analysis (OLS and LOGIT) for testing the two main hypotheses, 
formulated for Governance - Strategy and Strategy - Performance research in Section 3.2 
below. The second approach is based on the study of the three strategic HRM bundles, 
derived below from Western theory, and representing Traditional Social Welfare, Cost 
Minimisation and Human Resource Investment strategies. However, before these research 
questions are addressed, a suitable theoretical lens (or lenses) must be chosen and justified 
for this Russian research. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
The question of associations between Governance - Strategy - Performance in terms of 
employee welfare in Russian industrial firms opens another field for analysis of post- 
privatised economies. It has to be recognised that this analysis will require different 
methodology and techniques, which will be described in later chapters. 
Nevertheless, numerous findings on the outcomes of privatisations in Central and Eastern 
Europe and some of the FSU countries, presented in this Chapter, suggest that there are 
both similarities and differences among countries which prevent the direct application of 
established CG models and strategies, successful in one places, to another. In particular, 
these differences include diverse national cultures and business systems; institutional and 
legislative factors; managerial development and career structures, and the degree of 
competence of HR actors, etc. 
Post-privatisation Russia, as a descendant of the Soviet Union with its strong history of 
hierarchical ministries in a command-administrative economy, a highly integrated 
industrial structure and soft budget constraints, inherited a system that reduced many 
uncertainties for managers (but increased others), was highly centralised with strong 
collectivistic attributes and possessed a lack of experiences of the West and market 
economies (Ennew et aL, 1993). Following the above discussion, the resulting ownership 
structure of Russian enterprises, described as "employee-owned, manager-controlled" 
(Earle and Estrin, 1996), could influence strategic decisions in favour of employees' 
immediate sources of welfare - job stability, high wages, social benefits, etc. This implies 
that such a non-strategic concern for employee-owners, perhaps being less focused on 
raising shareholders' value, than on welfare provisions for themselves, could be damaging 
to a firm's financial performance. These possible influences of employee-owners on 
company strategies and subsequent performance of the enterprises set up the two main 
research questions of this study. 
It is also worth noting that this thesis focuses on ownership proportions and legal company 
forms as two governance elements, associated with strategy, and ignores the overall 
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company strategy or other governance dimensions like technology, etc. Besides, the only 
strategy parameters, associated with firm performance, are HRM strategies (training, 
benefits provision, etc. ), ignoring marketing strategy for example, and other general firm 
strategies. 
There is also a growing debate on which HRM model to adopt for successful performance. 
Chapter II presented three major HRM strategies (models), identified in Western 
literature, and adopted in some of transition economies. More precisely, Chapter provides 
examples of two cost-effective strategies - either Cost Minimisation or Human Resource 
Investment - and another, reflecting the Soviet founders' employment template, 
recognised as the Traditional Social Wetfare strategy. To check for interactions between 
governance and performance, these three coherent strategies will be accommodated for 
Russian firms by a cluster approach, developed in the review of relevant HRM literature, 
presented in Chapter III of this study. 
Thus, the structure and ownership concentration in Russian firms raises a number of 
questions in relation to Governance - Strategy - Performance that are important for 
theory and policy. What are the HRM strategic clusters that best characterise Russian 
alternatives, what governance is associated with these strategic clusters and are the 
different strategies associated with significantly strong or weak performance? This thesis 
is intended to provide answers to these questions. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter presents a literature review relevant to the analysis of CG in Russian post- 
privatised firms, with a particular focus on questions concerning Governance - Strategy 
links and subsequently Strategy - Performance mechanisms, leading to relevant 
hypotheses. It proposes a stakeholder perspective for the analysis of large privatised firms 
in Russia and develops testable hypotheses in relation to HRM strategy bundles derived 
from Western theory. 
The break-up of the FSU after 1991 and subsequent policies promoting global integration 
and mass privatisation, leading to employee-owned businesses as the dominant form of 
governance in manufacturing industry in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have already been 
described (Filatotchev et aL, 2000; Hoskisson et aL, 2000). To date, however, there has 
been only one large-sample empirical study of the influence of governance forms on HRM 
strategies (in Ukraine, see Buck et aL, 2003), and only one (Fey and Bj6rkman, 2001) on 
the consequences of these strategies, for firm performance, in Russia in 1998. However, 
the Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) study only investigated relationships in foreign-owned 
subsidiaries (Finnish, Swedish, US, German and British) in Russia, located in just two 
cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), and did not cover any indigenous Russian enterprises. 
This research focuses on indigenous Russian firms and extends the Fey and Bj6rkman 
(2001) and Buck et aL (2003) analyses in a number of ways. In the context of a mass 
privatisation programme that conveyed most property rights to insiders, it completes the 
established Governance - Strategy - Performance sequence (Hitt et aL, 1996; Thomas and 
Waring, 1999), by supplementing the Strategy - Performance approach of Fey and 
Bjbrkman (2001) with a consideration of associations between corporate governance - 
corporate ownership structures and the legal forms of enterprises - and different HRM 
strategies. Compared with Buck et aL (2003), this study, firstly, represents an advance in 
terms of studying Russia - the most developed State, founded after the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union (EBRD, 2001). It is well-known that Ukrainian market reforms are weaker 
than Russia's, thus Russian firms could be more generous in the extent to which they are 
ready to provide social facilities and benefits to its employees, thus reducing any bias 
towards cost-cutting strategies. Secondly, by supplementing the Buck et aL (2003) 
Ukrainian study with the analysis of Governance - Strateg'y - Performance in Russian 
industrial firms, it will be possible to generalise the findings. However, unlike Buck et aL 
(2003), this thesis does not address research questions with Structural Equation Model 
(SEM) techniques. SEM analysis methods have serious weaknesses, and it was thus 
decided not to use these techniques for this study. (These limitations will be addressed in 
Chapter IV below). The approach here also embraces legal forms as a governance element 
in addition to the ownership variables; and alternative performance measures to the 
quantitative capacity utilisation and sales per employee variables, used by Buck et aL 
(2003). 
In terms of the stakeholder approach proposed below, the circumstances in Russia provide 
an interesting environment where managers and workers, as enterprise stakeholders, 
became major shareholders and board representatives. As shareholders with an existing 
employee role within the firm, are managers and other employees likely to divert 
shareholder value towards their immediate sources of welfare such as employment 
stability, wages, multiple social provisions, and are these decisions subsequently 
associated with stronger or weaker performance? 
To answer these questions in the context of the proposed research, the next three main 
sections (with a number of subsections) review those theories, developed in relation to 
Western organisations, that could be appropriate for Russian firms as well, and focus on 
relevant HRM theories in order to address the research questions and develop hypotheses. 
Besides, these three main sections Provide a theoretical ground for two types of analyses, 
applied for this thesis - (a) correlation/regression analysis and (b) cluster analysis with 
three coherent HRM constructs. 
More specifically, Section 3.2 justifies The Choice of Paradigm and introduces two main 
hypotheses for: 
3.2.1 Governance - Strategy relationships, and 
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3.2.2 Strategy - Performance mechanisms. 
Then, Section 3.3 introduces a review and formulates relevant hypotheses for HRM 
Theory and Strategic Clusters, and focuses on: 
- 3.3.1 Traditional Social Welfare Strategy, 
- 3.3.2 Cost Minimisation Strategy, 
- 3.3.3 Human Resource Investment Strategy, and 
- 3.3.4 Mixed HRM Strategies and Summary on Appropriate Clusters for Russian 
Research. 
Finally, Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2 THE CHOICE OF PARADIGM 
3.2.1 GOVERNANCE - STRATEGY 
To fill the gap in analysing Governance - Strategy - Performance link in Russia, the 
Strategic Management (SM) paradigm is adopted here to address the research questions 
set out in Section 2.5. The adoption of an analytical structure developed within the SM 
paradigm in general, and within Stakeholder Analysis in particular, provides an important 
framework of analysis. In general, the SM approach has established a sequence of 
Governance - Strategy - Performance (Hitt et aL, 1996; Thomas and Waring, 1999), with 
subsequent Performance - Governance feedback, developed mainly in the context of 
strategic decisions concerning diversification (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). 
The following picture presents a framework of model, which is to be tested in this study: 
Governance 1 01 Strategy i0 Performance 
In this thesis, the relevant strategies are human resource strategies. It is recognised that the 
specific strategy relating to employee welfare within firms (wage levels, job creation, 
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spending on training, health insurance and on other social provisions) has a long tradition 
within other literatures. Indeed the intention here is to synthesise these different 
perspectives under the SM umbrella. 
For example, within the Human Relations tradition, there is a substantial literature on 
44social contracts" and on "welfare capitalism" (e. g. Jacoby, 1997). This literature provides 
useful insights for the subject at hand. For example it distinguishes an era of enterprise- 
driven welfare provision in the US (approximately 1880-1950), that contrasts with the 
typical European welfare state, where most of the burden of welfare provision was 
transferred from the enterprise to the State. From this perspective, the Soviet period can be 
seen as an interesting intermediate case, typically mixing substantial amounts of 
enterprise-level welfare provision in the form of housing, kindergartens and polyclinics, 
etc., backed up by considerable State support in the form of subsidised household 
materials and services, minimum wage legislation, etc. 
Similarly, the Occupational Psychology literature has focused on the "psychological 
contract" whereby the firm implicitly provides employees with informal guarantees 
concerning employment stability and discretionary insurance provisions. In return, the 
employee may contribute effort on behalf of the firm that exceeds any contractual 
obligations and increase firm performance (see a whole special issue of the Journal of 
Organisational Behavior, particularly Guest, 1998). This perspective provides a useful 
antidote to the notion that most spending on employee welfare in some sense "wastes" 
shareholder value and threatens the survival of firms that must compete on global markets 
(Greenaway and Nelson, 2000). Further support for this antidote is provided by the UK 
Government's White Paper in December 2000 on Globalisation and Poverty. 
This research synthesises these different literatures with the view that major HRM 
decisions by the firm are crucial to the development of a firm's human capital, a key 
enterprise capability in a resource-based view of the firm. As with the psychological 
contract, a resource-based view emphasises the positive aspect of those investments in 
employees that produce a resource that is unique, value-creating, and hard to imitate by 
competitors (Barney, 1986,1991,1995). Alternatively, employees may demand 
investment in their own human resources at a level that reduces firm value, and, in a 
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competitive market economy, such firms may be out-competed by firms that employ 
"flexible production" and the casualisation of employment relations (Birkenshaw and 
Hagstr6m, 2000; Kleinknecht, 1998; Wood and De Menezes, 1998), leaving social 
provisions (e. g. employment insurance, holiday entitlements and pensions) to the 
individual worker's personal resources. However, strategies which include the flexible 
recruitment and optional retention of workers for particular tasks are generally opposed by 
a majority of Russian employees, as not conforming to their national culture and 
psychology of high uncertainty avoidance and thus enhanced employment security 
(Elenkov, 1997,1998). 
It must be admitted, however, that, in addressing these issues, the SM literature has 
typically paid little attention to the determination and consequences of strategic decisions 
concerning employee welfare. Significant exceptions would include studies of strategies 
concerning the consequences for employment change of major shifts in company 
ownership/governance (e. g. Johnson, 1996, on MBOs; and Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990, 
on the impact of post-takeover restructuring). 
Stakeholder Theory (see a whole number of the Academy of Management Journal, 
particularly Berman et al., 1999) has been advanced and justified in the management 
literature due to its instrumental power, descriptive accuracy and normative validity 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995), but has been generally concerned with the influence of 
different stakeholders (besides dispersed outside shareholders) on strategic decisions in 
general, but with no specific concern for employee welfare. It is proposed that for the 
purpose of this thesis, a consideration of the effect and importance of different 
stakeholders can provide the basis for the analysis of stakeholder influence over HR 
strategies and subsequent firm performance. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) describe the different approaches of Stakeholder Theory. 
Firstly, it can be descriptive, and "presents a model describing what the corporation is". 
Secondly, it may be instrumental, i. e. it establishes a framework for examining the 
connections between the stakeholder management and the achievement of corporate 
performance goals, measured conventionally through growth, firm stability, profits, etc. 
Thirdly, Stakeholder Theory can be managerial, recommending structures, attitudes and 
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practices, that "taken together constitute stakeholder management" (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). 
Whatever the particular approach, Stakeholder Theory defines "stakeholder" as any 
individual or group of constituents, who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
firm's objectives (Freeman, 1994), or have a legitimate claim on the company (Pearce, 
1982), where this legitimacy is based on the existence of a reciprocal relationship. The 
term stakeholder usually embraces stockholders, managers, employees (workers), 
creditors, customers, suppliers, local authorities and the general public (Hill and Jones, 
1992), and includes primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders include 
shareholders, managers, employees, consumers and local authorities. The State and civil 
institutions usually constitute secondary stakeholders, although the State can be a primary 
stakeholder too, through direct ownership of the firm. 
Following March and Simon (1958), participants (stakeholders) supply their own 
contributions to the firm and, in exchange for these contributions, expect fulfilment of 
their interests (through rewards and influence). Stockholders, as a particular subset of 
stakeholders, possess capital, which they are ready to invest in exchange for certain 
returns. Loans from creditors provide the firm with funding, and are expected to be paid 
back in time, with interest. Managers and workers work for "fair" wages and decent 
treatment (e. g. welfare provision, good working conditions and other benefits), providing 
firms with their skills and human capital. Suppliers provide the firm with various inputs, 
that turn later into saleable products, which customers are ready to buy (for fair prices) in 
exchange for their money. Local authorities provide an infrastructure and expect loyalty 
from citizens (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
The stakeholder approach argues that all individuals or groups contribute to an enterprise 
in order to receive benefits. Thus, shareholders try to maximise the value of the firm; 
managers may want to maximise the size of the firm; employees may favour strategies that 
raise their wages and secure jobs; the State may seek to raise votes through job 
preservation; banks may support actions that secure company liquidity, etc. However, both 
the finance and SM literature, as well as agency theory, have noted the existence of a 
variety of agency conflicts within modem firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
37 
Chapter III. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
These agency conflicts generally refer to shareholders and managers, but also arise in 
relation to managerial behaviour with respect to each class of stakeholders, and 
particularly workers. At present, scholars note quite a weak role for shareholders and 
banks within Russian firms, some weak (generally subordinate) influence for workers, and 
a dominant role for managers (Buck et aL, 1998). Also Hill and Jones (1992) assert that 
the stake of an individual (unskilled) worker, especially with few alternative employment 
opportunities, is likely to be negligible, e. g. in many Russian cities. 
This raises the question of stakeholder identification and salience - the degree to which 
managers give priority to particular stakeholders' claims (Mitchell et al., 1997), a concept 
that is very close to the concept of resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In 
the salience literature, there is no normative discussion of whether managers should pay 
more attention to a particular group of stakeholders. However managers often do pay more 
attention to some certain kinds of stakeholders as a result of their bargaining power and 
ownership of key resources that the firm needs, causing the described agency conflict. 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) propose that managers care strongly about people who have a 
stake in the business - customers, employees, stockholders, suppliers, etc. In this situation 
workers, particularly as shareholders, should have a legal and moral claim on the firm and 
an ability to influence the firm's behaviour. However, as already noted, employees in 
Russia have little bargaining power over managerial decisions because of limited 
alternative employment opportunities and their dependence on the firm for many social 
provisions, e. g. housing. This diminishes the salience of employee stakeholders. 
One possible way of resolving powerful stakeholder influence and subsequent agency 
conflict involves the takeover mechanism, which depends upon the ease of buying/selling 
shares (shareholder "exit") on a capital market and disciplines management by easy 
replacement procedures (Driver and Thompson, 2002). However, according to these 
authors, regardless of the threat of a possible takeover, empirical evidence is "against the 
view that actual takeovers are primarily aimed at correcting or eliminating poor 
management" (p. 113). 
As an alternative to the discipline of capital markets, a stakeholder approach may lead to 
the building of good relations with stakeholders - employees, buyers, suppliers, creditors, 
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local communities, etc., which could lead to competitive advantage if these stakeholders 
apply effective monitoring of managers (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Hillman and Keim 
(2001) test this proposition with 500 Standard & Poor's listed firms and find that 
stakeholder management leads to improved stakeholder value, while from the social side 
this association is negative. 
In contrast with Stakeholder Theory, one branch of the law literature stresses the principle 
that boards and corporate managers in particular should act exclusively in the economic 
interests of shareholders (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2002). While national and 
international government officials continue to debate on effective CG mechanisms that 
will deliver managerial accountability and accompanying efficiency increases (Wright et 
aL, 2003), Hansmann and Kraakman (2002) suggest that the standard legal model of the 
corporation results partly from the failure of alternative models, such as the manager- 
focused US model, the labour-focused German model, and State-focused model, recently 
dominant in France and most of Asia. As a result of the development of this new kind of 
model, the efficiency and performance of a company is expected to improve. However, 
recent findings also emphasize institutional differences in governance, share ownership 
and local business culture among Europe, US and other countries (e. g. see Gilson and Roe, 
1993; Roe, 1993). 
In the case of Russia, there has been an examination of the effect of outside investors on 
CG in Russia (Earle et aL, 1996; Frydman et aL, 1996a, b), while attention towards other 
important stakeholders, particularly managers and workers, has been less extensive. 
Nevertheless, some findings suggest that even though employees have significant equity 
stakes in their own enterprises, their involvement in boards of directors and other control 
mechanisms is generally very low (Filatotchev et aL, 1996a; Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2002), and ineffective (Blasi and Shleifer, 1996). 
Focusing on shareholders as dominant stakeholders, another important issue within a 
Governance - Strategy framework is the question of the influence of ownership structures 
on firms' strategic decisions. The core idea of Russian market reformers and their Western 
advisers was to produce open capital markets, based on the Anglo-American "exit" model. 
Following Buck et aL (1998) and Frydman et aL (1996a), the market reforms and 
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manager-employee "giveaway" privatisations in Russia have secured the presence of these 
two groups of enterprise stakeholders, and also used their voice to prevent a withdrawal of 
the State from the governance of industrial enterprises, though the aim of privatisation was 
to remove State influence too. 
As may be expected from their low salience, the evidence suggests that employee 
involvement in strategic decisions and other control mechanisms is generally very low in 
Russia (Filatotchev et al., 1996a), and managers are able to threaten workers into 
submission with dismissals, wage cuts, etc. (Sprenger, 2002). In these circumstances the 
presence of the State as a stakeholder often deters managers from hostile behaviour and, 
although usually the objectives of the State are not clearly identified, one of their main 
interests, however, may be focused on the provision of Public goods (Fox and Heller, 
1999) and law enforcement. Following Uhlenbruck and De Castro (1998), however, firms 
with significant State ownership may promote strategies that are not economically 
effective and more politically driven. At the same it is recognised that the presence of the 
State among the stakeholders in privatised former State-owned enterprises (SOEs) is often 
a big obstacle to restructuring, as State representatives (as new management or board 
members) are usually non-professionals, and scholars suggest that to achieve effective 
performance, this non-professional management has to be replaced (Peng et aL, 2003). 
With the main interest of this research on employee welfare, this literature review will 
mostly concentrate on managers' and workers' representation, paying less attention to 
State ownership and non-employee stakeholder concepts. 
The "giveaway" voucher privatisation, as a constituent of Russian economic reforms 
announced in 1992 and implemented to date, boosted employee ownership of enterprises 
and different governance structures. Privatisations worldwide have been widely studied 
(see Chapter II) with a focus of its impact on enterprise strategy and performance 
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002; D'Souza et aL, 2001; Megginson and Netter, 2001). Also, 
studies of employee ownership and control in transition economies have analysed their 
influence on productivity and financial performance (Blashi and Shleifer, 1996; Earle, 
1998; Earle and Estrin, 1996; Frydman et aL, 1999). Other researches have focused on the 
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extent and role of employee ownership in Russia and in some former Soviet Republics 
(Buck et aL, 1994,1999,2003; Estrin and Wright, 1999). 
The transfer of ownership of the firms to a new legal entity in which managers and 
workers are significant (if not major) shareholders is usually referred to as a buyout 
process. The main distinguishing criteria of these buyouts is whether the ownership comes 
to managers only (managerial buyouts, MBOs), to inside managers and employees 
(managerial-employee buyouts, MEBOs), or is concentrated in employees' (workers') 
hands only (employee buyouts, EBOs). 
Following common Western experience, managers and workers are those who are likely to 
take an active part in the governance of the firms because their stakes do not allow them to 
easily divest their equity in poorly perfon-ning firms (Lane et aL, 1998). On the other 
hand, the introduction of significant insider equity stakes is also expected to increase 
incentives for employees to perform and make decisions intended to maximise firm's 
profits. In particular, by becoming shareholders, employees could be encouraged to seek 
involvement in different strategic and operating decisions, like enterprise capitalisation, 
monitoring themselves, taking part in tasks requiring entrepreneurial judgment on the part 
of employees, product diversification, etc. More often however, employee ownership and 
control may encourage employees to act as employees, rather than as effective employee- 
shareholders, thus choosing wage distribution rather than dividends and capital gains, vast 
social provisions, lower levels of restructuring and secured jobs (Buck et aL, 1994; Wright 
et aL, 1998b). These results also agree with the Fama and Jensen (1983) findings that, for 
firms with over 50% insider ownership, the question of firm survival takes priority, and 
employees may insist upon job stability and higher wages rather than be focused on firm's 
market valuation. From this perspective, employees are relatively risk-averse 
(Doucouliagos, 1995), which is negative it terms of an influence on performance, but the 
problem of separation of ownership and control is potentially much less acute in 
employee-owned firms (Hansmann, 1996). 
Workers, therefore, in their dual stakeholder role as employees and as shareholders, are, 
on balance, likely to choose higher current wages and more social benefits as immediate 
sources of utility in the short-run, rather than more retained profits, deep restructuring, 
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long term investment (Buck et al., 1999) and company diversification (Hill and Snell, 
1998), resulting in lower profits for Russian EBOs, as they will be dominated by 
employees. To some extent this is likely to happen because of the expropriation of 
employees by powerful insiders, such as managers (Filatotchev et aL, 2001a). If their 
views conflict with those of employees, the question who is most salient as a stakeholder, 
e. g. an owner-manager or an owner-employee, becomes crucial. 
From the beginning of the privatisation process, a majority of Russian companies imposed 
limits on the external sale of shares by insiders. In particular these barriers to "exit" 
originated with managers (often being legally supported by official privatisation variants 
too), who discouraged employees' share sales to outsiders. In return, managers assured job 
security for employees, wages and perquisites, being to some extent paternalistic towards 
workers and influenced by their needs. Following Filatotchev et al. (1999), since 
employees may prefer current wages to future uncertain wages, they may also be reluctant 
to sell shares to outsiders, and will sell them to managers, who prefer insider control of 
enterprises. When managers' stakes increase and reach substantial amounts, they may 
become entrenched (Morck et aL, 1988) and guarantee attractive salaries and employment 
opportunities for themselves, who, if appointed in the Soviet era, are also concerned about 
their job stability (not as manager-shareholders) in the face of strong competition from the 
external managerial labour market. 
As a primary conclusion to this Governance - Strategy analysis, it is worth noting that 
most of the theoretical approaches are highly contingent on the environment in which they 
were developed. The central theoretical problem in governance research is in applying a 
causal ordering or a priori structure to the existing business environment (Peters and 
Savoie, 1998; Lynn and Hill, 2004). In the face of these challenges and taking into account 
all theoretical and practical arguments discussed above, this research is of importance in 
studying the unprecedented privatisation experiment in Russia, where different groups of 
stakeholders - workers and managers - obtained some control over their enterprises, and 
were faced with a situation where they had to take decisions on enterprises' strategies 
which offered immediate welfare - higher wages and social benefits - but probably not 
enhanced efficiency, higher retained profits, additional investment and restructuring, etc. 
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Thus, in the context of Governance - Strategy relationships, it is possible to hypothesise 
that: 
Hypothesis 1. Higher levels of workers' ownership and closed legal forms will be 
positively associated with strategies that direct more resources towards 
immediate sources of employee welfare, e. g. higher wages, job 
preservation, social benefits, etc. 
Of course, such employee-favouring strategies may be expected in a Western context to 
damage firm performance (to some extent), but here, workers' involvement in corporate 
governance may offer a comparative performance advantage under certain conditions, e. g., 
where worker-shareholders may be motivated to practice mutual monitoring on 
themselves and their colleagues (Earle and Estrin, 1996). Also, in the language of 
Occupational Psychology, firms' strategies that promote employee welfare may encourage 
consummate employee contributions to firm performance that are in excess of their 
contractual obligations (Guest, 1998). 
Therefore, following this Governance - Strategy review and the introduction of a relevant 
hypothesis, the next Subsection proceeds to a discussion of Strategy - Performance 
relations, with particular attention to HRM strategies. 
3.2.2 STRATEGY - PERFORMANCE 
Gaining competitive advantage through different strategic actions has become one of the 
major focuses of research in the field of strategic HRM in industrialised Western 
economies (Pfeffer, 1994; Wright and McMahan, 1992; Wright and Snell, 1991). The 
basis for these researches mostly came from the SM literature, addressing the internal 
drivers for economic development (Barney, 1991). With the focus of this research on 
Russian firms, as noted in the Introduction to this Chapter, it is possible to refer to only 
one Strategy - Performance study, by Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), that has examined HRM 
practices in foreign-owned subsidiaries in Russia. Thus, this research is intended to break 
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new theoretical and empirical ground by studying the Strategy - Performance relationship 
on a large sample of insider owned indigenous Russian firms. As will be noted later, 
recent studies by Elenkov (1997,1998), Holt et aL (1994) and Ralston et aL (1997) find it 
important to distinguish Russia and Western firms in terms of theory and strategic 
practice. 
Most Stakeholder Theory, and related strands of the literature of corporate ethics (Bloom, 
1999), social responsibility (Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Swanson, 1999) and 
organisational citizenship (Lambert, 2000), has been more concerned with the general 
consequences of stakeholder influence on firm performance, as conventionally measured. 
At the same time, although it was stressed in the contingency theory of SM (see below) 
that enterprise strategies have to be aligned with a country environment to achieve 
superior performance, little attention has been paid to the specific case of governance by 
employee shareholders and their influence on HRM strategies, which could be politically 
rather than efficiency-driven (Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998). 
Empirical and conceptual work in the field of HRM suggests that the role of human 
resources can be crucial to firm performance (Arthur, 1994; Becker and Huselid, 1998; 
Huselid, 1995; MaeDuffie, 1995), but it is also stressed by researches that further studies 
have to be undertaken. For instance, in the study of the influence of HRM decisions on 
firm performance, scholars often refer to a need to improve efficiency or contribute to 
revenue growth. 
Since human resources are often viewed more narrowly as a cost needed to be minimised 
to achieve subsequent gains, reduction in employment is often considered as a main 
managerial strategy in cutting costs, leading to agency conflict between managers and 
employees (Charreaux and Desbrieres, 2001). However, the Russian environment 
represents a form of CG, where a majority of manufacturing firms are employee owned. 
Even when the ownership appears to be strongly divided between managers and workers, 
with control concentrated mainly in managers' hands, such decisions as cutting costs 
through employee dismissals are unlikely to be supported by workers as shareholders, 
whose shares may help to guarantee their employment (Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
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As regards the consequences of HRM strategies for firm performance, Becker and Gerhart 
(1996) review a literature that studies the impact on firm performance of 27 different 
measures of HRM strategies in firms from the 1996 Fortune 500 list; Delaney and Huselid 
(1996) replace conventional performance measures with perceived performance 
evaluations, based on questionnaire surveys of 590 for-profit and non-profit US 
organisations from the National Organisation Survey; and Youndt et aL (1996) emphasise 
that strategies addressing employee welfare in 97 manufacturing plants had an impact on 
performance that interacts with product quality manufacturing strategies. These 
approaches have, however, so far proved inconclusive in the sense that various HRM 
strategies are associated with different levels of performance in different circumstances. 
Nevertheless, these studies do identify unresolved questions for future studies, and their 
approach to date has not been applied to transition economies. 
Berman et aL (1999, p. 494) employed a sequence of stakeholder relationships --+ firm 
strategy --> firm financial performance and noted (p. 489) "... the potential for FIR practices 
to lower turnover and absenteeism, improve productivity and increase worker commitment 
and trusf '. Among other researches undertaken, Youndt et aL (1996) analyse the effects of 
manufacturing strategy on the relationship between HRM and operational performance, as 
measured by employee productivity, machine efficiency and customer alignment, and find 
a positive association between them. Becker and Gerhart (1996) conclude that HRM 
decisions are likely to have an important and unique influence on firm performance. 
Pfeffer (1994) refers to management "best practices" as elements of high performance, but 
also identifies that the effect of "best practices" is more likely to be embodied in the 
structure of an enterprise's system (through motivation, job security, various pay policies, 
etc. ). Delaney and Huselid (1996) find a positive association between a variety of HRM 
practices and perceptual firm performance measures. 
All these scholars argue that organisations can adopt HRM practices that enhance 
workers' skills and the quality of hired individuals through comprehensive training. The 
way the workspace is structured affects organisational performance through the degree to 
which motivated, skilled and trained employees are involved in strategic decisions. 
Similarly, Osterman (1994) argues that such innovative work practices as teams, quality 
circles, job rotation and quality management result in productivity and performance gains 
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as "best practices". However, few of these American practices will fit or have already 
fitted Russian reality. 
According to the contingency approach to strategic HRM, briefly mentioned at the 
beginning of this Section, the impact of HR practices on firm performance is subject to the 
firm's overall strategic position (e. g. Schuler and Jackson, 1987). One could argue that 
developed HR practices are trivial in relation to performance in manufacturing firms, 
where human capital may be replaced by physical capital, as the central component of 
manufacturing efficiency. However, Youndt et aL (1996) stress that it does not have to be 
the case, although there are examples of firms competing this way rather than using such 
modem strategies as cost-cutting or employment flexibility. 
According to the behavioural perspective (Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Wright and 
McMahan, 1992), to achieve effective performance organisational strategies require 
unique attitudes and role behaviour from employees, and HR activities have to be the 
primary means of maintaining and intensifying these kinds of employee behaviour. Also, 
advocates of control theory (e. g. Snell, 1992) highlight the fact that effective performance 
relies upon correspondence between appropriate HR practices and the administrative 
environment. 
This alignment is essential for the Russian environment, where workers could be very 
anxious about any cost-cutting strategy that could involve wage cuts or dismissals, and 
would normally oppose it as major enterprise shareholders. At the same time, workers are 
likely to favour various HRM strategies, e. g. employee training or investments in 
intellectual human capital, which will directly increase employees' personal welfare. If 
employees feel that their voices count and see that managers have an interest in their 
development, they are more likely to positively respond to managers and produce better 
outcomes. Subsequently, cost-cutting, improved training quality and other high 
commitment strategies will be examined in the next Section, as justifying the specific 
HRM cluster approach in this thesis. 
When turning to the managers' perspective within the Strategy - Performance analysis, 
Stakeholder Theory proposes two quite opposite views - the first is that other stakeholders 
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deter managers from being creative, but the second is that the involvement of other 
stakeholders may bring about motivational changes that may enhance performance (Driver 
and Thompson, 2002). Both arguments are usually supported by empirical analyses, 
including correlations between stakeholding and conditional measures of performance - 
productivity or innovation (Driver and Thompson, 2002; Lambert, 2000). A prevailing 
notion in the SM literature is that managers are those who have to cope with a changing 
environment through a variety of appropriate strategies (Jennings and Seaman, 1994). The 
leading function of managers is recognised by Kay and Silberston (1995) who argue for a 
privileged role for managers by giving them (p. 95) "... the greatest possible freedom to 
develop the business over a period of years in whatever way they think fit, while holding 
them rigorously responsible to all parties involved". 
One supporting answer to the question of managerial freedom comes from the history of 
the steady growth of firms in emerging economies, not heavily dependent on shareholder 
finance. However, it is worth noting that this growth in emerging economies was often 
accompanied by violation of stakeholders' rights due to asymmetric information or 
incomplete contracts - known as the hold-up problem. If the governance of the firms 
required incomplete contracts to favour certain stakeholders, these contracts would not be 
feasible (Kay and Silberston, 1995). Hart (1995b, 1996) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
argue for conferring residual rights to workers, but stress that the hold-up problem will 
continue to exist if workers get compensation in the form of equity and have a voice over 
wage determination. 
Here, a question of appropriate motivation arises as being crucial for performance in 
Stakeholder Theory. From this point of view, employee share ownership seems to be a 
potential answer to the question of employee motivation (Michie and Oughton, 2001). For 
example, The Companies Act in the UK requires that directors of companies must 
consider employees' interests in their decision making (Companies Act, 1980). Also the 
new laws of the European Community allow companies to take into account the interests 
of stakeholders - creditors, customers, investors and employees (Orts, 1992). However, it 
has to be remembered that the motivation of employees (as shareholders) in Russia may 
have been impaired if shares were obtained in the giveaway process without any elements 
on financial sacrifice on their part (Boycko et aL, 1994,1995). 
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The detailed content of HRM strategies is important for resulting performance. For 
example, in terms of different approaches to remuneration forms, variable pay has a low 
emphasis in Arthur's (1994) "commitment" system, whereas Huselid (1993,1995) and 
MacDuffie (1995) emphasise it as a positive influpnce in terms of Western experience. 
Abowd (1990) concluded that the degree to which managerial compensation was based on 
the firm's financial performance was significantly related to future financial performance. 
Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) found better financial performance in organisations that had 
remuneration plans contingent on financial results. However, little evidence exists on 
employee motivation policies and resulting firm performance in transition economies 
(Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998), and particularly in Russian privatised, employee 
owned manager controlled, companies. 
Nonetheless, although exploitation occurred in Russia at many levels after privatisation, in 
the context of the FSU, paternalism towards workers was generally a consistent feature of 
enterprise behaviour (via provision of social facilities like kindergartens, housing or 
medical care, summer camps for children, etc. ) together with stable employment and 
substantial training programmes. Following the above discussion it is argued that the most 
generous firms in Russia in terms of workers' benefits attract the best workers and secure 
the best performance, in "Soviet" terms at least. It is therefore tentatively hypothesised 
that this association will continue through economic transition: 
Hypothesis 2. Firms' strategies that promote employee weýfare will be positively 
associated with improved corporate performance. 
Kaplan and Norton (2001) broaden the focus of managers from traditional financial 
measures of performance (like return on sales, return on investment, improved 
profitability, etc. ) to a more diverse set, which in particular includes such non-financial 
measure as organisational learning, in the context of improvements in skills through hours 
spent on training. Such learning results in higher employee productivity. Following 
Barney (1991) and Collins and Montgomery (1995), Kaplan and Norton (2001) recognise 
that HR strategies are path dependent, and could integrate measures that reflect cause-and- 
effect relations between outcomes (lagged measures), and critical drivers (lead measures) 
of these outcomes. This concept of multiple-measure systems is generally supported by 
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accounting theorists, who are focused on revenue growth or future profits, as lag 
indicators of strategies applied in previous periods. Besides, governance may be expected 
to have a lagged influence on strategies' relations (Buck et aL, 2001). Finally, 
performance can influence ownership (i. e. governance), either lagged or with 
simultaneous, reciprocal causation (Wright, 2002; Finkel, 1995). 
The decision of lagged effects or cause-and-effect relations depends on the availability of 
data, and thus reflects whether lagged dependent variables are included as explanatory 
variables in regression equation (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). In this study we support the 
view that strategies have an impact on future performance, as most of today's strategies 
(like training) usually produce outcomes within a number of years, not momentarily. 
However, as will be noted in the Chapter IV, this research is constrained by using one 
cross-section of data only (with only a very limited number of parameters measured for 
two successive years), thus it is not possible systematically to use independent variables 
for one year and then control dependent variables for the next year, i. e. at least with a one- 
year lag. This notion represents one of the limitations of this study, addressed in Chapter 
V1. 
Nonetheless, as noted above, Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) examine FIRM strategies and 
performance and find a positive relationship between HRM investments and foreign 
subsidiary performance in Russia. The authors distinguish "soft" HRM, which has direct 
employee welfare rather than business performance as its primary concern (Guest, 1998), 
from "hard" HRM, that leads to improved productivity and better firm performance. This 
broad distinction between "hard" and "soft" FIRM will be developed and operationalised 
in the context of this thesis, and Section 3.3 starts this discussion. 
3.3 HRM THEORY AND STRATEGIC CLUSTERS 
This Section continues a discussion of researches undertaken in the field of Strategic 
Management and intends to develop an appropriate FIRM cluster approach, adopted from 
the Western literature, for Russian fimis in order to be able to propose and analyse 
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Governance - Strategy - Performance hypotheses in tenns of coherent HRM clusters, 
typical of particular HRM policies. The Section gradually introduces six specific HRM 
hypotheses, resulting from the above discussion and theoretical views. 
Within the last few years a number of researchers have provided anecdotal discussions of 
HRM issues in Russia, pointing out their importance (e. g. Juplev et aL, 1998; Laurence 
and Vlachoutsicos, 1990; Longenecker and Popovski, 1994; May et al., 1998; Magura, 
1998, Puffer, 1997, Radko and Afanasieva, 1999; Shekshnia, 1994,1998; Welsh et al., 
1993). For instance, Longenecker and Popovski (1994) explore managerial trials in 
organisations in St. Petersburg associated with the transition to a market economy, and 
conclude that Russian managers have to be retooled with technical and organisational 
skills to be able to lead their firms. May et al. (1998) note specific barriers to the 
effectiveness of Russian HR managers, observed in specialised group HRM training 
sessions, organised by US and Russian practitioners in 31 firms across Russia. Shekshnia 
(1994) examines the "most common myth about Russia" concerning the supposed 
availability of very cheap and highly skilled workers. This myth causes problems for 
international investors and undermines the principles of successful investment in Russia. 
Contrary to the author's 1994 study, the 1998 paper surveys HR management in Russian 
subsidiaries of Western firms and concludes that Western companies are practicing 
efficient and sophisticated systems of FIR administration and management. 
The paucity of Russian HRM research was noted by Fey and Bjbrkman (2001, p. 60), who 
observed that "... little systematic Russian-language research exists on HRM issues and 
the Western literature investigating Russian management is also very limited". 
One major barrier to the replicability of Western research in Russia is that, most Western 
studies try to establish an empirical relationship between HRM practices and firm 
financial performance or market value. However, in the case of Russia, the use of stock 
market-based performance indicators, such as Tobin's Q, is fairly inappropriate, as stock 
markets are thin, firms do not Provide tax authorities with accurate data and imperfect 
disclosure codes make performance indicators rather unreliable too. 
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Furthermore, in recent studies by Elenkov (1997,1998), Holt et al. (1994) and Ralston et 
al. (1997), a significant difference in the national cultures of Russia and Western countries 
was noted, and it has been suggested that only specific HRM strategies may be appropriate 
for Russia (Elenkov, 1998; Fey and Bjbrkman, 2001), which have yet to be tested. Thus, 
to identify and test appropriate HRM clusters for Russian firms, the Western HRM 
literature and findings must be modified after reference to specifically Russian research. 
HR practices, as individual components of reward systems, affect firm performance not in 
isolation, but as elements of internally consistent FIR "bundles" or system, not individually 
(Baron et al., 1996; MacDuffie, 1995; Osterman, 1999). The variety of actual HRM 
practices in different firms must therefore be surnmarised meaningfully in broad 
aggregates, although it is not possible or necessary to insist on tight definitions (Osterman, 
1999). Moreover, firms have only a limited ability to pick and choose among specific 
elements of individual policies in structuring employment relations and governance 
practices, and have to select from among a limited number of FIR systems, representing 
menus, bundles or clusters of HR practices (Baron et al., 1996). 
Having once decided to perform Governance - Strategy - Performance research with the 
use of HRM bundles, it is necessary to identify strategic bundles suggested by theory, to 
develop the required number of distinct bundles, and also to choose specific clusters 
within each bundle. The term "bundle" refers to the practices that are interrelated and 
internally consistent, and comprises the effect of multiple practices, combined (clustered) 
into one specific bundle, thereby reflecting the overall firm's business strategy 
(MacDuffie, 1995). 
The question of identification of bundles of HRM practices confronts most Western HRM 
research, which includes in particular studies by Baron et aL (1996,1999), Hannan et al. 
(1996), MacDuffie (1995), Osterman (1999,2000), and Spenner et al. (1998). Some of 
these authors (Baron et al., 1999; MacDuffie, 1995; Osterman, 1999) develop their 
approach with reference to the database of the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies 
(SPEC), and focus their research on High Performance Work Organisations (HPWOs), as 
representing a dominant strand in the Western HRM literature. HPWOs originated in the 
early 1990s and were seen as more productive in terms of output and quality as a result of 
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a more efficient use of labour, if being compared to the rest of American firms. But, with 
economic recession, HPWOs were soon faced with a need for restructuring, involving 
increased layoffs and lower wages, in an environment of organisational turmoil. However, 
although it was argued that HPWOs would retreat as practices, Osterman (2000, p. 183) 
still claimed that firms performed "... best with substantial employee commitment to the 
enterprise". 
Fortunately, this phase of crisis, with layoffs, global restructuring and widespread 
recession in the early 1990s is hopefully behind us now, both in Russia, Eastern Europe, 
and the West. Nevertheless, the great variety of HRM strategies developed within these 
years of "shock therapy" has to be adopted thoughtfully and with flexibility, accepting the 
necessity of HRM bundles in empirical research. 
However the question of the optimal number of bundles and their appropriate composition 
is crucial. For instance, Baron et al. (1996) and Hannan et al. (1996) examine the models 
of employment relations on a sample of 100 Bay Area high technology firms, clustering 
them into four distinct types - Commitment, Engineering, Factory and Star Models. More 
precisely, the authors refer to the Factory Model as "pecuniary attachment, managerial 
control, hire for current skills"; the Commitment Model as entailing reliance on 
"peedcultural control, "love" and hire for cultural fit"; the Star Model as referring to 
"attachment to work, professional control, hire for potential"; and the Engineering Model 
as involving "attachment to work (and to a project), peer control, hire for current skills" 
(Hannan et al., 1996, p. 513). In Baron et al. (1999), the authors use the described 
Commitment, Engineering and Star Models, and also introduce Autocracy and 
Bureaucracy Models. The latter involves "attachment based upon providing challenging 
work and/or opportunities for development, selection of individuals based on their 
qualification for a particular role, and formalised control", while the Autocracy Model 
refers to "employment premised on purely monetary motivations, control through close 
personal oversight, and selection of employees to perform specific tasks (Baron et al., 
1999, p. 530). MacDuffie (1995) follows Osterman (1994) in his clustering approach, that 
distinguishes between practices that affect the organisation of work and the way work 
tasks are carried out. Delaney and Huselid (1996) separate HRM practices that enhance 
employee skills from those that motivate employees and those that structure the 
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workplace. Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) examine foreign subsidiary performance in Russia 
using three HRM clusters: Employee Development, Feedback Systems and 
PaylOrganisation, while Ngo et al. (1998) identify only two HRM bundles for their Hong 
Kong study - Structural Training and Development and Retention-oriented 
Compensation. Huselid (1995) also uses a two-cluster structure, with one similar to Ngo et 
al. 's (1998) compensation variable - Compensation and Promotion - and another 
concerned with employee feedback and skills development. 
Following this wide range of models (in particular within the HPWO literature), "it is not 
possible, or desirable to insist on tight definitions" of different strategies for Russian 
research, since "there are important differences in the intensity of work, in health and 
safety issues, the extent to which gains are shared" (Osterman, 1999, p. 100), and there is 
the embeddedness of employment practices in national culture, founders' philosophy and 
organisational blueprint dependence in the evolution of employment systems in firms (e. g. 
Baron et al., 1996). 
Nevertheless, some of them implicitly define the three clusters proposed for this research. 
For instance, the Star Model (Baron et al., 1996,1999; Hannan et al., 1996) applies only 
to environments where professional organisations impose a strong influence on firms, but 
the professions have traditionally been weak in the FSU (Filatotchev et al., 2001b); the 
Engineering Model is designed explicitly for the context of high technology Silicon Valley 
firms. On the other hand, path dependence and organisational inertia are attributed to 
either an absence of strong competitive pressure (Williamson, 1993) or to patterns of 
bureaucratisation, administration and managerial intensity that logically follow founders' 
blueprints of employment relations (Baron et al., 1999). Therefore, institutional inertia and 
considerable path dependence must be considered as likely features of post-reform Soviet- 
style strategies in transition economies, and will form the basis for the first HRM bundle 
in this research, proposed below. 
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3.3.1 TRADITIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE STRATEGY 
This first HRM bundle will be referred here to as the Traditional Social Weýfare (TSW) 
strategy, or Strategic Option 1. It was noted in the previous Section that "sofV' HRM has 
direct employee welfare rather than business performance as its primary concern (Guest, 
1998). This goes deeply into the national culture and traditions of the FSU, where firms 
were required to make social provisions for employees, regardless of any resulting 
financial deficit for the firm: deficits that were in any case financed by the State. During 
the period of transition, some firms continued to provide Soviet-style social facilities for 
their employees and, as stated above, retained a high level of employment as well, thus 
attracting State subsidies and acting as a miniature welfare State to some extent. (Of 
course, some degree of exploitation of the worker also existed. ) 
Many firms, rather than trying to adopt new strategies under transition, simply followed 
founders' initial models of the employment relation (Baron, et al., 1999), thus exhibiting 
institutional inertia. In the Russian case, the founders used a Soviet-style template and 
those HRM strategies, that mimicked previously-internalised traditional Soviet-style 
welfare strategies, involving costly resource commitments in the absence of strong 
competitive pressures, referred here to as the Traditional Social Wetfare (TSW) bundle. It 
of course also represents the status quo, for Russian firms, and a strategy which, although 
possibly ill-suited to transition economies to some extent, is familiar to firms and in which 
they may have established a core competence. 
It has to remembered that Russia has generally been identified as having a national culture 
exhibiting high levels of collectivism (thus low individualism), high levels of uncertainty 
avoidance and low levels of power-distance tolerance (i. e. a tendency towards 
egalitarianism) (Elenkov, 1998). This implies a traditional emphasis on values of 
solidarity, close personal relationships, care for the weak, and protecting past results rather 
than on taking risks in an uncertain future. In other words this implies that workers are 
unlikely to support value-maximising restructuring efforts and do not spur performance 
improvements (Boycko et aL, 1996) at the expense of their personal benefits. Employment 
relationships in the FSU were effectively based on lifetime employment and enterprises 
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provided many of the social needs of both current and retired employees. The privatisation 
outcome of managerial and employee ownership may have positive effects on employee 
motivation and labour productivity (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995), i. e. insider ownership will 
be associated with the excessive provision of various social facilities, typical of the 
"Soviet" model, and described here as the TSW Strategic Option. Hence we can 
hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3. Higher levels of insider ownership are positively associated with higher 
levels o Traditional Social Wetfare provisionfor employees. ?f 
Following Buck et aL (2003), the hypothesised association for TSW implies that (P. 538) 
"employee shareholders to some extent will be prepared to sacrifice profits ... in the long 
term for immediate, job-related utility as employees". TSW strategy amounts to 
paternalism by corporations -a form of management practice quite popular in British 
industrial production in the I 9th Century, which has already become a rather unfashionable 
business strategy in Western firms (Wray, 1996). Following Wray (1996, p. 704), 
66 ... paternalism exhibits a two-way commitment, with responsibilities and obligations 
required from both sides" of the employee-manager relationship. Employers do not 
provide only wages in exchange for work, but are also socially responsible for workforces 
through benefits and welfare provisions. However, although it still exists in Russia today, 
TSW could survive mostly in an environment offering soft loans from banks or extensive 
State support (though this has recently become more unusual, with the State attempting to 
withdraw its ownership and control from the industrial sector), or be feasible within 
strongly performing enterprises. 
It is not surprising that the gradual withdrawal of the State from Russian enterprises has 
lead to its replacement by other ownership categories - outsiders or private insiders. In the 
case of private inside ownership, certain legal forms of enterprise (e. g. the open joint stock 
company) may impose a discipline on senior managers to choose strategies that reduce the 
threat from outside investors (Buck et aL, 2003; Filatotchev et aL, 1999). However, Stark 
(2001) warns that either minor or expected actual changes in property forms may act as a 
cosmetic device to conceal the status quo that in fact is close to the traditional "Soviet" 
HRM system of welfare provision. 
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With structural inertia in a status quo, any changes to developed routines are harmful per 
se, since they disturb established processes and reduce performance reliability (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984). However, changes may have a neutral or positive effect if they are 
build on existing competences or routines aligned with environmental shifts in the 
command-administrative economy (Spenner et aL, 1998). Thus, in the light of this 
literature, for the reformed Russian market environment, TSW provisions may be expected 
to be positively associated with enterprise performance. 
This positive association may be also supported by the presence of job security (Delery 
and Doty, 1996; Pfeffer, 1994) in enterprises promoting the TSW strategy. Companies that 
provide their employees with job security signal a long-standing commitment to their 
workforce, and, as a result, employees are more likely to volunteer productivity 
improvements. Although the high costs of TSW could conceivably damage firm 
performance in some ways, it was decided to follow Spenner et aL, (1998) and 
hypothesise in this thesis that the TSW strategy bundle is expected to be positively 
associated with the performance of Russian enterprises in overall terms. 
To be consistent with Hypothesis 2 in relation to aggregate FIRM strategies and firm 
performance, it is, somewhat heroically, assumed that the provision of TSW benefits in the 
FSU is uniquely suited to the national culture and institutions of Russia. Specifically, we 
hypothesise for the TSW Strategic Option: 
Hypothesis 4. Firm performance is positively associated with Traditional Social Weýfare 
provisionfor employees. 
In other words, we continue to assume that provision of TSW benefits in the FSU is 
uniquely suited to the national culture and institutions in Russia, and thus this specific 
bundle of TSW strategies is positively associated with performance. 
Two other important strategies, identified in the Western literature, are quite different to 
TSW and include a Cost Minimisation (CM) Strategy (Section 3.3.2) and a Human 
Resource Investment (HRI) Strategy (Section 3.3.3). It has to be remembered, that from 
the employees' (managers' or workers') point of view, these strategies are not equally 
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desirable. On the contrary, there are significant differences in the perception of health and 
safety issues, job security, the intensity of work, and the extent to which gains are shared, 
benefits provisions and associated costs, etc. (Osten--nan, 1999). Consequently these 
strategies could be either opposed or favoured by the employees, and result in stronger or 
weaker performance. 
3.3.2 COST MINIMISATION STRATEGY 
The first "hard" HRM strategy, in contrast to "soft" TSW, can involve downsizing and 
"flexible production" (Birkenshaw and Hagstr6m, 2000), characterised by hiring and 
firing, instead of labour retention. Downsizing, as an HRM policy, has become a popular 
organisation strategy in the West for improving performance through reducing costs 
(Luthans and Sommer, 1999), and can also include outsourcing and subcontracting. These 
business processes are typical of those manufacturing firms in Russia that found 
themselves in financial crisis after mass privatisation, i. e. in a "business turnaround" 
situation (Filatotchev et al., 2000), requiring labour retrenchment. In these circumstances, 
"hard" HRM strategies could be feasible, leading to cost reduction and restoring control 
over cash flows. This first radical strategy will be referred to as a Cost Minimisation (CM) 
Strategy, or Strategic Option 2. It is also identified in the Western literature as "Theory E" 
(Beer and Nohria, 2000), the Factory Model (Baron et al., 1996; Hannan et al., 1996), or 
Bureaucracy or Autocracy Models in the studies of Baron et al. (1999). 
According to Beer and Nohria (2000), in a financial crisis or "business turnaround" 
situation, drastic changes in strategy (and subsequent cuts in expenditures) may be 
required. In addition, a company that adopts "Theory E" ignores to a large degree the 
feelings and attitudes of their employees. As the only legitimate concern of this "hard" 
approach is shareholder value downsizing, enterprises may lose the commitment, the 
coordination, the communication, and the creativity from employees, needed for sustained 
competitive advantage. As shareholders, employees could win under a CM strategy, but as 
employees they are likely to lose, as changes usually involve the heavy use of economic 
incentives, drastic layoffs, downsizing, and restructuring. Thus, workers' ownership and 
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control may prevent restructuring, since workers are unlikely to provide any kind of 
support for layoffs as a starting point for restructuring as a main managerial strategy in 
cutting costs (Charreaux and Desbrieres, 2001), especially if they still get subsidies 
(Boycko et aL, 1996). The reason for this is that employees may assume that they will 
personally suffer from retrenchments (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, Filatotchev et aL, 
2000). In the case of the FSU, and following the outcomes of the privatisation programme 
in Russia (see Buck et aL (2003) for Ukraine), increased outside ownership and control 
and withdrawal of the State, with its system of social provision, have led in many firms to 
the minimisation of social costs, the implementation of short-term or contractual working 
schemes with lower wage rates, and other market-related work practices associated with 
cost minimisation. Thus, it is possible to hypothesise that lower insider ownership and 
control could be associated with a more active Cost Minimisation (CM) Strategy, referred 
to here as Strategic Option 2. Hence: 
Hypothesis 5. Lower levels of insider ownership are associated with active Cost 
Minimisation strategies. 
Being a "hard" HRM strategy, "Theory E" is rather common among restructuring US 
companies, where it is focused on the maximisation of shareholder value and is achieved 
through financial incentives (Beer and Nohria, 2000). In Russia however, employees may 
be more concerned with their personal welfare and job stability, rather than the value of 
enterprise shares, and as a result of a CM strategy, may lose any trust in the company and 
management. Thus it is very unlikely that this strategy will result in improved 
performance and gains for the firms. 
This prediction in relation to the strategy identified here as Cost Minimisation, is also 
supported by the work of Spenner et aL (1998), although their work went beyond just 
HRM strategies, and Buck et aL (2003) Ukrainian study. Spenner et aL (1998, p. 601) 
argue that drastic, "... core organisational changes will have a negative effect on 
organisational performance". On this view, any governance changes that radically depart 
from the old practices (in the case of Russia, the Soviet command-administrative 
economy) and, on the contrary, implement unrestrained market practices, would be 
extremely damaging for the performance outcomes of the firms (Ernst et al., 1996), in the 
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early years at least. Therefore, following Buck et aL (2003), Ernst et aL (1996) and 
Spenner et aL (1998) it is assumed that cost-cutting in relation to employment costs runs 
contrary to the national culture, philosophy and institutions of Russia, and is unlikely to 
result in improved performance. Hence we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 6. Firm performance is negatively associated with Cost Minimisation 
strategies. 
Under the influence of private inside owners, a number of the State's HR practices were 
transferred to the firms themselves, and thus replaced the old system with a new one, 
based on low-commitment, high-turnover employment relations (MacDuffie, 1995; 
Osterman 1999,2000). This type of firm, also denoted as being based on the Factory 
Model (Baron et al., 1996; Hannan et al., 1996), is characterised by pecuniary 
attachments, hierarchical managerial control and hiring for current skills. Following Baron 
et al. (1996), the Factory Model is based on purely monetary motivations, control and 
coordination through formal managerial control and selection of employees to do 
predetermined tasks (with no or very limited training provided). The similarity between a 
workspace as a "factory" and a traditional industrial factory of early capitalism comes here 
from the notion that employees are considered as technical inputs with tight bureaucratic 
control. Unsurprisingly, firms using the Factory Model may employ a minimalist (CM 
HRM strategy compared with those using a TSW (above) or HRI strategy, discussed in the 
next Section. 
Following the above discussion, a Cost Minimisation strategy is considered as departing 
most decisively from the antecedent Soviet founder's employment model, and is 
hypothesised as being damaging in terms of performance outcomes for Russian firms (in 
the short term at least), and resulting from decreasing insider shareholdings and control. 
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3.3.3 HUMAN RESOURCE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
In stark contrast with Cost Minimisation, Beer and Nohria (2000) develop the HPWO 
literature, and refer to "Theory 0", involving long-tenn, high commitment investments in 
employees with the purpose of raising performance and productivity, in an attempt to 
establish a "psychological contract" between workers and their firms. "Theory 0" also 
calls for radical departure from traditional Soviet HRM practices, although less drastic 
than "Theory E", and is identified in the Occupational Psychology literature with 
"psychological contracts", where employees are provided with informal guarantees 
concerning employment stability and insurance provisions in exchange for their 
commitment to the enterprises (pay as fair exchange). This HRM strategy will be referred 
to as a Human Resource Investment (HRI) Strategy or Strategic Option 3 in this research. 
It is worth noting that following "Theory 0", HRI is a "hard" HRM alternative to the 
"flexible" firm and labour retrenchment, but an HRM strategy that involves investments in 
employees (both retained and newly hired). The goal of "Theory 0" is to develop a 
corporate culture and human capability through individual and organisational learning 
(Beer and Nohria, 2000) to achieve superior performance. Following Vlachoutsicos and 
Lawrence (1996), investing heavily in managerial learning of Russian partners and 
employees was observed as a common feature of successfW joint ventures. 
This third, high-commitment, Western HR model also corresponds to that identified by 
Osterman (1999,2000), who examines HPWO practices in relation to productivity and 
quality gains that are to some extent shared to employees' benefit. (His low commitment 
model comprises features associated here with the CM model. ) The conventional view has 
always been that in order to achieve high commitment from the employees, firms also 
have to make a reciprocal commitment (Osterman, 1999) or contribute to "psychological 
contracts" (Dore, 1992; Guest, 1999) so that "flexible" employees would not require 
extensive vertical monitoring and high buffers stocks. "Flexible" or "lean" production is 
also identified by MacDuffie (1995) and Baron et aL (1996) with a high-commitment HR 
strategy, which requires motivated, skilled and adaptive workers that in combination with 
reduced stocks could create the conditions under which innovative FIR practices are most 
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likely to yield effective economic performance. On this view, employees who have strong 
emotional ties to their firm and feel that their opinions count, are those who believe that 
their managers are interested in their development (i. e. emotional/psychological 
engagement), and are more likely to produce favourable outcomes and thus improve firm 
performance (Luthans and Peterson, 2002). 
High-commitment "psychological contracts" that lead employees to contribute efforts on 
behalf of the firm that exceed any contractual obligations (Guest, 1998), can theoretically 
result in strong efficiency gains for the enterprise (Barberis et aL, 1996), and in the 
development of human resources, through different forms of training and education. It is 
known that technological skills were on a high level in the FSU due to good education in 
natural sciences, especially engineering and mathematics. But when Russian enterprises 
found themselves in a market environment, where they now have different tasks, and 
individuals are required to develop other skills (often based on tacit know-how), the 
provision of various forms of training and developmental investments for employees 
(including team-based performance compensation programs) became essential. Russian 
organisations can also improve their HRM by giving team-based financial awards on a 
monthly, quarterly, and annual basis for achieving a variety of targets. So, it can be 
hypothe§ised that: 
Hypothesis 7. Higher levels of insider ownership are positively associated with the 
intensity of high-commitment Human Resource Investments. 
Subsequently, following Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), who empirically proved that HRI 
strategies in foreign subsidiaries in Russia are positively associated with improved firm 
performance, and Buck et aL (2003), who have drawn a similar conclusion for high- 
commitment HR strategies in Ukraine, we can hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 8. Firm performance is positively associated with new HRI investments. 
One may argue that a similar HRI strategy could be pursued by foreign entrants too. 
However with the main focus of this research on insider owned Russian firms, we do not 
consider the examination of outsiders in this thesis. 
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The HRI model is proposed here as one involving high commitments from both the firm 
and employees, involving team-based (rather than individual) compensation, where the 
latter is more typical of the TSW model. However, it is clear that the HRI model has more 
in common with the fundamental philosophy of the TSW model than CM, and is directly 
concerned with employees' welfare, as a primary source of sustaining competitive 
advantage for a firm (Pfeffer, 1994). To this extent, HRI implies a less radical departure 
from TSW than CM. 
Therefore, following Mac; Duffie (1995) and Spenner et al. (1998), the HRI strategy is 
another variant of the high commitment model that departs from direct financial and in- 
kind subsidies to employees, and represents investment in an enterprise's human resources 
and the introduction of new - performance-related - incentive schemes, aligning them 
with environmental shifts, e. g. those that have occurred during transition. 
As stated, the HRI strategy is proposed here as involving commitments to initial and 
ongoing training as well as team-based compensation, rather than the individual 
contingent contracts associated with the TSW and CM models. Also, the HRI strategy can 
be viewed as a "total quality" strategy that focuses on continually improving 
manufacturing performance via investment in human capital (Garvin, 1993). More 
specifically, employees in such environments are required to make the transition from a 
labour force providing only physical work effort, to empowered intellectual capital whose 
responsibilities expand to include such activities as planning, problem solving, quality 
assurance, etc. (Snell and Dean, 1994,1995; Youndt et aL, 1996). This requires a skilled 
and motivated workforce that has the knowledge and capability to perform the required 
tasks (Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999). Since employee development can be expected to be an 
important determinant of enterprise performance in Russia, a variety of HRI practices is 
related to the development of the human resources of the firm itself. Thus for instance, 
enterprise investments in technical and non-technical training are likely to be positively 
associated with the "... extent to which the company actually succeeds in developing the 
skills and knowledge of its employees" (Fey and Bj6rkman, 2001, p. 62). The positive 
relationship between employee training, as one of the high commitment HRM practices, 
and firm performance was also found by Delaney and Huselid (1996), Huselid (1995), 
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Koch and McGrath (1996), and MacDuffie (1995). Besides raising productivity, however, 
training clearly involves costs too. 
Following the preceding discussion, the HRI strategy is expected to work best in an 
environment where employees are willing to learn new skills and improve their quality 
and productivity. The HRM literature provides a conventional view that employees are 
willing to make this kind of commitment (Osterman, 2000). 'In a survey of private sector 
non-managerial workers and low- and mid-level managers, Freeman and Rogers (1995, 
p. 340) find that "... some 79% of non-managerial participants in employee involvement 
programs reported to personally" benefit from participation "... by getting more influence 
on how their job is done". To large extent this perception was achieved due to 
performance-based compensation as a prominent feature of high-involvement HRM 
practices. This has also been reported in other Western studies (e. g. Arthur, 1994; Delery 
and Doty, 1996; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Huselid, 1995). Following Fey and 
Bjbrkman (2001, p. 64), these authors "... have identified performance-based compensation 
as the single strongest predictor of firm performance". However, until recently very few 
local Russian companies were making use of pay in this way to reward employees (May et 
aL, 1998), although this practice was quite common and successful in the Russian 
subsidiaries of Western firms (Fey et aL, 1999; Juplev et aL, 1998; Puffer, 1997; Puffer 
and Shekshnia, 1994). Being recognised as a prominent characteristic of HRI strategies in 
Western research, team-based performance pay is included here in the HRI strategic 
cluster, as opposed to the individually-oriented bonuses, typical of CM strategy. 
According to the above discussion, an HRI strategy is considered as a "hard" strategy 
departing least from the antecedent Soviet founder's employment model, and was 
. hypothesised as being positively associated with the performance outcomes in Russian 
finns and supported by firm insiders. 
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3.3.4 MIXED HRM STRATEGIES AND SUMMARY ON APPROPRIATE 
BUNDLES FOR RUSSIAN ]RESEARCH 
The preceding Section identified three strategic HRM bundles (with corresponding 
hypotheses introduced), recognised in Western research, for the analysis of Governance - 
Strategy - Performance relationships in Russia. Specifically, these bundles comprise 
Traditional Social Welfare (TSW), Cost Minimisation (CM) and Human Resource 
Investment (HRI). The analysis shows that, although the TSW and BRI strategic bundles 
are quite distinct in terms of their underlying factors, they both represent high commitment 
models. From this perspective, the proposed BRI model is argued to be a gradual 
departure from traditional HRM in the FSU. The CM "hard" HRM strategy departs from 
the traditional Soviet HRM model most decisively. 
Meanwhile, the question arises, what if a company chooses a sequence of strategies or 
decides to apply them simultaneously, mixing, for instance, CM with HRP. According to 
Beer and Nohria (2000), companies can enact "Theory E" (CM and "Theory 0" (HRI) in 
sequence. For example, a company can first layoff employees ("Theory E") and then cut 
down organisational hierarchy and start investing into training of remaining employees' 
("Theory 0"). Additionally, if HRI follows CM strategy, employees and managers may 
feel betrayed, and, normally, it is too hard to manage these circumstances (Beer and 
Nohria, 2000). 
Also following Beer and Nohria (2000), instead of using only one strategy or their 
sequence, a company could try to implement both HRI and CM at the same time. The 
authors argue that in this case the simultaneous use of both HRM strategies is more likely 
to be the source of sustainable competitive advantage, although it has to be remembered 
and understood that the goals of these two policies explicitly conflict. 
Lepak and Snell (1999) also noted that firms can utilise multiple HRM strategies, 
especially if these are "make/buy strategies", which are not mutually exclusive. However, 
Sormenfeld and Peiperl (1988, p. 597) maintained that "... each firm should exhibit one 
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modal type of the system, which we would expect to be most closely connected with the 
base, or primary, business strategy", a position that the empirical literature in the strategic 
HRM field generally supports (Bac and Lawler, 2000). 
Following this discussion, it becomes clear that the process of mixing or sequencing two 
HRM strategies becomes a balancing act between initiating actions that follow one 
strategy and then deviating from that strategy. It also takes years and highly skilled 
management to fully implement one strategy, and if, during the process, senior 
management is changed, the program may lose momentum and direction. To estimate 
HRM strategies applied in sequence or in mix, one would require a time series of data, 
however. With the real possibility that Russian managers may not be qualified to promote 
commercially-oriented strategies, and due to the constraints imposed in this thesis by only 
one cross-section of data, we therefore leave this issue as being beyond the bounds of this 
study. 
Meanwhile, the question arises, how significant may these three broad strategies be for 
Russian firms? In existing research, Longenecker and Popovski (1994), May et aL (1998), 
Puffer (1993), Radko and Afanasieva (1999), Welsh et aL (1993) have suggested that 
modem HRM policies are crucial to success in Russia. Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) 
investigated the relationship between HRM and firm performance in 101 foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in Russia and found that greater HRM investments for managerial and non- 
managerial employees are positively related to firm performance, e. g. labour productivity 
improves. This finding coincides with a resource-based view of the firm and provides 
support for the investments in high-commitment HRM strategies that aim at getting more 
from workers by giving more to them (Baron and Kreps, 1999). 
The following table summarises the range of models and methodologies, used in Western 
or CEE (Spenner et al., 1998) studies, which were found to closely correspond with the 
three coherent clusters proposed for this Russian research - Traditional Social Weýfare, 
Cost Minimisation and Human Resource Investment, and thus supporting their choice. 
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Table 3. Some of the Recognised Models and Methodologies Used by Authors 
Traditional Cost Human Additional 
Social Welfare Minimisation Resource Models 
Authors Equivalents Equivalents Investment 
and (plus (plus Equivalents 
Methodologies Associated Associated (plus 
Concepts) Concepts) Associated 
Concepts) 
Baron et al. Founders' Factory Model Commitment Star and 
(1996) Organisational. (Cost Model (Lean Engineering 
100 Bay Area hi- Models Minimisation) Production) Models 2 
tech firms, Cross- 
section plus 
Weighted Least 
Squares 
Baron et al. Founders' Bureaucracy Commitment Star and 
(1999) Organisational or Autocracy Model (Lean Engineering 
SPEC, Cross- Models Models (High Production) Models 2 
section plus Managerial 
Weighted Least Intensity) 
Squares 
Hannan et al. Founders' Factory Model Commitment Star and 
(1996) Organisational (Cost Model Engineering 
SPEC, Cross- Models Minimisation) Models 2 
section 
MacDuffie (1995) Only Mass High Transitional 
Cross-section plus concerned with Production Commitment Model, Low to 
Factor Analysis, HRM (Low (Flexibility, High 
Reliability, innovations Commitment, Empowerment) Commitment 
Cluster Analysis Taylorism) 
Osterman (1999, Only Low High 
2000) concerned with Commitment Commitment 
Two Cross- HRM (High 
sections, innovations Performance 
Descriptive Work 
Analysis, OLS Practices) 
Spenner et al. Command- Core HRM Peripheral, 
(1998) Bulgarian Administrative Changes Incremental 
Panel, OLS Economy HRM Changes 
1 Methodologies will be examined in full detail in Chapter IV. 
2 The Star Model is only relevant to an environment where professional 
organisations impose strong controls. The Engineering Model is described by 
Hannan et aL (1996) as the Silicon Valley Model, and is concerned with project 
attachment and peer control. 
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As can be seen from the table, Baron et al. (1996,1999) and Hannan et al. (1996) refer to 
a founders' model, which embeds employment practices, institutions and national culture, 
and follows the founders' philosophy and organisational. blueprint in the evolution of firm 
employment system. In the case of the FSU, the concept of Traditional Social Welfare 
corresponds with a founders' model. Although it could be very costly to implement in the 
post-reform transition environment, TSW must be considered as an important "soft" HRM 
strategy that has direct employee welfare rather than business performance as its primary 
concern (Guest, 1998), and thus is expected to be adopted in employee-controlled 
enterprises. In other words, a Stakeholder perspective can be combined with HRM bundles 
to generate predictions in relation to strategies. Furthermore, TSW strategies, associated 
with employee ownership, may be associated with inferior firm performance. 
The Factory, Bureaucracy and Autocracy Models, used by the same authors, together with 
strategies denoted elsewhere in the Western literature as mass production, Taylorism or 
low commitment (MacDuffie, 1995; Osterman, 1999,2000), represent a family of models 
corresponding to the Cost Minimisation strategic option. This "hard" HRM strategy is 
focused on improving effectiveness through reducing costs via massive layoffs, 
downsizing, and "flexible production" (Birkenshaw and Hagstr6m, 2000), etc. This model 
is characterised by high-turnover labour relations (where employees are hired for short 
periods to perform particular tasks), low-commitment from both sides, as employees lose 
any trust towards the company and its management. This Cost Minimisation strategy 
deviates most decisively from the founder's model of employment in the FSU. 
Again, links between governance through stakeholders and HRM strategies and hence 
performance may be proposed. Where enterprise employees represent a majority of inside 
owners, it is argued that the CM strategy will be seen to be damaging and will therefore be 
opposed by insiders, since it brings job instability to employees and cuts in social 
provisions. In the context of the FSU, it is also argued that CM is negatively associated 
with firm performance. 
The Human Resource Investment model is recognised by Baron et al. (1996,1999), 
Hannan et aL (1996), MacDuffie (1995), Osterman (1999,2000), and Spenner et al. 
(1998) as a high commitment HRM strategy, built as a development of the TSW model. In 
67 
Chapter III. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
particular, it involves long-term investments in employees (e. g. training) with the purpose 
of raising productivity and performance in an attempt to establish a "psychological 
contract" between workers and firm, where workers are provided with informal guarantees 
concerning employment stability and benefits. Employee-shareholders may be expected to 
be associated with such strategies and although, being a "hard" FIRM strategy, it is less 
radical than the CM strategy, and is more likely to produce favourable outcomes and 
improve firm performance (Luthans and Peterson, 2002). 
To summarise, in order to extend previous studies of HRM practices in the West and in 
the FSU, and Russia in particular, this analysis adopts three coherent HRM bundles, the 
first based on institutional inertia - TSW, the second founded on radical economic change 
- CM., and the third involving a development of high-commitment founders' blueprint - 
HRL 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
To conclude this Chapter, it seems clear that important gaps in the literature have been 
identified in relation to (a) the influences of governance (besides MBOs and takeover) on 
HRM strategies and (b) the consequences of these HRM strategies for firm performance in 
transition economies. Finally, (c) there has been no analysis of the inter-relations between 
governance, strategies and performance. In this sense, this research breaks new ground 
theoretically and empirically by studying employee welfare strategies in the FSU, 
specifically Russia. 
As globalisation continues and it becomes clear that human resources are the real 
competitive advantage, effective HRM becomes crucial for enterprise performance. The 
challenge facing international HRM is not whether to use recognised and already adopted 
concepts, frameworks and techniques, but rather how to effectively adapt and fit them 
across cultures (Luthans et aL, 1997). There is also a growing debate on which HRM 
model to adopt - "soft" or "hard" for successful Governance - Strategy - Performance 
relations. The literature review in this Chapter would suggest that most of the countries 
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that went through transition firstly demolished the old system of employment relations, 
and then started building new cost-effective strategies - either Cost Minimisation or 
Human Resource Investment strategies. In most of the countries studied, after years of 
economic distress, the situation was generally improving and enterprise owners started 
investing into employees. 
The insider ownership generated by the Russian mass privatisation programme, 
encourages the firms to treat employees as assets and source of competitive advantage. 
Subsequent chapters are intended to give answers to the question of whether the 
stakeholder rights of employees influence strategic decisions in favour of immediate 
sources of their welfare (employment, high wages, social benefits, etc. ), and how this 
impacts on performance. In terms of a cluster approach, developed in the review of 
relevant HRM literature, above, available data will be exploited to see if the adoption of 
the three broad strategies (Traditional Social Welfare, Cost Minimisation and Human 
Resource Investment) can be also attributed to the extent of insider ownership. In addition, 
once the Governance - Strategy - Performance relations are considered as interdependent, 
the chosen methodology, therefore, will accommodate interactions between governance, 
HRM strategy and performance. This methodology is described later in the next Chapter. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most of the literature on Corporate Governance and Strategic Management, that provided 
research basis for this study in Chapter III, led to quantitative analysis. There is a 
prevailing view that quantitative variables are to be trusted more, even with the 
misreporting and accounting difficulties that are rife in transition countries (Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002). Nonetheless, quantitative variables can measure directly the output of 
enterprise restructuring and economic performance. There is also the view that 
"quantitative performance might suffer when an enterprise is investing in large-scale 
reorganisation and that the results of this process might be observed earliest in qualitative 
variables" (Djankov and Murrell, 2002, p. 750). 
However, although the techniques for conducting and reporting qualitative research are 
fairly similar to quantitative ones, the nature of qualitative study (based mostly on the 
collection of case study information) has led to distinguished articles on the topic (Moore 
et aL, 1986). According to Van Maanen (1983), the label "qualitative methods" has no 
precise meaning in any of the social sciences. The author states (p. 9) that "it is at best the 
umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, 
translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain 
more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world". Qualitative research 
seeks to describe and explain particular phenomena which under investigation (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1989). Questions and problems in qualitative research are usually derived 
from real world observations, dilemmas or questions, and take the form of wide-ranging 
inquiries (Marshall and Rossman, 1989) that produce descriptive data from persons' 
written or spoken words (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). In other words, a study that attempts 
to uncover the nature of people's experiences as a social phenomenon naturally lends itself 
to qualitative types of research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Chapter IV. Data and Methodolqy 
Some researchers are concerned about reliability and validity in qualitative research 
(Delamont, 1992; Goetz and LeCompte, 1982; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988). 
Most theorists agree that concerns of reliability and validity can be addressed in 
qualitative research, albeit from a different perspective than in quantitative studies 
(Delamont, 1992; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988). These researchers argue that 
since qualitative research is based on people's experiences and assumptions about reality, 
it should have different conceptualisations of validity and reliability (Merriam, 1988), and 
should be applied to case studies mostly. 
With a rich basis for research coming from the questionnaire data collected, this thesis 
favours the quantitative approach and is developed in the manner where hypothesised 
relationships between various strategic and governance factors are tested using methods of 
statistical analysis in order to accept or reject possible associations with certain levels of 
significance. 
This Chapter starts with Section 4.2 on Survey Methodology and Data Collection, turning 
next to Sample Representativeness and sampling issues. This Section is concerned with 
empirical data collection and the choice of data collection methods adopted in the conduct 
of this research. It also explains the main stages of questionnaire design, and provides a 
theoretical discussion and sample comparison with official Russian statistics. With the 
focus of this thesis on a wide range of HRM practices adopted for Russian privatised 
firms, Section 4.3 continues with an in-depth description of the Questionnaire Design, 
paying particular attention to question types, scales and other topic-related sections 
included into the questionnaire for obtaining relevant information and measures during the 
survey process. Then, on the basis of described questionnaire, Subsections 4.3.1,4.3.2, 
and 4.3.4 introduce correspondingly Main Independent Variables, Main Dependent 
Variables and Controls for Governance Strategy and Strategy - Performance analyses. 
Also, Subsection 4.3.3 describes Composite Strategic Variables for the specified cluster 
analysis applied in this research. Subsections 4.3.1 - 4.3.4 also discuss the relevance of 
introduced measures for testing of the stated hypotheses. Where needed, descriptive 
analysis backs up the choice of selected measures. 
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Next, Section 4.4 provides a fundamental description of Statistical Techniques with a 
particular focus on: 
- 4.4.1 Statistical Assumptions for Econometric Models; 
- 4.4.2 Examination of Regression Parameters; 
- 4.4.3 Modifications of Regression Models; and 
- 4.4.4 Cluster Analysis. 
Subsequently, Section 4.5 provides theoretical grounds for the specified cross-sectional 
study, as opposed to time series analysis, paying attention to the strengths of cross- 
sectional approach, as well as addressing its associated weaknesses. 
Section 4.6 hereafter presents Models and Specifications, which will be tested in support 
of the hypothesised relationships between Governance and Strategy (4.6.1) and Strategy - 
Performance (4.6.2). Subsection 4.6.3 describes Composite Strategy Models proposed 
here for adopted Traditional Social Weýfare, Cost Minimisation and Human Resource 
Investment specific HRM bundles' approach. 
The Chapter is concluded with Section 4.7, which provides a summary on data; 
methodological background; statistical techniques; models, variables and controls used in 
this thesis. 
4.2 SURVEY METHODOLOGY: DATA COLLECTION AND 
SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS 
During the years of transition, Russia has not generally been a subject of intensive 
research, being considered by the West as descendant of the Soviet economy of central 
planning and tight norms, arguably declining, unstable, unreliable, etc., and only years 
later as a growing economy in the middle of a world recession, that has attracted interest 
from researchers. As was noted by Fey and Bjbrkman (2001), little systematic Russian- 
language research existed on HRM issues in Russia, and the Western literature was very 
limited too. Thus, with regards to empirical data collection this thesis followed many of 
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the approaches of previous studies in transition economies. This is particularly the case 
with HRM strategies where employee ownership and control remains high by Western 
standards. 
This research is based on unpublished surveys collected in Russia during the year 2000 
(with some 1999 comparisons) by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva, 
Switzerland, as part of its traditional Russian Labor Force Survey. The author had no 
opportunity to influence questionnaire development and the survey process, which used 
two questionnaires and was thoroughly performed by ILO professionals. 
Regarding the survey instrument, both questionnaires were developed in English and then 
translated into Russian. The first questionnaire was piloted by mail (with a return 
envelope) with general directors of enterprises in Moscow, the Moscow region, St. 
Petersburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Ivanovo, Vladimir, Chelyabinsk and in the Republic of 
Tatarstan. The second questionnaire was administered through face-to-face interviews 
with general directors or senior managers of enterprises in the same regions. Both of the 
results were revised and back-translated into English afterwards (Standing and Zsoldos, 
2000). 
There are a number of responsiveness issues related to the use of both of the described 
methods of data collection. One of the major problems regarding the questionnaire-based 
interviews in Russia is a low response rate, caused mostly because of unfamiliar 
methodology (especially for indigenous Russian firms), and, also, the time-taking nature 
of the process. Following Filatotchev et aL (2001a), Russian managers were often 
reluctant to spare their time when being invited to participate in a number of surveys, 
conducted by Western researchers and professionals. Here, one of the ways to overcome 
the spare time issue was to conduct a face-to-face interview, whereas, the first obstacle 
could be escaped by simple wording and terminology of questionnaire. Thus, this was one 
of the reasons to use questionnaires translated into Russian, and conduct face-to-face 
interviews during the second stage of data collection process. The presence of ILO 
professional agents at State Committee of The Russian Federation on Statistics 
(Goskomstat) was considered necessary to secure accurate completion of a long, 
complicated survey instrument. 
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Following Standing and Zsoldos (2000), over the last eight years ILO has conducted a 
number of Labor Force questionnaire Surveys in developing and transition economies, like 
Azerbaijan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Moldova and Ukraine. For each of these countries 
questionnaire design has been modified and individual parameters, measure and scales 
were introduced to match survey environments and local conditions of these countries, 
particularly country-specific HRM practices (Standing and Zsoldos, 2000). For Russia, 
these in particular included such important HRM variables as a number of laid-off 
workers, benefits paid in-kind, plans to reduce social provisions, etc. 
ILO gathered objective and perceptual data on HRM practices and perceptual indicators of 
organizational performance from 309 enterprises. However, direct quantitative 
information on firms' financial performance (like firms' value, profitability or other 
accounting based information) was not collected. For some measures, like organizational 
size or a number of lay-offs, respondents provided extensive factual data. The obtained 
sample contained numerous information on enterprises with different property forms: 
State-owned enterprises, producer co-operatives and partnerships, closed and open joint 
stock companies (JSCs), and private firms. A number of questions in the 2000 survey were 
designed and answered for the year 2000 and also for 1999. These are for example: a 
percentage of sales exported within or outside the CIS, or bartered; a total number of 
workers and employment change (resigned/dismissed); paying for special training 
institute; social costs', training and wage share of production costs. Also, the survey 
contains data on such governance variables as share ownership of different groups (where 
insider ownership is of our particular interest), legal forms of enterprises, and other 
elements like profit sharing system, etc. 
A final sample (referred to hereafter as the ILO sample) was obtained from 295 firms 
giving useable responses from Moscow, Moscow Region, Nizhni Novgorod and Ivanovo 
by means of reduction of the original ILO sample according to missing values. This 
sample reduction did not change the total sample industrial distribution significantly as 
these two samples are generally within 0.02% of each other. Following Standing and 
Zsoldos (2000), enterprises themselves were systematically selected using a random start 
with probability rates based on population proportions according to employment size, i. e. 
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with a 50% probability rate of being selected for "large" enterprises, 25% for "medium- 
size" firms and 25% for "small" ones. 
This approach is similar to the one for Ukrainian ILO questionnaire survey, where The 
Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics required regional State statistics departments to collect 
data from a particular number of enterprises, based on the sampling procedure described 
above. From this point, Ukrainian questionnaires resemble more an official census than an 
academic survey once the returns were compulsory, and "the accuracy of quantitative data 
was checked by surveyors against what is called the official "balance sheet" of Ukrainian 
establishments" (Buck et al., 2003, p. 539). Although The Russian State Committee on 
Statistics did not enforce any participation conditions, as its Ukrainian counterpart did, 
similar selection process implies quite high reliability rates of data for Russia too. 
In this context, it should be emphasised that the author had no control whatsoever over the 
survey process, and the only discretion involved his extraction of relevant responses and 
the construction of clustered variables from a large number of questions. While this 
situation obviously involves risks in terms of validity and non-response bias, etc., the 
upside is that ILO professionals gained access to Russian firms, producing a massive 
survey that would have been quite beyond the resources of a single PhD research student. 
Some tests on representativeness can be used, however. 
The final sample of 295 enterprises (with 95% of independent firms, and the rest 5% 
constituting part of bigger establishments) covers 184,874 employees from Metallurgy, 
Engineering, Food and Light industries, Chemistry, Wood & Paper, and Construction 
materials (Table 5 beneath). The majority of responded general directors were male - 260 
(or 88%) - and the rest 35 (or 12%) were female. Directors also averaged 14.3 years at 
their enterprise and 7.6 years in their current position. Table 4 presents sample property 
form and detailed employment distribution: 
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Table 4. Property Form Distribution and Employment Percentages 
Property Form 
Number of 
Enterprises 
Number of 
Enterprises 
N 
Number of 
Employees 
Employment 
N 
State 45 15.25 24,394 13.19 
Partnership 37 12.54 16,536 8.94 
Closed JSC 64 21.69 35,185 19.03 
Open JSC 149 50.51 108,759 58.83 
Total 295 100 184,874 100 
It can be seen from the table that State enterprises accounted for only 13.19% of people 
employed, while open and closed JSCs had 58.83% and 19.03% respectively. Similar 
proportions come for the number of enterprises in each of these groups. The Table also 
shows that among 295 enterprises included into the sample, State enterprises embrace only 
15.25% of the sample, and open and closed JSCs represent 50.51% and 21.69% 
respectively. Partnership was found to be the least popular governance form in the ILO 
sample, both in terms of the number of enterprises presented and people employed. 
The choice of sample appears to be one of the most primary concerns of survey studies 
(Mouly, 1978). For example, collected data for a number of regions may not be 
representative of the population of the country. However, sampling methodology also 
depends on the subject of interest and general scale of research (Moser and Kalton, 1971). 
It has to be remembered that the ILO survey was not intended to be representative of the 
country as a whole, nor for all industrial sectors. In fact, it was restricted to manufacturing 
enterprises in the major regions listed above. In support of this (but remembering that our 
sample covers only 295 firms in the selected regions), in Table 5 we provide industrial 
distribution of the ILO sample, together with it's comparison with the official population 
of Russian firms in terms of employment in the selected regions. 
A potential selection bias in the surveyed sample may be expected due to the possibility of 
non-response, which represents one of the serious limitations for all survey-based 
analyses. However, representativeness improves when comparing ILO results with the 
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official Russian statistics on employment figures in Moscow, the Moscow Region, Nizhni 
Novgorod and Ivanovo. It is known that the former Soviet system gave high priority to 
"material production" and to the military-industrial orientation of enterprises, so it is of no 
surprise that Engineering represents the largest group in both official Russian statistics and 
in the ILO sample. With engineering having a half of the sample, the second largest 
industry is the Light industry with approximately 22% among the surveys enterprises. 
Also, close correspondence can be seen between Food, Chemistry, Wood & Paper, and 
Industry of Construction Materials. The least represented industry within these four 
regions is Metallurgy, which is covered by only 3 enterprises in the ILO sample, but does 
not vary a lot from this in terms of people employed within official Russian statistics too. 
Table 5. Industrial Sector Classification of the Sample and Comparison with 
Official Russian Statistics 
Branch of 
ILO Sample Official Statistics 
Industry 
Number of 
Enterprises 
Number of 
Employees 
Employment, (%) Employment, 
Metallurgy 3 1,186 0.64 0.51 
Engineering 109 92,705 50.14 48.36 
Food 45 12,694 6.87 7.24 
Light 72 40,548 21.93 22.21 
Chemistry 18 26,402 14.28 13.6 
Wood & Paper 27 4,749 2.57 4.37 
Construction 
Materials 
21 6,590 3.56 3.71 
Total 295 184,874 100 100 
Data source: 1 Russian Statistical Yearbook 2000 (State Committee of The Russian 
Federation on Statistics, Moscow, 2001) 
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The use of the ILO data overcame many of the difficulties highlighted in previous studies 
on the FSU and Russia, e. g. by Blasi et al. (1997); Buck et aL (1999); Earle (1998); or 
Estrin and Rosevear (1999), who pointed out the lack of available and reliable data for 
research. On the contrary, the ILO sample provided a broad array of information on a 
representative sample of Russian firms. 
The original ILO questionnaire consisted of more than a hundred ma or questions. It was 
already noted, that the author had no control over the design of questions or their 
administration, though both were subject to a high degree of professionalism within the 
ILO and Goskomstat professionals (in some regions, local Goskomstat employees were 
recruited by the ILO to handle the survey process). With the focus of this research on 
Governance - Strategy and subsequently Strategy - Performance mechanisms in relation 
to HRM strategies and employee welfare, we use only relevant measures that can be 
applied as testable components of the hypothesised relationships. Appendix I embraces the 
selected variables and forty-one relevant questions in full detail. The next Section (with a 
number of subsections) provides theoretical grounds for the choice of independent 
variables, dependent variables, composite strategic variables, and controls. 
4.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND MEASURES 
It was noted at the beginning of Section 4.2 that the ILO survey was conducted through 
two questionnaires: the first piloted by mail with general directors of enterprises, and the 
second administered through face-to-face interviews with general directors or senior 
managers. This survey process benefited from the use of extensive ILO professional 
knowledge of Russian post-privatisation restructuring processes and industry organisation. 
The survey was conducted through the personal distribution of questionnaires and in both 
stages, general directors were made aware of the survey personally or via phone in 
advance, to reduce the possibility of non-responses. The first questionnaire was piloted in 
the middle of 2000, and the second stage of face-to-face interviews took place by the end 
of that year. The majority of questions were designed to be answered for the year 2000, 
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sometimes backed up by the 1999 comparisons (i. e. for the period of July 1999 - July 
2000). Some additional information was obtained during the interviews, but primarily, due 
to its qualitative nature, it was not included into the data. 
The questionnaire consists of. (1) open-ended questions, where respondents were asked to 
provide either precise numerical values (like enterprise size, turnover rate or amount of 
earnings),, or percentage data (e. g. on shares held by insiders or outsiders); (2) general 
66yes", "no" or "do not know" questions regarding any strategies or practices taking place; 
(3) multiple choice questions (existing types of remuneration system or a list of benefits 
provided); and (4) a number of classification questions (region, industry, property type, 
etc. ). 
The questionnaire opens with industrial sector classification (Question 1) and regional 
groupings (Question 2). Industrial sectors particularly provided a choice of basic and 
precious metallurgy, engineering, food processing, textiles, closing and shoes production, 
chemical industry, wood processing, construction materials, medicine, paper production 
and leather processing. Industrial classification, as noted in Section 4.2, included Moscow, 
the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Ivanovo, Vladimir, Chelyabinsk 
and the Republic of Tatarstan (though useable responses were obtained only from 
Moscow, the Moscow Region, Nizhni Novgorod and Ivanovo). 
The following question asks for the property form of the enterprise, offering a choice of 
State, municipal or leasehold enterprises; partnerships/production cooperatives; closed and 
open joint stock companies; private/individual firms; public organisations; and other 
property types of the firms. Question 4 intends to establish if the establishment is 
independent unit or is a part of a larger enterprise. 
The next nine questions are related to numerically measurable attributes of the main 
enterprise activities and resources. Here, the respondents were asked to provide percentage 
data on shares held by insiders (i. e. workers and managers), the State and foreign owners; 
sales exported within the CIS, outside the CIS, either for cash or barter; they also 
disclosed wages, training cost's and social cost's shares of production costs; the total 
number of workers employed; the number of workers on administrative leave (unpaid, 
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partially paid, or full paid); and labour turnover within last year (total, resigned and 
dismissed). The last four numerical questions here address the value of earnings (in 
thousand roubles) for all employees, and specifically for managers, skilled and unskilled 
workers. These earnings are also distinguished among average wages paid, amounts paid 
in the form of bonuses, and the number of benefits provided. 
The questions on the share distribution of firms facilitate the important classification of 
enterprises. As was stated in the Literature Review and Hypotheses Chapter, various CG 
systems, and specifically different types of shareholders, can have a significant influence 
on strategic decisions, that subsequently influence perfon-nance. Thus, one of the aims of 
this study is to thoroughly identify insiders' influence on strategies through governance, 
and on performance through strategies. 
The next part of the questionnaire begins with general directors being asked to estimate 
the values of some indicators, by providing mostly "yes", "no" or "do not know" answers 
to questions, which were later instrumented into binary variables. All of these questions 
were found to be clearly worded and relevant to general directors' or managers' 
responsibilities. For example, this set of questions starts with Question 15 on "foreign 
investments in enterprise", which is next followed by the whole bulk of training- 
associated questions (Questions 16-22): "initial training"; "retraining to improve job 
performance"; "providing training to upgrade"; "change in period training program"; 
"paying for special training institute"; "is paying practice going on now"; or "planning to 
cut financing the training institute". The data obtained from these "training" questions 
were required in terms of guidance rather than as real numbers, however their use will 
allow the identification of various HRM strategies of the enterprises during statistical 
testing. 
The next group of "yes" or "no" questions includes those on "change in volume of 
production" - Question 23; "effect of product range change on employment" - Question 
24; "effect of technological change on employment" - Question 25; and "effect of work 
organisation change on employment" - Question 26. These four questions are 
accompanied by the numerically measurable "capacity utilisation rate" (Question 27), 
asked for as a percentage. 
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The next group of questions represents a mix of the different types of questions, and 
addresses the issues of wage determination and forms in which wages are paid. In 
particular, in Question 28 respondents were offered a multiple choice to specify among 
enterprise performance, individual performance, minimum wage law, or option "other" for 
the "main criteria of wage determination". Three subsequent questions were incorporated 
here to provide numerical answers to the "percentage of workers paid non-monetarily" - 
Question 29; "percentage of wages paid non-monetarily" - Question 30; and "percentage 
of wages not paid on time" - Question 31. The respondents were also asked if profit 
sharing system was operating on their enterprises within the last year (Question 32). 
The questions on remuneration system types and benefits provided constitute the next 
group of surveyed questions. Namely, a multiple choice of. - basic wage; basic wage with 
individual bonuses; basic wage with monthly bonuses; and option "other" was provided 
for valid types of remuneration system in Question 33. The following question intends to 
capture the long list of 17 types of benefits provided by enterprises to its employees (ether 
administrative or regular), accompanied by a choice of five perceptual frequency answers 
- tcyes9l, 66no", "occasionally", "not available" and "do not know". The benefits include 
(see Appendix I for a full list): paid vacation, rest houses, sickness benefit, paid health 
services, subsidised rend, subsidised kindergartens, loans, retiring assistance, 
supplementary pension, etc. Two subsequent questions inquire if any benefits like 
subsidised catering, subsidised transport, subsidised housing, payment for additional 
vacation, medical service, medical insurance, social insurance, subsidised kindergarten, 
vouchers, subsidised prices, profit sharing, financial assistance, "other", or "none" of these 
were added (Question 36) or excluded (Question 37) within the last year. 
The last set of questions addresses the provision of social housing (Question 40), and the 
maintenance of social facilities (Question 38) or their transfer to local authorities 
(Question 39). The questionnaire ends with a multiple choice Question 41 on a perceived 
bankruptcy threat within the next year. 
The next four subsections represent main variables and controls, organised from the 
answers collected during the survey, and comprise Main Independent Variables (4.3.1), 
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Main Dependent Variables (4.3.2), Composite Strategic Variables (4.3.3) and Controls 
(4.3.4). 
4.3.1 MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
For Governance - Strategy estimation, CG variables represent the main independent 
variables in the estimation of the determination of strategic decisions, and include two sets 
of influences: ownership proportions and property form variables. Ownership is measured 
by the percentage of shares held by each type of owner - perhaps the most widely-used 
approach, e. g. Brown and Earle (2000), Claessens and Djankov (1999a, 1999b), Earle and 
Estrin (1996,1997), etc. The four continuous ownership variables were constructed from 
Questions 5.1 - 5.4, asked regarding a percentage of shares held. These include: 
10 - percentage of total managers' and workers' shareholdings, i. e. the percentage of 
insiders' shares; 
MO - percentage of managers' shares; 
WO - percentage of workers' (employees') shares; 
SO - percentage of State's shares. 
In discussing issues of employee ownership it is important to distinguish between 
ownership and control over the enterprises. Table 6 hereafter shows that insiders represent 
a majority of owners of Russian privatised enterprises (in the ILO sample). However, for 
all of the considered enterprises, managers' shareholdings significantly exceed those of 
workers, which raises the question of workers' power to influence managerial decisions. 
As with workers' ownership, managerial share ownership has a Janus face: shares held by 
managers can provide incentives for improved decision-making directed at shareholder 
value, but at the same time, MO can facilitate entrenchment behaviour by managers, as 
they wield their shares and voting power to protect their existing jobs, perquisites and 
power too (Morck et al., 1988). Furthermore, it has been argued that MO can have an 
exponential influence on incentives and entrenchment. In support of this notion, Morck et 
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aL (1988) find that MO has a positive association with firm performance at low level of 
MO, but over a higher MO, entrenchment dominates improved incentives. At very high 
levels of MO, however, senior managers seem to behave like shareholders again. To 
accommodate this possibility and following Morck et aL (1988), the term MO squared 
(M02) will be included in one version of Governance - Strategy model (see Subsection 
4.6.1 below). 
State representation as the owner of privatised Russian firms was noted to decline over 
years (see Table 1 in Chapter II) and does not present a significant share in our data too 
(Table 6). To avoid collinearity with ownership proportions adding to unity, one 
ownership variable had to be omitted. Once it is recognised that privatisation is associated 
with more enterprise restructuring, and since in the main focus of this research are 
privatised Russian firms (i. e. inside, outside and privately owned), and considering the 
available data, the category of State ownership was therefore excluded. When comparing 
the full model (with SO included) with the restricted one (without SO), the variable 
deletion test showed no significant contribution from the eliminated variable to the 
residual sum of squares, thus supporting its omission (Maddala, 1994). The decision to 
remove SO is also supported by the Djankov and Murrell (2002) analysis of restructuring 
enterprises in transition economies, which examines the effectiveness of different reform 
policies and the effects of privatisation. The authors find that state ownership (within 
traditional state firms) is less effective than all other ownership types. 
Besides ownership proportions as CG variables, a set of four legal-form dummies was 
constructed from a list of questions asked regarding property forms of the considered 
establishments. In particular, Question 3 of the questionnaire (see Appendix 1) proposed a 
choice of. (1) State, municipal or leasehold enterprises; (2) partnerships/production 
cooperatives; (3) closed or (4) open joint stock companies; (5) private/individual firms; (6) 
public organisations; and (7) other property types of firms. The ILO sample contains 
significant proportions of closed and open joint stock companies (CJSC and OJSC 
respectively) and partnerships (PART). These dummies equalled one if an enterprise has a 
particular legal form and zero otherwise. Here, following Djankov and Murrell (2002), a 
LOGIT (dummy-variable) regression was chosen to test for the effect of property forms on 
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enterprise strategies, rather than simply using differences between the means of property 
form proportions. 
The analysis of the sample (Table 6), gives the following average sample share 
distribution for the considered property forms of the enterprises: 
Table 6. Sample Average Percentage of Shares 
Property Form Total Insiders Managers Workers State 
Partnership 71.38 62.17 7.17 4.41 
Closed JSC 87.69 46.05 41.78 2.69 
Open JSC 
1 
56.41 31.21 25.67 10.65 
Note: managers' and workers' shares do not sum to total insiders owing to some 
companies not distinguishing between different kinds of insider. 
Table 6 suggests that differences between owners are of great importance. It shows that 
managers and workers have significant equity stakes in closed and open JSCs, which 
means that these two types of owners (especially workers) could have an influence over 
various (strategic) decisions. At the same time, in partnerships managers' ownership 
significantly exceeds that of workers. State shareholdings are the smallest in all the 
considered property forms of the enterprises. This finding will have an application for 
hypotheses testing of Governance - Strategy relations, when the sample will be restricted 
to only closed and open JSCs (out of the whole sample), i. e. to enterprises where 
ownership may be expected to change because of high proportions of shares held by 
private inside owners (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
For the Strategy - Performance analysis finn strategies were represented by independent 
variables comprising strategies directly. These in particular include "wage share of 
production costs", "social cost share of production costs", "training share of production 
costs", training systems introduced (initial training, training to upgrade or general increase 
in training), "proportion of total range of benefits received" (for administrative and regular 
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workers), "unpaid leave" and labour turnover parameters, specified by the total number of 
dismissed within the last year (June 1999 - June 2000). 
Many studies have employed training parameters as independent variables for Strategy - 
Performance examination: Bae and Lawler, 2000; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Fey and 
Bj6rkman, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Koch and McGrath, 1996; 
MacDuffie, 1995; etc. For instance, Bae and Lawler (2000) use "amount of money spent 
on training" variable; "opportunity for training"; "extensive training for general skills", 
"availability of different kinds of training"; "systematically structured training process" 
and "high priority on training". These researches provide support to the notion that such 
HRM activity as training are positively associated with company performance, which, in 
particular, could be achieved though work force motivation and skills improvement. 
The variable "proportion of total range of benefits received" was constructed from a list of 
17 benefits actually provided for the employees and reported in Questions 34-35 of the 
questionnaire (see Appendix I). These benefits ranged from paid vacation and sickness 
benefit through paid health services and subsidised rents, to subsidies for kindergartens 
and retirement assistance. With the focus of this research on employee welfare we 
examine average benefits for both administrative workers and regular workers. 
There is a prevailing universal assumption that there are always HRM activities that are 
better than others, and therefore organisations have to adopt these activities (Huselid, 
1995; Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer, 1994). In particular, such HRM activity as training has 
been found to be positively associated with company performance (e. g. see Pfeffer and 
Veiga, 1999). Consistent with these findings, successful companies (in the US or the UK) 
put an emphasis on training and other training-focused activities because skilled and 
motivated work force, that has a knowledge and capability to perform required tasks, is 
likely to bring competitive advantage to the firm, what also results in profits. In this thesis 
training was considered in four variables describing initial training, training to upgrade, 
increase in training and retraining to improve job performance. These variables were also 
instrumented with two dummies: first equal to one if training was provided and zero 
otherwise, and will be examined as strategy parameters, resulting in improved 
performance. 
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After this introduction of the main independent variables, the next Subsection turns to 
main dependent variables for this study. 
4.3.2 MAIN DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In testing the established sequence of Governance - Strategy - Performance, we firstly 
use strategy variables as dependent during the Governance - Strategy stage, and 
subsequently apply them as independent variables for the Strategy - Performance stage. 
The analysis of Governance - Strategy relationships is focused on a study of the effects 
that CG parameters like managerial or workers' shareholdings, or legal property forms of 
enterprises, have on such dependent strategy parameters as "wage share of production 
costs", "social cost share of production costs", "training share of production costs", 
training systems introduced (initial training, training to upgrade, retraining to improve job 
performance and increase in training), introduction of remuneration system in the form of 
basic wage with monthly bonuses, "proportion of total range of benefits received", and 
labour turnover parameters. 
In addition to variables specified in the previous Subsection, it is worth mentioning that 
remuneration system variables for Governance - Strategy estimation were constructed in 
the form of basic wages paid together with monthly bonuses. This variable was 
instrumented with two dummies: first equal to one if the described remuneration systems 
was provided and zero otherwise. 
For examining the implications of managerial strategies for firm performance, researchers 
usually use accounting measures and ratios. However, unfortunately this is not possible in 
case of Russia (Hoskisson et al., 2000) where the national accounting system is different 
from the international one and only few (mostly internationally traded) companies follow 
international standards or use both systems. Also the unwillingness of firms to provide tax 
authorities with true data and imperfect disclosure codes make performance indicators 
rather unreliable, so the use of such stock market performance indicators as Tobin's Q, or 
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other variables that are performance measures of companies in market economies, is not 
feasible for Russia. Also, a significant number of papers measure performance in output 
level, captured, for example, by sales (e. g. Konings, 1997; Earle, 1998); added value 
(Anderson et al., 2000; Smith et al., 1997); or growth rates of revenues, employment, 
revenues per employee, and costs per unit of revenue (Frydman et al., 1999; Jones, 1998). 
However, these measures were intentionally not asked during the survey process, to 
prevent non-responses and total avoidance of participation (Standing and Zsoldos, 2000). 
The problems associated with a lack of comprehensive performance data could be 
overcome with the introduction of a number of proxies for performance that describe both 
positive and negative sides of it. Among the positive performance indicators are "increase 
in volume of production", and numerically measured "percentage of sales exported within 
the CIS", "percentage of sales exported outside the CIS", and average capacity utilisation 
during the year. 
The choice of export variables as the proxies for performance is supported Py Earle et al. 
(1996) and later by Filatotchev et al. (2001b), who find that, for employee-owned and 
outsider-owned firms in Russia, exports are significantly higher than in firms with other 
forms of ownership. The authors focus on exports as a percentage of total sales, as a key 
strategic performance outcome, and show that while ownership structure has an 
insignificant direct association with performance, governance affects mediate strategies 
that in turn are related to performance. In particular, MO was found to be positively 
related to product strategies (through quality control) that focused rather on domestic than 
export markets. These findings on associations between MO and export-oriented strategies 
support the use of percentage of sales exported as a measure of performance. 
There is also some evidence (Driver and Thompson, 2002) that downsizing programs of 
corporations in recent years have caused macro-level short-term damage to the economies 
in which they took place because of the extensive cut-backs of investments, which 
subsequently damaged their performance. However, some scholars argue (for the US, see 
Donaldson, 1995; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) that a downsizing strategy was chosen 
deliberately to improve performance by reducing investments. Similar literature for the 
UK shows that MBOs combined cost cutting with increases in efficiency investments 
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(Thompson and Wright, 1995; Wright et al., 1992). On the one hand, this may be 
explained by existing low levels of equipment per worker, although on the other hand, the 
effect may have been to reduce capacity utilisation (Driver and Thompson, 2002). 
Following this experience, we introduce an average capacity utilisation (during the year) 
as a proxy for performance. 
Negative performance indicators included numerically measured "percentage of sales 
bartered", "the percentage of wages paid non-monetarily", and binary ("yes", 66no" or "do 
not know") perceived bankruptcy threat in the next 12 months. 
With the prominence given to Kornai's (1990) concept of the relatively soft budget 
constraint under socialism, it seems strange that so little emphasis in the Western 
Governance - Strategy - Performance literature or the literature on economic transition 
has been placed on the penalties for poor performance. In this context, it is actors' 
perceptions and expectations of negative phenomena (such as the bankruptcy threat or 
non-cash sales) that may be expected to influence attitudes towards HRM policies. This 
study may claim some novelty in its design and application of negative performance 
indicators like perceived bankruptcy threat. Thus, this thesis also endorses and extends the 
view of Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), who argue the case for subjective performance 
measures. 
4.3.3 COMPOSITE STRATEGIC VARIABLES 
It was noted that to date there was only one large-sample empirical study by Buck et al. 
(2003) on the influence of governance forms on HRM strategies in the FSU, specifically 
Ukraine. Other research was performed by Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), limited to the 
Strategy - Performance aspect of foreign subsidiaries operating in Russia. This thesis 
intends to embrace the whole Governance - Strategy - Performance relationship in 
indigenous Russian firms by examining three composite business policy variables (based 
on theoretical expectations) representing Traditional Social Weýfare, Cost Minimisation 
and Human Resource Investment strategies. 
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Given the range of models and methodologies for specific HRM bundles, research in 
Western or CEE countries (e. g. see the summary table in Subsection 3.3.4 of Chapter III), 
and following the introduced methodology for modelling specific HRM strategies in 
Russian firms (Subsection 3.3.1 - 3.3.3 ibid), this Subsection introduces variables that 
were clustered into the three coherent HRM bundles - TSW, CM and HRL 
However, Ngo et aL (1998) point out that there is only limited theoretical guidance on 
precisely how FIRM practices should be bundled together. Therefore, in choosing 
appropriate clusters for the three coherent HRM bundles in this research, we follow Baron 
et aL (1996,1999); Hannan et aL (1996); Berger and Huselid (1996); MacDuffie (1995); 
Osterman (1999,2000; Spenner et aL (1998), and conceptualise the constructs according 
to established theoretical expectations. 
Since direct observations for most of elements of the three bundles were not available in 
the same units of measurement (Delaney and Huselid, 1996), we constructed the following 
proxies from the relevant 26 responses in the questionnaire for the three composite 
business policy variables representing TSW, CM and HRI strategies. For each of the 
specified HRM bundles they include: 
Traditional Social Wetfare (TS99 
High wage share of production costs Question 7.1 
High social costs share of production costs Question 7.2 
High proportion of full or partially paid workers on administrative 
leave 
Questions 9.2-9.3 
Finn provides initial training Question 16 
High proportion of total range of benefits received Questions 34-35 
No social benefit was excluded during the last year Question 36 
Firm maintains social facilities Question 38 
Firm provides housing services Question 40 
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Cost Minimisation (CM) 
Low social costs share of production costs Question 7.2 
High proportion of dismissed employees Question 10.3 
Firm reduced training Question 19 
Firm did not pay or plan to reduce paying for training Questions 21-22 
Firm introduced new product range, work organisation or 
technology resulting in reduction of employment 
Questions 24-26 
Individual performance was a main criterion of wage determination Question 28 
High proportion of wages paid non-monetarily Questions 30.1-30.2 
Low proportion of total range of benefits received Questions 34-35 
At least one new social benefit was excluded during last year Question 37 
Finn transferred social facilities to local authorities Question 39 
Human Resource Investment (HRI) 
Firm provided training to improve job performance Question 17 
Finn provided training to upgrade (to raise pay and obtain a higher Question 18 
grade) 
Finn provided funds for special training institute and grants Question 20 
Firm introduced new technology resulting in increase or no change Question 25 in employment 
Firm introduced new work organisation resulting in increase or no Question 26 
change in employment 
Team performance was a main criterion of wage determination Question 28 
Firm had a profit sharing system (profit related pay) Question 32 
At least one new social benefit was added during last year Question 36 
Some of the variables that were combined into composite variables above, were 
continuous, and some were nominal ("yes", "no" or "do not know" responses). For 
continuous variables, sample means were used as cut-off points to define "high" and 
"low" levels of variables. A strong TSW strategy (or weak for CM was identified with a 
high proportion of total range of benefits received variable, a count of responses was used 
to evaluate the presence of individual social benefits (e. g. paid vacation, sickness benefit 
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through paid health services, subsidised rent and subsidies for kindergartens, retirement 
assistance, etc. ) to provide a measure of the proportion of total social benefits actually 
provided. All variables were then dichotomised into nominal variables. Finally, each HRM 
cluster was constructed as a linear combination of the unweighted means of the relevant 
outcomes for the corresponding HRM strategy. 
This approach of constructing composite measures prevented us from getting a mixture of 
dichotomous and ordinal measures in HRM bundles, and thus precluded this approach 
from extreme degree of non-normality, exhibited usually in survey data (Delaney and 
Huselid, 1996; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). A detailed description of confirmatory 
cluster analysis and its results are presented in Subsection 4.4.4 and Section 5.5 below. 
4.3.4 CONTROLS 
A variety of control variables, supplementing the proposed influence of governance on 
strategies and subsequently of strategies on performance (related to employee welfare), 
were employed to hold non-hypothesised influences constant. These controls are common 
and include (employment) size of the enterprise, industrial sector dummies, firm as "part 
of a larger enterprise" dummy and "foreign investment in the enterprise" dummy. 
Many researches use industrial sector dummies as controls: for instance Djankov and 
Murrell (2002) in their enterprise restructuring in transition quantitative survey. The use of 
industrial sector dummies (IND) is supported by the fact that labour markets in Russia are 
highly compartmentalised industrially and it often happens that wages set by a (large) 
industrial firm have an impact on wages set by other firms and on wage setting in the 
region. Food and Light industries, Chemistry, Wood & Paper, and industry of 
Construction Materials present industrial sectors from Moscow and Moscow Region, 
Nizhni Novgorod and Ivanovo. "Part of a larger enterprise" is also a very common control 
parameter. It could discover the nature of the product competitiveness or provide an 
insight to establishment's skills level of the work force (Osterman, 2000). 
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Enterprise SIZE was also controlled for, since larger firms might have more resources to 
devote to business generally and to HRM investments in particular. SIZE is measured here 
as the logarithm of absolute number employed (Koch and McGrath, 1996) so that a few 
large firms would not disproportionately affect results. 
These control variables were used for investigation of the proposed Governance - Strategy 
and Strategy - Performance relations in terms of human resource strategies. 
4.4 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
4.4.1 STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
A regression model must be correctly specified in terms of the proposed functional form 
and variables included in the model. The majority of regressions utilise the OLS type of 
regression model, which is one of the most common statistical methods for estimating the 
values of constant a and regression coefficients 6 of multiple linear regression models, 
expressed in the general form of Y, =a+, 8X, + c,, where Yi is the ith true dependent 
variable, Xj is the ith true independent variable, and 6i is a random error term. 
Multiple regression models have more than one independent variable (Xj) and imply a 
number of important assumptions for model specification, independent parameters and the 
error term. To be able validly to apply the OLS model to the data and be able to test the 
relationship between the variables, the data must comply with the assumptions underlying 
the regression model (Watsham and Parramore, 1997). For the error term 6j, the 
following assumptions apply: 
* The error term has a zero mean for any given value of X, implying that the 
estimated value of Yj , Y,, for any given Xi is equal to 
d+ 
j8X, , where estimated 
values of a and 8 are denoted by 6 and ft 
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* The variance of 61 for each Xj is a constant C2 , known as the assumption of 
heteroskedasticity (i. e. if the variance of 6i changes with Xj, then it is referred to as 
heteroskedasticity) 
* The random error terms associated with two different observations are 
uncorrelated, i. e. there is no autocorrelation between the error terms (covariance 
between pairs of error terms is zero) 
* The error term is normally distributed for each 
The error has zero covariance with each explanatory variable 
For a basic examination of Governance - Strategy and Strategy - Performance relations 
the following two multivariate estimating equations were used, based on the multiple 
linear regression equation above: 
RG-->S ý- C' +)61 X1 + #82 
X2 + 
#63 
X3 +-*+A Xn +6 
Rs LA++j nXn + 7+ JOIXI + J62X2 
+ 
18 
6 
These regressions (presented here in general fonn) and their variations for strategic 
bundles will be explained in full detail later in this thesis, together with the independent 
variables included for each approach (Section 4.6). Here, it is worth noting, that RG-, s and 
Rs-+p represent dependent strategy and performance variables respectively. 
LOGIT models extend the principles of generalised linear models (regressions) to better 
treat the case of dichotomous dependent variables and differ from standard regression by 
substituting the maximum likelihood estimation of a link function of the dependent 
variable for regression's use of least squares estimation of the dependent variable itself. 
The function used in LOGIT is a natural logarithm of the odds ratio. The odds ratio is the 
ratio of the probability that something is true divided by the probability that it is not, i. e. 
LOGIT=ln(jPP) where P=Pr(variable=l) if the event occurs or equals zero 
otherwise. LOGIT models contain exactly the same information as odds ratios (that is, 
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they are measures of the strength of relationship between variables) but because they are 
symmetrical, they can be compared more easily. A positive LOGIT means the independent 
variable has the effect of increasing the odds that the dependent variable equals a given 
value (usually I for binary dependents and usually the last value for multinomial 
dependents). A negative LOGIT means the independent variable has the effect of 
decreasing the odds that the dependent variable equals the given value. 
Following the above description, the general form of the LOGIT model (for binary 
variables) for the examination of Governance - Strategy relations is presented by the 
equation: 
LOGIT(RG--->S) = In 
RG-), 
S a+ 
181XI 
+, fl2X2 +)63X3 ++ 
J8nXn 
+ 
(1 
- RG-+S 
RG-+s represents dependent strategy variables respectively here. As with the OLS 
multivariate regressions described above, Section 4.6 will explain in full detail all 
variations of LOGIT models for testing Governance - Strategy and Strategy - 
Performance relations, together with the independent variables included for each 
approach. 
4.4.2 EXAMINATION OF ]REGRESSION PARAMETERS 
To evaluate goodness of fit of the regression equation, the coefficient of detennination R' 
is calculated. To calculate it, we need to find the total sum of squares (SST), the sum of 
squares due to regression (SSR) and the sum of squares due to error (SSE). 
Following Watsham and Parramore (1997), SST is the sum of the squared differences 
between observed value of the dependent variable Yj and the mean of the observed values 
of the dependent variable Y, i. e. SST (Yj - The S SR is the sum of the squared 
differences between the predicted values of the dependent variable fj and the mean of the 
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observed values of the dependent variable Y, i. e. SSR =I (ýj - Y) 2. And finally the SSE 
is the sum of the squared differences between Yj and Yj, i. e. SSE (Yj - 
ýj) 
The SST equals the sum of SSR and SSE. The SSR/SST ratio gives the proportion of the 
variation in Y explained by the variation in X. This ratio is called the coefficient of 
detennination and is defined by R' 
21 
- 
F) 2 
The coefficient of detennination is calculated as R2= 
SSR 
=, 
(k, 
SST Y, (y, - 
R' varies from zero (if X has no influence on Y, i. e. predicted value Yj is not better than 
the mean value to one (if variation in X explains all the variation in Y, i. e. Y, perfectly 
predicts Yj). Therefore, the larger the value of the coefficient of detennination, the better 
the fit. However, in cross-section studies a lower level of R' could happen because of the 
large variation across individual observations, inherently presented in the data (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1981), but the model will still be satisfactory. 
In the multivariate regression model, the addition of new explanatory variables causes the 
coefficient of determination to increase. So, instead of using R', the adjusted coefficient 
of determination k2 has to be used to take account of the number of independent 
variables (Watsham and Parramore, 1997). 
is calculated as 1- (I - R') 
n-I 
, where n is total number of observations and 
k 
n-k 
is the number of explanatory variables. The adjusted coefficient of determination will 
decrease if a new added variable is not significant, but the decision on adding or deleting 
variables has not to relay on their influence on adjusted R' only. The main basis for 
inclusion/deletion is the theory behind the regression that is being tested, so a "variable 
that has a strong theoretical basis for inclusion should be added to the regression even if 
the adjusted R' fails to improve" (Watsham and Parramore, 1997, p. 204). 
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Another useful statistical indicator is the significance of the regression model. Under the 
basic (null) hypothesis, it is implied that each of explanatory variables Xj has no effect on 
the dependent variable Y, or the effect of all explanatory variables Xis together is jointly 
zero, i. e. 16, = J62 = ... =A= 0. The alternative to the null hypothesis is that at least one of 
the explanatory variables Xi affects Y, i. e. 18,9'- 
A#... #A:?, - 0. If the designed regression 
model has a high explanatory power, the variation in the dependent variable Y will be 
caused by variations in the independent variables X, and the sums of squares due to 
regression (SSR) will be large relative to the sum of squares due to error (SSE). If, on the 
other hand, the model has low explanatory power, the variations in the dependent variable 
Y will be caused by variation in the error term, and the SSE will be large relative to the 
SSR (Watsham and Parramore, 1997). 
R'lk_ The test statistic for R' is calculated as F-2 where F follows the F- 
2 distribution with k and n-k-I degrees of freedom . If the calculated value of F is greater 
than the critical value, then statistical significance of the model is concluded (via the 
rejection of the null hypothesis). 
To check if each of the regression coefficients is significantly different from zero, we need 
to calculate t-statistics, by dividing estiniates of the regression coefficients by the 
estimated standard errors. 
The t-statistic is t-distributed with n-k-I degrees of freedom and is represented as 
where ý, is the estimated value of A and S,, is its estimated standard error. S. A 
The regression coefficients are significant when t-statistics are greater than their critical 
values (Watsharn and Parramore, 1997). 
22R2 (n k) The test statistic for adjusted R is calculated as 
Fk-,, 
n-k - (I R 2) (k 1) , where 
the test statistic is 
F-distributed with k-I degrees of freedom in the numerator and n-k degrees of freedom in the denominator 
(Watsham and Parramore, 1997). 
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4.4.3 MODIFICATIONS OF REGRESSION MODELS 
To test the eight main hypotheses stated above, a number of diagnostics had to be 
performed. Data were analysed using a number of formal tests, using moderated 
regression analysis. The latter shows the presence of heteroskedasticity, confirmed by 
Breusch-Pagan tests, so Huber/White/sandwich modifications of OLS and LOGIT were 
chosen for continuous (e. g. insider share ownership proportions), categorical (e. g. legal 
form of enterprise) and binary variables (e. g. responses to the questions like "were new 
social benefits introduced? "). 
If the residuals have a constant variance, they are homoskedastic, but if the variance is not 
constant, then residuals are heteroskedastic. Heteroskedasticity implies that the regression 
coefficients are no longer the best (or minimum) variance estimates, i. e. they are no longer 
the efficient estimators. So, although the coefficients are unbiased in the regression, the 
variance and the standard errors of these coefficients will be biased. Thus, it is possible to 
accept the hypothesis when in fact it should be rejected. 
As a solution to heteroskedasticity, the relationship between the error terms has to be 
examined, and then the regression model has to be transformed to reflect this relationship. 
In particular, this may be achieved by regressing the error term on different functional 
forms of the variable that causes the heteroskedasticity (Watsharn and Parramore, 1997). 
The Breusch-Pagan test computes the Breusch-Pagan (1979) Lagrange multiplier for 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms, conditional on a set of variables which are presumed 
to influence the error variance. The test statistic, a Lagrange multiplier measure, is Chi- 
square distributed under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 
1979). Breusch-Pagan test is asymptotically equivalent to White's (1980) general test for 
heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2000), which tests for heteroskedasticity in the error 
distribution by regressing the squared residuals on all distinct regressors, cross-products, 
and squares of regressors. 
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In the case of a LOGIT model, the introduction of a robust or cluster command for 
maximum likelihood estimation gives the Wald test (statistics) of a Chi-square test, rather 
than a likelihood-ratio test. A Wald test is used to test the statistical significance of 6 
coefficients in LOGIT model and is calculated by Z-statistics (Z = -A-), then squared and SE 
yielding a Wald statistic with a Chi-square distribution 3. SE represents a standard error of 
regression coefficients. However, Menard (1995) warns that for large coefficients, the 
standard error is inflated, lowering the Wald statistic (chi-square) value. 
4.4.4 CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
To examine the total HRM system, and to develop and empirically identify key 
dimensions of a firm's HRM system, cluster analysis was deployed. 
Cluster analysis is a multivariate statistical tool that can be used to examine associations or 
the underlying relations among a large number of variables and to determine if it is 
possible to summarise the information into a smaller set of composite variables (Cool and 
Henderson, 1997). Cluster analysis can be both an explanatory and a confirmatory. In 
explanatory cluster analysis, no a prior! constraints are imposed on the number of 
generated bundles, while in confirmatory cluster analysis, the researcher has some 
predetermined ideas, based on previous research, about the actual structure of data and the 
number of bundles (Hair et aL, 1995). 
Following Cool and Henderson (1997), when a questionnaire is designed a for 
confirmatory cluster analysis, similar questions are usually asked in order to form a multi- 
subject construct. However, the idea with the ILO questionnaire was to cover a large 
3 In fact, Chi-square statistic is quite similar to F-statistics after a normalisation: Chi-squared = (numerator 
degrees of freedom) * F. Chi-square is the limiting distribution of the F, as the denominator degrees of 
freedom go to infinity (Gould, 1999). 
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number of firms, getting multi-subject responses from them. So the questionnaire was not 
designed for confirmatory cluster analysis. 
The preceding theoretical discussion (see Chapter III) of specific Traditional Social 
Wetfare, Cost Minimisation and Human Resource Investment strategies identified a 
reasonably broad variety of HRM strategies in the literature. It was also noted by some 
researchers (Osterman, 1987; Pfeffer, 1994), that HRM systems, rather than individual 
practices, are the appropriate level of analysis when an estimate of the firm-level effect of 
HRM practices is desired. In particular, it is known that HRM practices may cause studies, 
which focus on a single practice at a time, to overestimate its contribution to enterprise 
performance because of collinearity among these practices (Delaney and Huselid, 1996). 
At the same time, studies that embrace multiple HRM measures could also underestimate 
the effects of these practices, but in different ways. First of all, collinearity among HRM 
variables increases standard errors and reduces likelihood that individual HRM 
coefficients will be statistically significant. Then, studies could underestimate the 
combined firm-level effect of the multiple measures to the extent that complementarities 
exist among HRM practices (Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). This led researchers to 
employ data reduction procedures, like cluster analysis and factor analyses (Huselid, 1995; 
Youndt et al., 1996), to create bundles of clusters. 
Following MacDuffie (1995), there are three statistical procedures, each confirming 
advantages and disadvantages, that can be used to validate "bundle": reliability analysis, 
factor analysis and cluster analysis. Reliability analysis can evaluate the intercoffelations 
among variables grouped together into a bundle - an advantage if the conceptual basis is 
strong for categorising practices, and a disadvantage if not. Factor analysis is more 
appropriate for the identification of interrelationships among sets of items in scale, all 
designed to measure the same conduct. Factor analysis is less appropriate for assessing a 
bundle, which is not a scale, but an index, consisting of the set of interrelated variables 
(DeVellis, 1991), each of which represents a different parameter. Cluster analysis groups 
observations that lie in close proximity in multidimensional space for a given set of 
variables. Since different clustering algorithm produce different clusters, it is important to 
test if obtained clusters are quite distinctive (Hartigan, 1995; Ulrich and McKelvey, 1990). 
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With dozens of HRM strategy elements in the survey questionnaire, simplification was 
achieved through cluster analysis which seeks to identify homogenous subgroups of cases 
from the sample data. In other words, cluster analysis (also known as segmentation 
analysis), seeks to identify a set of groups, which both minimise within-group variation 
and maximise between-group variation (Garson, 2001). For these purposes three 
composite business policy variables (strategic bundles) were generated from the relevant 
responses in the questionnaire (reported in Subsection 4.3.3 above), and then methods of 
k-means cluster analysis and stepwise discriminant analysis were used together with 
ANOVA and Chi-square tests for validation of each composite strategy variable. 
However, before discussing the results, it is also important to acknowledge a legitimate 
concern that associations between main independent and dependent variables could be 
attributable to common methods bias. This implies that variables in this study may be 
correlated because of common method variance derived from data, being collected from 
the same respondents (De Jong and Kemp, 2003). 
There are a number of approaches to test for potential common method bias. Some authors 
(e. g. Tanewski et aL, 2003) follow principal-axis factor analysis (Podsakoff and Organ, 
1986) accompanied by Kaiser criterion for retention of factors. Others (e. g. De Jong and 
Kemp, 2003) check for common method variance using Harman's (1967) one-factor test. 
To demonstrate the independence among conceptual clusters, comprising the three 
strategic bundles, we use principal-axis factor analysis. In particular, this analysis involves 
the factor analysis of independent and dependent variables, and extracting the first factor, 
which should contain the best approximation of common method variance (Podsakoff and 
Organ, 1986). 
The result of the performed principal-axis factor analysis allows us to conclude that 
common method variance bias is not a threat to the validity of this thesis. Further 
techniques used in this research for validation of the three strategic bundles of clusters, 
and results of the described methods of cluster analysis, are presented in Section 5.5 
below, and in the Appendix Il. 
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4.5 SIMPLIFICATIONS FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL APPLICATION 
The objective of most cross-sectional surveys is to produce unbiased (or fairly unbiased) 
estimates of levels such as totals or means at a given time point. However, one of the 
limitations of this study (all limitations will be thoroughly examined together in a later 
Section) is its cross-sectional nature, which requires caution in drawing causal inferences, 
while some relationships may be susceptible to reverse causality. Thus, a distinction has to 
be made between cross-section analysis and time-series analysis. Following Watsham and 
Parramore (1997), cross-sectional regression tests the relationship between variables at a 
particular point of time, while for time-series data for each variable is collected over 
successive time periods. 
The McConell and Servaes (1990) and Holderness et aL (1999) papers, which use data 
from two different years and test the predictions on both sets, are exceptions to the overall 
pattern of using a cross-section of data at only one point in time. The approach of this 
research, which is actually due to limited data availability, cannot establish the 
associations between governance, strategy and performance over time and is based upon 
one cross-section of data for the year 2000, which nevertheless provides a rich variation in 
parameters. 
Once CG mechanism is not the only source of value creation in firms, a theoretical 
prediction of the Governance - Strategy - Performance interaction should therefore 
include exogenous variables in the environment, that either influence governance directly 
or affect performance without influencing governance (Bohren and Odegaard, 200 1). The 
problem is, however, that with complications like conflicts of interest between managers 
and owners, no existing valuation model can specify these characteristics, and the standard 
solution to this problem is an ad-hoc approach, which is used to explain cross-sectional 
differences, i. e. factors which have been shown to have independent explanatory power on 
govemance/strategy, and thus have to be included in regression models. 
In terms of these examinations, the approach adopted in this work, uses ownership shares 
of insiders (i. e. of managers and workers), legal forms of the enterprises (open and closed 
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JSC and partnership) and TSW, CM and HRI composite bundles as independent measures 
of governance and strategies. Consistent with the studies of firm ownership structures, the 
associations between ownership proportions and governance/strategy/performance are 
examined in a cross-section of firms, rather than on changes in these characteristics 
between years, although perfort-nance is very hard to measure in Russia because of 
hyperinflation, poor and inconsistent accounting practices, lack of familiarity with 
developed market definitions of profits, imperfect disclosure codes, etc. 
Control variables have also been used to avoid spurious correlations 4. This problem occurs 
when an association between governance and strategy or strategy and performance is 
driven by an omitted (third) variable. For example, where (a) performance decreases with 
firm size as a result of diseconomies of scale, and (b) insider ownership decreases with 
firm size as a result of the cost of being undiversified, then if performance is regressed on 
insider holdings alone, a spurious negative relationship between the two variables may in 
fact be caused by changes in firm size. But if this negative relationship still exists after the 
size effect on performance has been properly controlled for, insider ownership may have a 
separate (size-independent) association with firm performance (Bohren and Odegaard, 
2001). The introduction of size, industry and part of the larger enterprise controls was 
aimed to prevent the described distortions. 
4.6 MODELS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
It is recognised by some researches that it is rather difficult to estimate associations 
between governance, strategy and performance using multivariate regression on one 
cross-section of data (MacDuffie, 1995). However, Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
estimation techniques, using LISREL (J6reskog and S6rbom, 1999), PLS, AMOS, EQS, 
4 Spurious regression may result from analysing data where the magnitude of the observations of each 
variable tends to increase (or decrease) over time. This tendency, mostly typical of time-series analysis, 
creates a degree of correlation that overstates any underlying causal relationship (Watsham and Parramore, 
1997). 
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MPLUS or other software packages, have their own limitations, which made them 
inappropriate for this research (Fey et aL, 2000). 
Following Fey et aL (2000), there are arguments that favour the use of multivariate 
regressions. In particular, whereas most of studies have evaluated HRM practices for one 
entire firm or one selected group of employees only (e. g. see Longenecker and Popovski 
(1994) study on managerial trials in St. Petersburg's organisations; research of May et al. 
(1998) on Russian HR managers in 31 firms across Russia; or Shekshnia's (1998) paper 
on HR management in Russian subsidiaries of Western firms; etc. ), this thesis studies 
Governance - Strategy - Performance relationships and associated HRM practices 
separately for managers and workers in Russian industrial firm. To test the first two 
general hypotheses concerning HRM strategies and subsequent firm performance (see 
Section 3.2 above), a number of models were constructed for OLS and LOGIT 
regressions. In particular, the association between CG variables and strategies was tested 
with heteroskedasticity-adjusted OLS estimators. In the case of Strategy - Performance 
associations, adjusted OLS estimators for continuous measures of performance, and 
LOGIT for binary variables were deployed. For this, we used single-item measures, which 
prevented us from being able to analyse the data with SEM techniques. However, they did 
enable us to perform this research on one of the largest samples ever reported for any 
Russia-focused research (Fey et aL, 2000). 
One of the weaknesses of "traditional" multivariate regression techniques, emphasised by 
SEM advocates, is that "traditional" approaches do not take into account of the fact that, 
for example, causality between strategies and performance may run in both directions 
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). However, while performance can have a reciprocal 
causation with strategy, strategy can not have any reciprocal influence on ownership (in 
terms of opposite direction to the discussed Governance - Strategy relationship). Such 
unsophisticated SEM modelling will provide results and conclusions that can be seriously 
flawed and invalid. 
Ridgon (1998) discusses various limitations of SEM and maintains that this methodology 
is still under development. In particular, the author stresses that SEM requires much larger 
samples than are needed for more specialised methods, such as regressions. The ILO 
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sample of 295 firms is below the accepted minimum here. Also, Ridgon (1998) points out 
that all aspects of SEM modelling must be directed by theory, and if not, clear 
misapplication can occur when data are modelled by SEM, and only then can theory be 
developed from the analytic results. 
Thus, following Fey et aL (2000); Knoke (2004); Ridgon (1998) one could see that the 
price paid for SEM advantages is susceptible to erroneous parameter estimates and model 
fits if the researcher misspecifies the true measurements and structural relationships. For 
example, covariation in cross-sectional data offers no clues to asymmetric or reciprocal 
causation. Also, the temporal sequences among repeated measures in longitudinal panels 
are not an infallible guide to causal order. (For additional critiques of SEM methods see 
Cliff (1983) and Breckler (1990). ) 
According to the above discussion, therefore, it was decided to follow Baron et aL (1996, 
1999), Hannan et aL (1996), MacDuffie (1995), Osterman (1999,2000), Spenner et aL 
(1998), etc. to perform the analysis of hypotheses developed earlier in this thesis with 
multivariate regressions, leaving causal modelling techniques for future studies (e. g. on 
time series of data). 
4.6.1 GOVERNANCE - STRATEGY MODELS 
To examine Governance - Strategy relations in open and closed JSCs, regression equation 
[1] on insider equity and firm strategies was constructed for continuous data, together with 
a described modification (see Subsection 4.3.1) with MO squared included [2]. Thus, the 
first equation is: 
RG-+s =a+ß, MO + ß2W0 + ß3PLE + ß4SIZE + ß5IND, + ß6IND2 + ß7IND3 
+, 081ND4 +)69 IND, +c 
where a -constant; 
[1] 
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fls - regression coefficients; 
e- error term; 
RG-+S - one of dependent strategy variables; 
MO - percentage of managers' shares; 
WO - percentage of workers' shares; 
PLE - part of larger enterprise; 
SIZE - size of the enterprise, measured as a logarithm of absolute number 
employed; 
INDI - IND5 - industrial sector dummies, representing Food, Light, Wood & 
Paper, Chemistry and the Construction Materials industry. 
With the addition of the MO squared variable: 
RG-, S ýct+, 8, MO+, 82MO'+, 83WO+, 64PLE+, 85SIZE+, 86IND, +, 87EVD2 
+j68IND3+j6qIND4+AoIND5 +c 
where RG--), S is one of the dependent strategy variables; 
[2] 
M02 - is a quadratic term representing the percentage of managers' shares 
squared. 
Among the dependent strategy variables RG, s are proportion of total range of benefits 
received for administrative and regular workers, wage share of total production costs and 
labour tumover parameters. 
To reveal the association between various legal ownership structures and firm strategies, 
the following equation is estimated for continuous data: 
RG--, 
S =--a +, B, P. 4RT+, 82CJSC+, 930JSC+, 84PLE+fl5 SIZE+ A IND, +AIND2 
+, 8, IND3 +, 69IND4 +Ao IND5 +- 
where RG-, S is one of dependent strategy variables; 
PART- partnership dummy; 
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CJSC - closed JSC dummy; 
OJSC - open JSC dummy. 
Dependent strategy variables RG-, S include proportion of total range of benefits received 
for administrative and regular workers, wage share of total production costs, social cost 
share of total production costs and training share of total production costs. 
To estimate the relationship between governance and strategy for binary variables, logistic 
regression modifications of equations [1], [2] and [3] are deployed. LOGIT is the 
logarithm of the odds ratio, i. e. LOGIT(RG-4S) = In 
R G-+S where 
(1 
- RG-4S 
) 
RG->S = Pr(variable = 1) if the event occurs or equals zero otherwise. Thus for binary 
variables, equations [1], [2] and [3] are presented in the form of the following logistic 
equations: 
LOGIT(RG--), 
S) =a +AMO + 
82WO +, 83PLE +, 84SIZE +1851ND, + J861ND2 
187 IND3 
+ 
188 
IND4 + 
J891ND5 
+ 'o 
And its modification with a term of MO squared: 
LOGIT(RG-ýS) =a+ J81MO +A 
M02 +, 63 WO +, 64 PLE +, 65 SIZE +, 86 IND, 
)67 IND2 +, 68IND3+, 891ND4+AoIND5 +c 
[4] 
[5] 
Among the dependent strategy variables RG--,, s are remuneration system in the form of 
basic wage with monthly bonuses, initial training, training to upgrade, increase in training 
and retraining to improve job performance. 
The association between various legal ownership structures and finn strategies for binary 
variables is estimated using the following logistic regression: 
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LOGIT(RG-*S )= a +, 8, PAR T+ J62 
CJSC + 
183 
OJSC +, 84PLE +, 85SIZE +, 86IND, 
A IND2+j88IND3+, 8qIND4+, fl, 0 IND5 +c 
[6] 
where the dependent strategy variables RG, s are presented by layoffs, remuneration 
system (basic wage with monthly bonuses), initial training, training to upgrade, increase in 
training and retraining to improve job performance. 
4.6.2 STRATEGY - PERFORMANCE MODELS 
For examination of the Strategy - Performance link, the next equation is used: 
Rs-,, p =a+ J61 
WSPC + 82 SCSPC + 83TSPC +, 84ABA W +, 8, ABR W+ J86F, + J671T + 
+ 8, TU +, 69INCT +, 810UL +AILO+ J812SIZE + J613PLE + J614 
IND, +, 615 IND2 + [7] 
1816 IND3 + J617 IND4 + 1818 INDS +6 
where Rsp is one of the dependent performance variables; 
WSPC - wage share of total production costs; 
SCSPC - social cost share of total production costs; 
TSPC - training share of total production costs; 
ABA W- average benefits for administrative workers; 
ABRW- average benefits for regular workers; 
FI- foreign investment in enterprise; 
IT - initial training; 
TU- training to upgrade; 
INCT- increase in training; 
UL - unpaid leave; 
LO - layoffs. 
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Dependent performance variables Rs--), p are represented by percentage of sales exported 
within the CIS, percentage of sales exported outside the CIS, capacity utilisation and 
increase in volume of production, as positive performance indicators, and percentage of 
wages paid non-monetarily, percentage of sales bartered and bankruptcy threat, as 
negative performance indicators. 
The increase in the volume of production and the bankruptcy threat are binary variables 
and require logistic regression for analysis, thus the following modification of equation [7] 
is used: 
LOGIT(Rs, p) =a+ i8lWSPC + . 
82SCSPC + 
#83TSPC + )644BA 
W+ PsABRW+ fl6F, 
67 IT+, 68TU +, 891NCT +, 610UL +, 611LO +, 8,, SlZE + JOUPLE + 
[8] 
+18141NDI +A5 'ND2 + J8161ND3 + 
A71ND4 + 
J818IND5 
+6 
4.6.3 COMPOSITE STRATEGY MODELS 
Subsequently, a number of hypotheses are generated concerning composite HRM 
approaches in relation to governance, strategy and performance. The analysis of the stated 
Hypothesis 3- Hypothesis 8 is done through the following four regression equations. For 
examination of the Governance - Strategy, the next two equations are used: 
R comP a+A Mo +A Wo +, 03 PLE +, fl4 SIZE +, 8, IND, + J66 IND2 +A IND3 G-), S 
+, 88IND4+, Bg IND5 +c 
and 
RcomP =a +, 8, PART+ J62 CJSC + P3 OJSC +, 84PLE +, 85SIZE +1861ND, +, 87IND2 G-*S 
J68 IND3 + 89 IND4 + 810 IND5 +c 
where RGcP' ., s are one of 
the strategy variables *S 
191 
[10] 
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In the context of factor analysis, selected strategy variables RG", Ps' are presented by ý, S 
Traditional Social Welfare, Cost Minimisation and Human Resource Investment 
composites, generated from the relevant responses in the questionnaire. The derivation of 
these composites is described in Section 3.3 of Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Chapter. 
For examination of the Strategy - Performance association with composite business 
policy variables, the next regression equation is used: 
RcOmP =a+, fl, TSW + 62CM+ fl3HRI +, 84PLE +, #, SIZE +)66IND, +J87IND2 S--). p 
+, 68 IND3 +, 89 IND4 +, 610 IND5 +c 
where Rc"P is one of the dependent performance variables; S-ýP 
TSW -Traditional Social Welfare; 
CM - Cost Minimisation; 
[11] 
HRI- Human Resource Investment. 
Dependent performance variables Rc" are the same as in the general Strategy - S-+P 
Performance hypothesis estimation, i. e. percentage of sales exported within the CIS, 
percentage of sales exported outside the CIS, capacity utilisation, increase in volume of 
production, as positive performance indicators, and percentage of wages paid in a non- 
monetarily form, percentage of sales bartered and bankruptcy threat, as negative 
performance indicators. 
Increase in the volume of production and bankruptcy threats are binary performance 
variables and require logistic regression for analysis, perfonned with equation [12]: 
LOGIT(Rc"P) =a +ATS W+ 162 
CM + fl3 HRI +, 84 PLE +)6, SIZE +A INDI + S-W 
[12] 
J67 IND 2+A IND3 + 
AIND4 + fl, OIND5 + 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter provides a detailed analysis of data, methodology and research design 
employed in the conduct of this study. Firstly, the Introduction Section considers the 
differences and fields of application for qualitative and quantitative research, justifying the 
choice of quantitative analysis techniques for testing of the hypothesised relationships in 
this thesis. 
The hypothesised relationships for Governance - Strategy and Strategy - Performance are 
examined on the data from the ILO Labor Force Survey, held in Russia during the year 
2000 (and sometimes backed up by 1999 comparisons). Data were collected by ILO 
professionals, together with local Goskomstat agents, from the firms giving useable 
responses in Moscow, Moscow Region, Nizhni Novgorod and Ivanovo. The comparison 
of the ILO sample with the official Goskomstat employment figures for the four selected 
regions allows to say that ILO distribution is very close to official industrial classification, 
with significant differences (at the 5% level) identified only for Metallurgy and Wood & 
Paper industries. This implies quite high industrial representativeness of the sample, 
although originally the ILO survey was not intended to be representative of either the 
whole country, or selected regions. 
A variety of data, available from the ILO questionnaire, raised also the questions of 
appropriate statistical techniques and models for hypotheses testing. It is known that 
regression models must be correctly specified in terms of the proposed functional form 
and variables included in it. Thus, due to the presence of heteroskedasticity, confirmed by 
Breusch-Pagan tests, majority of regressions utilise Huber/White/sandwich modifications 
of OLS and LOGIT (chosen for continuous, categorical and binary variables) for testing of 
the stated eight hypotheses. Together with the models, this Chapter presented the Main 
Independent Variables (Subsection 4.3.1), Main Dependent Variables (4.3.2), Composite 
Strategic Variables (4.3.3) and Controls (4.3.4), constructed from questionnaire responses. 
Following the preceding discussion in Chapter III on a choice of composite business 
strategy variables and their appropriateness for Russia (discussed in terms of the second 
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approach of this study), three relevant HRM strategic bundles were developed in this 
Chapter on the basis of these theoretical expectations. For this purpose, the three coherent 
HRM dimensions, representing correspondingly Traditional Social Welfare, Cost 
Minimisation and Human Resource Investment HRM strategies of Russian enterprises, 
were constructed from relevant questionnaire responses. Section 5.5 below presents the 
results of explanatory cluster analysis, which was performed to justify the correct 
classification of these bundles. Also, some issues, associated with the limitations of cross- 
sectional data available for research, were discussed in this Chapter. 
To answer the main research questions and to obtain the results, presented in the next 
Chapter, all descriptive and statistical analysis was performed with the help of Intercooled 
Stata 7.0 and SPSS 10.0 software. 
III 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter intends to provide answers to the main research questions of this study, 
addressed via eight testable hypotheses, focusing on Governance - Strategy and Strategy - 
Performance mechanisms, gradually introduced in Chapter III above, and informed by the 
relevant literature. The hypothesised associations between governance parameters and 
firm strategies are approached with such CG parameters, as ownership proportions held 
by company employees, and legal company forms. With the main interest of this research 
on employee welfare in Russian post-privatised industrial firms, the association between 
strategies and performance focuses on HRM strategies only. 
The preceding examination of Western Strategic Management literature, concerned 
particularly with HRM issues, allowed us to develop and adopt three distinctive HRM 
strategies, suitable for Russian research. In particular, the identified strategies comprise 
Traditional Social Wetfare (TSW), Cost Minimisation (CM) and Human Resource 
Investment (HRI). 
Following the introduction of regression models and statistical techniques, applied to this 
research, this Chapter commences with Descriptive Statistics on parameters, used for the 
analysis (Section 5.2). These statistics give data on average earnings in sampled 
companies (see Table 7), and also present correlations between the variables used for 
hypothesis testing (see Table 8). In addition to Section 5.2, it is worth drawing the reader's 
attention to Tables 4-6 in Chapter IV, which presented data on property legal form 
distribution, industrial sector classification and shareholdings in companies of the 
considered ILO sample. 
Section 5.3 presents the results of statistical testing of the main Governance - Strategy 
hypothesis. Subsequently, Section 5.4 presents the results for Strategy - Performance 
relationships hypothesised. The presentation of the results is accompanied by the relevant 
Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
discussion on the validity of these results, and their relevance. After that, Section 5.5 
presents the results of tested associations between Governance - Strategy and Strategy - 
Performance with the three coherent bundles, representing TSW, CM and HRI strategies. 
However, to show that the conceptualised strategy bundles discriminate well between each 
other, results of the stepwise discriminant analysis (accompanied with ANOVA results) 
are first presented in Section 5.5. 
To guide the reader though the findings, each section, presenting the results of hypothesis 
testing, ends with Tables that summarise the parameters, that suggest the acceptance or 
rejection of a particular hypothesis. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes with the summary of all 
the major findings of this Chapter. 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
While a wide variety of model specifications were employed, this Chapter draws attention - 
to the main results, reported in Tables 7 to 20. First, some descriptive statistics on average 
earnings (wages and bonuses) is given for the three groups of workers: managers, skilled 
and unskilled workers: 
Table 7. Sample Average Earnings (in 000 Roubles, June 2000) 
Property Form 
Total Number 
of Employees 
Managers 
Skilled 
Workers 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Wages 
State Enterprise 2,074.11 3,453.98 1,991.84 1,025.38 
Partnership 1,538.41 2,840.47 1,317.97 531.83 
Closed Joint Stock Company 1,829.24 3,549.34 1,786.12 989.37 
Open Joint Stock Company 
1 
1,861.84 3,642.61 1,861.14 960.22 
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Bonuses 
State Enterprise 625.65 1,001.13 602.78 286.29 
Partnership 246.90 420.58 243.39 121.03 
Closed Joint Stock Company 317.70 622.52 304.72 160.15 
Open Joint Stock Company 504.33 950.54 503.69 244.37 
Benefits as Percentage of Wages 
State Enterprise 21.35 19.53 24.53 7.49 
Partnership 33.52 25.47 30.56 19.44 
Closed Joint Stock Company 27.39 25.90 34.57 18.22 
Open Joint Stock Company 42.88 24.73 65.76 14.73 
From Table 7 above we can see that for combined enterprise property forms, wages and 
bonuses are about two times higher for managers than for skilled workers, whose earnings 
exceed those for the unskilled ones. Here, the largest difference occurs in wages in 
partnerships. For all three groups of employees, bonuses are higher in State enterprises, 
then come open JSCs, closed JSCs, and then partnerships. The same is true for wages with 
only two exceptions: for managers, wages are higher in JSCs than in State enterprises; the 
second is for unskilled workers, who earn more in closed JSCs than in open JSCs. 
These results also show that, except for the JSCs, employees in State enterprises are 
generally better paid. The comparison of benefits provided in relation to wages, suggests 
that in State enterprises, benefits (as the percentage of wages paid) are smaller than in 
enterprises with other property fonns - JSCs and partnerships. On the one hand, this result 
simply means that in partnerships and JSCs, benefits are generally higher than in the State 
companies. On the other hand, this finding could imply that the total yearly earnings of 
employees in the State enterprises (measured as wages plus all benefits provided) are more 
stable than in JSCs and partnerships once the variable part (i. e. benefits) of the total yearly 
income is smaller. So, this finding could have implications for the employees of all 
companies. 
Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation coefficients for the variables included in 
the models are given the Table 8. Consistent with much prior research, most of the 
114 
Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
coefficients in the correlation analysis have the predicted signs, high levels of significance, 
and provide reasonable support for hypothesised relations between Governance - Strategy 
and Strategy - Performance. Of course, more refined multiple regressions will be more 
relevant in this context. 
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Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
5.3 GOVERNANCE - STRATEGY RELATIONS 
The preceding discussion on the results of privatisation in Russia and a subsequent 
Governance - Strategy review indicate that the Russian mass privatisation programme 
conveyed most property rights to managers and workers, as enterprise insiders. In terms of 
the proposed stakeholder approach, this outcome of privatisation raises the question of 
shareholder value distribution. In particular, are managers and workers likely to divert 
shareholder value towards their immediate sources of welfare (such as employment 
stability, wages, multiple social provisions) as employees, rather than as shareholders? 
To answer this question, the first main Governance - Strategy hypothesis was developed 
in the context of this thesis. The results of tests on Hypothesis I (stating that higher levels 
of workers' ownership will be positively associated with strategies that direct more 
resources towards immediate sources of employee welfare, e. g. higher wages, job 
preservation, social benefits etc. ), are presented in Table 9. 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 are based on the two regression equations [1] and [2], described in 
the Section 4.6. The first three rows of the Table show the main association between 
insider ownership (workers', managers' and managers' squared) and employee welfare 
strategies, measured as continuous variables. Following the discussion in Chapter IV, the 
sample is restricted to those firms (with an average of 127 out of the 295 sampled for this 
study), where ownership may be expected to change, i. e. open and closed JSCs. This 
restriction was made deliberately, because managers and workers have significant equity 
stakes in closed and open JSCs (see Table 6 in Chapter IV), and this concentrated 
ownership may produce larger effects that with other, more dispersed ownership structures 
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
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Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
The proportion of the total range of benefitsS provided for administrative and regular 
workers shows a significant association with linear representations of both workers' and 
managers' ownership. However, only four coefficients are significant (5% level) and have 
interpreted signs (with two coefficients close to zero). In particular, workers' 
shareholdings are positively and significantly (at the 5% level) associated with the 
proportion of the total range of benefits received by regular workers. This may be 
interpreted as follows: if MO and all other controls in the regression are held constant, a 
one unit change in WO is associated with a 0.108 increase in the proportion of benefits 
provided to regular workers. This relation may indicate that workers, acting as 
shareholders, have a consistent influence on HRM strategies that immediately favour 
employees and are likely to transfer any achieved surplus of the enterprise into a form of 
benefits. 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 show no significant association between managerial 
ownership (MO) and any variable relating to employee welfare. However, to address 
possible non-linearities, and following Morck et aL (1988), a quadratic term on 
managerial ownership (M02) was included. In this case, MO continues to be insignificant 
(10% level), but the quadratic term is significant (5% level) and negative. As with the 
interpretation of WO, if MO, WO and the controls are held constant, a one unit change in 
M02 Will cause a decrease in benefits to workers by 0.004 units (0.003 for administrative 
workers, both significant at the 5% level). Being inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, this result 
suggests provisionally that MO may be associated with benefits for employees 
exponentially, first going up with increasing MO and then falling down after MO passes 
some threshold level. Perhaps with MO at low levels, managers feel obliged to collude 
with workers in the provision of benefits to employees, but feel able to challenge them at 
higher levels. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the coefficients are close to zero, and 
thus the possible degree of "exploitation" of workers seems negligible. 
5 The variable for the proportion of total benefits received was constructed from the listed benefits, ranged 
from paid vacation, additional vacation, rest houses, sickness benefit, paid health services, subsidised rent, 
subsidised kindergartens and bonuses to profit sharing, loans, retiring assistance, supplementary pension, 
subsidy for canteen or benefit for meal, subsidised consumer goods, transport subsidies and unpaid shares 
(see Questions 34-35 in Appendix I for a full list of benefits provided). 
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Other results provide no significant association between the described ownership forms 
and labour turnover variables or wage share of production. It is interesting to note that 
labour dismissals, for example, are not significantly associated with either workers' or 
managers' ownership, whereas numerous layoffs have been reported for most of Russian 
"employee-owned manager-controlled" (Earle and Estrin, 1996) manufacturing firms. At 
the same time, the result for wages as a share of production costs may imply that either 
workers (in their role as shareholders) do not have control over wage flows, or managers 
do not provide workers with low payments, or delay them. From these points of view, 
enterprise retrenchment has to be explained in terms of business crisis and non-governance 
variables (Buck et aL, 1999), rather than ownership proportions. 
To hold the non-hypothesised influences constant, a number of control variables were 
included into the regressions. The use of the establishment size, measured as the logarithm 
of absolute number employed, was supported by a number of significant coefficients 
obtained. In particular, significant and positive signs on the size control variable indicate 
that in larger firms of the considered sample, labour turnover is also generally higher. Also 
size of the enterprise has a negative and highly significant (at the 1% level) association 
with wage share of production costs. This may be interpreted as indicating the 
unwillingness (or inability) of large firms that dominate local labour markets to allocate 
substantial funds for wages. 
Besides the establishment size, "part of the larger enterprise" and five industrial sector 
controls were introduced. While the first control parameter does not indicate any 
significant difference between independent enterprises and those that are parts of the 
larger ones, results for industry controls vary a lot across Table 9. Among them, the Food 
industry is the one that exhibits the highest number of significant coefficients. 
Following the results of Hypothesis I testing for continuous variables, Table 10 presents 
the results of analysis of the same hypothesis, but for binary strategy variables. This 
analysis is based on logistic regression equations [4] and [5]. Binary variables include the 
"remuneration system in the form of basic wage with monthly bonuses", "initial training", 
"training to upgrade", "increase in training" and "retraining to improve job performance". 
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Of five significant (at the 5% level or better) coefficients for Governance - Strategy 
elements, two are of the hypothesised sign, and three oppose Hypothesis 1. For example, 
higher managerial ownership has a negative and significant impact on training to upgrade 
(at the 1% level) and increase in training (at the 1% level), which implies that managers, 
as relational shareholders, are not likely to encourage and subsidise any form of training as 
an HRM strategy, favouring employee welfare. Besides, negative signs for retraining to 
improve job performance, and initial form of training, indicate that these forms of training 
may also be opposed by managers, since these associations are either insignificant or 
present a low (the 10%) level of significance. In addition, there is no significant 
association between workers' ownership and the four described forms of training. Thus, 
one may speculate that the question of training does not loom large in the preferences of 
workers, and being shareholders does not obviously influence their strategic decisions. 
Nonetheless, the negative and significant result for managers contradicts Hypothesis I in 
terms of training as a welfare parameter, and leads to its re ection. i 
One more significant result for binary strategy variables relates to workers' shareholdings 
in relation to the remuneration system. Here, workers' ownership shows a significant (at 
the 5% level) and positive association with a remuneration system comprising basic wages 
and monthly bonuses. This finding could be interpreted, as with the association between 
workers' ownership and the provision of benefits (see Table 9), workers may also have a 
consistent influence on the remuneration strategies of their enterprises. 
The introduction of a quadratic term of managerial ownership for binary strategy 
variables, suggested by Morck et aL (1988), gave however no improvement in terms of 
total fit. The coefficient for M02 is negative and significant (at the 5% level) in relation to 
training to upgrade only. The fact that this coefficient is negative can be treated as 
opposed to Hypothesis 1, implying that managers do not support this form of training. The 
use of various controls in the regressions did not lead to any consistently significant 
results, except those described above for continuous variables. 
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Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
Tables II and 12 provide the results of Governance - Strategy hypothesis testing with 
continuous governance (insider ownership) variables replaced with legal forms of 
enterprises, including open JSCs, closed JSCs and partnerships, presented in the form of 
dummies. In this context, open JSCs for example, may be expected to attract more 
resources from outside capital markets, and thus offer higher levels of employee benefits. 
For these tests, dependent, continuous strategy variables include, as before, the proportion 
of the total range of benefits provided for administrative and regular workers, wage, 
training and social cost shares of production costs; and also "layoffs", "remuneration 
system in the form of basic wage with monthly bonuses", "initial training", "training to 
upgrade", "increase in training" and "retraining to improve job performance" for binary 
strategy variables. 
However, the results of regression [3] analysis provide no support for this supposition, as 
legal forin of the enterprise has no significant association with proportions of benefits 
received, wage, training and social cost shares of production costs. 
Enterprise size, measured by the logarithm of the total number employed, has highly 
significant signs, showing that large enterprises slightly outperform the small ones, except 
in terms of wage share of production costs. This variable, as in the analysis for different 
ownership structures (Table 9), is negative and fairly significantly associated with the size 
control. 
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Table 11. Legal Forms and Firm Strategies (Robust Regression [White 
Estimator]) 
Proportion 
of Total 
Range of 
Benefits 
Received 
(Administra 
tive 
Workers) 
Proportion 
of Total 
Range of 
Benefits 
Received 
(Regular 
Workers) 
Wage 
Share of 
Production 
Costs, 
1999 
Social 
Cost Share 
of 
Production 
Costs, 
1999 
Training 
Share of 
Production 
Costs, 
1999 
Legal Forms: 
Partnership -0.041 -0.063 0.018 -0.028 0.002 
(-1,17) (-1,76)t (0,48) (-0,73) (0,46) 
Closed JSC -0.017 -0.028 0.008 -0.017 0.002 
(-0,55) (-0,89) (0,25) (-0,50) (0,83) 
Open JSC 0.014 -0.004 0.033 0.001 0.001 
(0,51) (-0,13) (1,15) (0,01) (0,07) 
Controls: 
Part of Larger 0.001 0.017 -0.031 0.019 -0.002 
Enterprise (0,02) (0,49) (-0,88) (0,51) (-0,58) 
Ln Employment 0.054 0.058 -0.020 0.042 0.0018 
(7,30)** 7,79 ** (-2,52)** (5,28)** (3,13)** 
Food 0.081 0.063 -0.105 -0.021 0.001 
(2,89)** (2,21)* (-3,57)** (-0,69) (0,31) 
Light 0.022 0.018 -0.049 0.018 -0.001 
(0,92) 75 -1,89 (0,69) (-0,60) 
Wood & Paper 0.088 0.074 -0.045 0.035 0.006 
(2,22)* (1,84)t (-1,08) (0,83) (2,10)* 
Chemistry 0.046 0.056 -0.035 -0.002 0.002 
(1,30) (-0,94) (-0,05) (0,60) 
Construction -0.057 -0.043 -0.037 -0.050 0.002 
Materials (-1,52) (4,14) (-0,97) (-1,25) (0,74) 
Constant 0.092 0.092 0.368 -0.153 -0.007 
(1,99)* (1,96)* (7,54)** (-3,06)** (-1,97)* 
Observations 295 295 286 291 293 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.06 
F-statistics 8.02 9.39 2.20 2.78 1.90 
(Prob>F) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.003) (0.045) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level 
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For binary variables (Table 12 and regression [6]), legal forms of the enterprise are mostly 
insignificant as well, except for the partnership dummy which has a significant (at the 5% 
level) and negative association with training to upgrade and a significant (at the 1% level), 
and negative association with the presence of a remuneration system with basic wages and 
monthly bonuses. This negative association for the partnership legal form may imply that 
share-owning managers in partnerships resist demands for employee-favouring benefits. 
As before, size of the enterprises is important for benefits offered, as positive and highly 
significant coefficients suggest. 
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Table 12. Legal Forms and Firm Strategies (LOGIT) 
Layoffs Remunerati 
on System 
Basic Wage 
with 
Monthly 
Bonuses 
Initial 
Training 
Training to 
Upgrade 
Increase in 
Training 
Retraining 
to Improve 
Job 
Performan 
ce 
Legal Forms: 
Partnership 0.496 -1.293 -0.725 -1.014 -0.330 0.294 
(1.02) (-2.49)** (-1.42) (-2.07)* (-0.49) (0.64) 
Closed JSC 0.786 0.122 -0.350 -0.185 0.130 0.428 
1.80)t (0.28) (-0.76) (-0.41) (0.25) (1.01) 
Open JSC 0.405 -0.352 0.072 0.338 0.664 0.645 
(1.05) (-0.95) (0.18) (0.88) (1.41) _ (1.74)t 
Controls: 
Part of Larger 0.029 -0.433 0.300 0.048 -0.354 -0.501 
Enterprise (0.06) (-0.81) (0.49) (0.09) (-0.63) (-1.04) 
Ln Employment 0.295 0.325 0.57 0.576 45 0.313 
(2.96)** (3.04)** ** 4.2 (4.66)** 
4 
. 30 (3.03)** 
Food -0.200 1.535 0.611 0.260 -1.056 0.607 
(-0.51) (3.87)** (1.27) (0.62) (-1.91)t (11.61)t 
Light 0.202 0.921 0.696 0.405 0.189 (0.514 
(0.64) (2.74)** 11.8DI (1.07) (0.54) 1.61 
Wood & Paper 0.460 -0.221 0.370 0.442 -0.035 (0.249 
(0.84) (-0.41) (0.61) (0.76) (-0.07) (0.48) 
Chemistry 0.321 0.301 0.638 0.855 0.262 0.042 
_ (0.69) (0.65) (1.10) (1.64)t (0.48) (0.09) 
Construction -0.623 0.861 0.273 0.629 0.235 0.349 
Materials _ (-1.18) (1.80)t (0.46) (1.07) (0.45) _ (0.74) 
Constant -2.377 -1.971 -2.216 -2.685 -2.700 -2.438 
(-3.84)** (-3.02)** (-3.01)** (-3.77)** (-3.79)** _ (-3.77)* 
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.06 
Wald Chi-square 18.98 33.65 28.63 44.37 16.75 19.36 
. 
(Prob>Chi-square) 
l 
(0.041) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.080) (0.036) 
Robust Z-statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at the I% level 
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The following table summarises all the results for Hypothesis 1 testing on Governance - 
Strategy relationship for different governance variables (share ownership and legal forms) 
and individual benefits provided. 
Table 13. Summary, Hypothesis 1 Test Results (Tables 9-12) 
Supported Rejected 
for One for One 
Indicator Indicator 
For Different Ownership Structures (Tables 9,10) 
Proportion of Total Range of Benefits Received 
(Administrative Workers) 
Proportion of Total Range of Benefits Received 
(Regular Workers) 
Remuneration System (Wage + Bonuses) 
Training to Upgrade 
Increase in Training J 14 
For Different Legal Forms (Tables 11,12) 
Remuneration System (Wage + Bonuses) 4 
Training to Upgrade 4 
Hypothesis I states that higher levels of workers' ownership are positively associated with 
strategies that direct more resources towards immediate sources of employee welfare (e. g. 
higher wages, job preservation, social benefits, etc). The results, surnmarised in Table 13, 
are very mixed (with many insignificant results not presented, of course), but generally 
tend to refute Hypothesis 1, rather than support it. 
This mixed result could be explained by the nature of cross-sectional data that may be 
insufficient to produce consistent patterns of Governance - Strategy results within one 
year. Another reason could be the choice of available governance variables from the ILO 
questionnaire. Finally, benefits given to employees may interact and the significance of 
benefits variables may only become apparent when they are clustered into the specific 
composite bundles, suggested by theory in Section 3.3, and empirically tested in Section 
5.5 below. 
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Also, it has to be remembered that some ambiguity in the results, reported in Table 13, 
reflects (to certain extent) the nature and the results of the Russian privatisation 
programme. It was pointed out that Russian privatisation conveyed most property rights to 
enterprise insiders - managers and workers (Boycko et aL, 1995), arguably being more 
politically, than economically driven (Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998). Besides, a long 
tradition of benefit provision in the FSU, where substantial amounts of enterprise-level 
welfare provision (housing, kindergartens, polyclinics, etc. ) were backed up by 
considqrable State support (subsidised household materials and services, minimum wage 
legislation, etc. ) has to be remembered too. Thus, the resulting shareholdings of Russian 
employees may be more likely to be diverted to reflect their perceptions and current 
wellbeing as employees, rather than as shareholders. 
Disregarding all insignificant results, we can see that proportions of the benefits provided 
are controlled by the firm's insiders, particularly by workers. This association is 
significant and shows some improvement in the governance in Russian enterprises, where 
workers, acting as shareholders, have consistent influence on HRM strategies. In 
particular, this could imply that workers impose discipline on managers to choose 
strategies that immediately favour employees, thus this association can be taken as 
supportive for Hypothesis 1. Other findings suggest that various legal forms of the 
enterprises (partnership, open JSC or closed JSC) have no significant association with 
proportions of benefits received. This result follows Stark (2001), who warns that different 
property forms may act as a cosmetic device in Russia, and have a neutral effect, since 
they are built on the existing "Soviet" competences or routines (Spenner et aL, 1998). 
These "Soviet" routines of welfare provision represent a status quo, which is argued to be 
supported by company insiders and which may result in improved performance, and will 
be empirically examined later in this thesis via a cluster approach (under different 
hypotheses formulated, see Section 5.5). 
The presence of a remuneration system in the form of wages with monthly bonuses was 
found to be positively associated with WO in relation to workers' pay only (Table 10). 
This result could be interpreted in the way that workers have a consistent influence on 
remuneration strategies of their enterprises, and managers do not seem to seriously oppose 
these strategies of workers. However, this form of welfare provision is not relevant to the 
130 
Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
considered legal forms of enterprises, and is significantly and negatively associated with 
the partnership fonn only (Table 12). 
Although it is recognised that most successful companies (in the US or the UK) put an 
emphasis on training and relevant training-focused activities (Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999), no 
form of training was found to be significant among the strategies that direct resources 
towards employee welfare, either for different ownership structures or for different legal 
forms of the enterprise. Here, managerial ownership in the enterprises was found to be 
negatively associated with spending on training, while for workers, this issue seemed to be 
outside their competences and influences, so that at least no significant association 
between workers' ownership and different forms of training was found. But, as noted, the 
result for managerial ownership suggests that they are not likely to train their employees 
and invest in intellectual human capital. This result could also imply that most of the 
employees considered in the ILO sample of manufacturing flrms, have low productivity or 
have skills that are not in demand (Brown, 1998). Although this result is not repeated in 
relation to labour dismissals, non-provision of training to employees may represent one of 
managers' retrenchment strategies, in the short run at least. 
5.4 STRATEGY - PERFORMANCE RELATIONS 
After presenting the results on 'Governance - Strategy tests, this Section continues to 
examine the outcomes of the Russian privatisation programme for Strategy - Performance 
relationships, with the aim of answering the question whether firms' strategic decisions, 
possibly directed to some extent at short-term employee welfare, are associated with 
stronger or weaker enterprise performance? 
To answer this question, the second main Strategy - Performance hypothesis was 
developed in the context of this thesis. In particular, Hypothesis 2 states that the firm's 
individual high-commitment strategies, promoting the welfare for the employees, will be 
positively associated with improved corporate performance. (By implication, individual 
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strategies that damage employee welfare, like layoffs, are predicted to be negatively 
associated with performance. ) 
Table 14 presents the results of regressions that test Hypothesis 2. For this test, the full 
sample is used and the analysis is based on regression [7] and logistic equation [8]. 
Following the discussion of appropriate performance indicators for Russia (see Subsection 
4.3.2), where we noted that the use of stock market performance indicators or national 
accounting measures and ratios could lead to unreliable results (Hoskisson et al., 2000), 
two sets of performance variables, representing: (a) positive performance indicators, i. e. 
the "percentage of sales exported within the CIS", the "percentage of sales exported 
outside the CIS", "capacity utilisation" and the "increase in volume of production"; and 
(b) negative performance indicators, i. e. the "percentage of wages paid non-monetarily", 
the "percentage of sales bartered" and the perceived "bankruptcy threat", were introduced. 
The choice of export variables, as dimensions of performance, is supported by Earle et al. 
(1996) and Filatotchev et al. (2001b); Driver and Thompson (2002) use the capacity 
utilisation rate in examining downsizing strategies. However, the use of negative 
performance indicators such as the "bankruptcy threat" or non-cash sales is claimed to be 
a novel aspect of this thesis. 
Table 14 provides some support to the argument that strategies that promote (damage) 
employee welfare will be positively (negatively) associated with corporate performance. 
Of ten significant (at the 5% level or better) coefficients for Strategy - Performance 
elements, six are of the hypothesised sign, and four oppose Hypothesis 2. Also four 
weakly significant (at the 10% level) coefficients, that have the hypothesised sign, are left 
aside due to the low significance level. 
It can be seen that higher wages, as a proportion of production costs, are positively and 
significantly (at the 5% level) associated with a higher percentage of sales exported 
outside the CIS, in the short term at least. However the same result does not occur for 
enterprises in relation to exporting within the CIS. This implies that firms exporting on 
domestic (i. e. CIS) markets are more wage-constrained in comparison with outside 
exporters. Outside exporters are also likely to increase training provision to its employees 
(though this association is weakly significant), whereas for the CIS exporters, this 
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association is significantly negative (at the 1% level). The last result is somewhat 
controversial, as enterprises exporting within the CIS already reported a significantly high 
level (at the 5% level) of training's share of production costs. Of course, one of the 
associations could be mechanical. 
Some support for the efficacy of high commitment strategies is provided by other positive 
performance indicators - capacity utilisation rate and increase in the volume of 
production. The results suggest that the higher is the capacity utilisation rate, the greater is 
the spending on initial training (5% significance), and the lower is a number of workers on 
unpaid leave (significant at the 1% level, a negative strategy). Increases in the volume of 
production are again negatively and significantly (at the 5% level) associated with layoffs. 
Though again this could be a mechanical association, the discussion after the Summary 
Table 15 in this Section provides an alternative explanation of this negative association. 
Positive and significant (at the 5% level) relationships between the capacity utilisation rate 
and the initial form of training for the employees may indicate a rise in the demand for a 
qualified work force in expanding or emerging enterprises. This latter interpretation is also 
supported by an increase in training provided associated with a 5% significant increase in 
the volume of production. 
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Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
The evidence in favour of Hypothesis 2 in relation to negative performance indicators 
however, is more contradictory. Of seven significant coefficients, only two (in relation to 
wages paid non-monetarily to engineers) were of the hypothesised sign, and even for this 
negative performance measure, three other significant coefficients had the wrong sign (for 
average benefits, training to upgrade and increases in training). In total, five strategy 
coefficients for negative performance indicators had the wrong sign in relation to 
Hypothesis 2. On the one hand, these results for negative performance indicators are rather 
disappointing, as they mostly oppose Hypothesis 2, but on the other hand, they could be 
interpreted differently for the Russian post-privatisation environment. 
In particular, it has to be remembered that after the mass privatisation programme, most 
Russian enterprises found themselves in a "business turnaround" situation, with no State 
support, severe cost-cutting and extensive enterprise downsizing (in the short-term at 
least) (Filatotchev et aL, 2000). Researchers usually suggest that all restructuring policies 
and strategies have to be applied cautiously to transition economies, taking into account 
country-specific factors. Thus, performance indicators, identified as negative for this study 
(e. g. the percentage of sales bartered or the percentage of wages paid non-monetarily), 
may in fact indicate positive economic processes in post-privatised firms, thus implying 
that these enterprises are functioning and production at least continues. 
As for the Governance - Strategy hypothesis testing, enterprise size and industrial sector 
variables were included into Strategy - Performance regressions, together with the "part 
of the larger enterprise" and the "foreign investments in enterprise" controls, to hold non- 
hypothesised influences constant. Highly significant and positive signs on the size control 
indicate that in larger firms in the considered sample, performance is better. In particular, 
exports and the volume of production are generally higher. At the same time, capacity 
utilisation is lower in larger enterprises, and non-cash wage payments also prevail. 
The coefficients for the part of the larger enterprise and the foreign investments in 
enterprise controls are mostly insignificant, except the two weakly and negatively 
significant (at the 10% level): one for the percentage of sales exported within the CIS (in 
relation to the foreign investments in enterprise); and the other for the percentage of sales 
bartered (in relation to the part of the larger enterprise). These associations could imply 
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that the barter form of sales is more typical of firms, comprising parts of larger enterprises, 
and foreign investments are fairly likely to go into enterprises exporting within the CIS. 
The introduction of legal company forms (open JSCs, closed JSCs, and partnerships) as 
controls in the Strategy - Performance regression equations did not produce any 
significant relationships on either the positive or negative side, and also did not show any 
improvement in terms of the total fit of the model. Thus, they are not reported here. 
In order to summarise these decidedly mixed results for Hypothesis 2, Table 15 shows the 
outcomes on all significant coefficients relating strategies with performance. 
Table 15. Summary, Hypothesis 2 Test Results 
Supported Rejected 
for One for One 
Indicator Indicator 
With Positive Performance Indicators 
Wage Share of Production Costs 
Training Share of Production Costs 
Proportion of Total Range of Benefits Received 
(Administrative Workers) 
Initial Training 
Increase in Training 
Unpaid Leave 
Layoffs 
With Negative Performance Indicators 
Proportion of Total Range of Benefits Received 
(Administrative Workers) 
Proportion of Total Range of Benefits Received 
(Regular Workers) 
Initial Training 
Training to Upgrade 
Increase in Training 
Layoffs 
Hypothesis 2 proposes a positive association between firms' strategies that promote 
employee welfare, and improved corporate performance. Like much previous research 
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(e. g. see Fey and Bj6rkman, 2001), the results summarised in Table 15 are very mixed and 
certainly do not permit the confirmation/rejection of Hypothesis 2 straight away, although 
some of the associations provide preliminary support for our hypothesis. Firstly, as with 
the Governance - Strategies tests, this ambiguity may be attributable to the choice of 
regression variables that were taken from the particular one-year performance indicators 
of the ILO questionnaire. Alternatively, one cross-section of data may be insufficient to 
produce consistent patterns of results. 
However, despite speculation on causation in relation to employee-friendly strategies, 
some of the results show possible improvement in the overall situation in Russia. For 
example, the result with higher wage payments reflects improved export performance, for 
CIS exporters at least. As already mentioned, wage payments in enterprises exporting 
outside the CIS are generally higher than in firms exporting within the CIS. This outcome 
may result from the competitive environment, which usually is tighter outside CIS 
countries, thus implying that goods exported there are of a better quality (and'are in 
demand) than those coming to domestic (the CIS) markets. This could be the reason why 
workers in enterprises exporting outside the CIS are better paid. One of the implications of 
this result could be a need for retooling of production with the aim to overcome the 
constraint represented by inert CIS markets, leading to the production of goods, 
competitive on international markets. (Admittedly, this technological strategy requires 
substantial investments, and is beyond the focus on HRM strategies in this study. ) Among 
other strategies promoting employee welfare and associated with improved enterprise 
performance are the increased share of wages as proportion of production costs and less 
unpaid leaves. 
Despite the hypothesised positive association between training strategies and firm 
performance, various training variables (increase in training, training to upgrade) are both 
supportive and unsupportive for Hypothesis 2. It is generally recognised that specific 
strategies, relating to employee welfare within firms (like wage levels or spending on 
training), have a long tradition within the FSU, where the quality and skills of hired 
individuals were enhanced through comprehensive training provided. However, our 
analysis shows that when the increase in training (positive performance association) is 
supported by the results, it is at the same time rejected by (three) negative performance 
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indicators. The same contradictory situation occurs with layoffs that are variously 
positively and negatively associated with performance in our findings. At the same time, it 
has to be remembered that during times of economic stress, layoffs could occur not only 
because of low skill levels, but also for strategic reasons (Hoskisson et aL, 1994). 
The ambiguity of results that is specified by positive and negative performance indicators 
may first be attributed to the choice of negative performance indicators, as was already 
noted. However, bearing in mind that workers with low productivity or low skill levels 
usually could be easily replaced from the pool of unemployed, and the positive and 
significant association between layoffs and the percentage of sales exported may simply 
indicate that growing exports require a more qualified work force, which however comes 
from outside rather than being trained within the enterprises. Also, the higher is the 
volume of production, the more layoffs occur - new, qualified workers may replace those 
with poor skills. 
Although this explanation sounds reasonable, some Western research on Russia and most 
of the FSU indicates that the in-house form of training is more traditional for Russian 
enterprises, at least when it is not too costly. The positive association between initial 
training and improved firm performance supports this notion with two kinds of 
performance indicators. As described, this may indicate a rise in the demand for qualified 
employees in fast growing or expanding Russian enterprises. 
The results presented so far in relation to individual HRM strategies have been, frankly, 
disappointing. However, one (suggested) productive line of enquiry may lie on the 
combination of individual strategies into meaningful strategic bundles. The next Section 
provides the results of statistical tests on Governance - Strategy - Performance 
relationships in terms of the three coherent strategic bundles, developed from the Western 
literature for this Russian research. 
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5.5 COMPOSITE HRM STRATEGIES 
In the Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) study of Strategy - Performance links in Russian 
enterprises, different HRM practices for managerial and non-managerial workers were 
reported to be positively and significantly associated with enterprise performance. The 
authors constructed three HRM composite variables for employees, which include 
Employee Development, 17eedback Systems and PaylOrganisation. Besides Fey and 
Bj6rkman (2001), Western research provides examples of other strategic HRM bundles of 
clusters, developed in particular by Baron et al. (1996,1999); Hannan et al. (1996); 
Berger and Huselid (1996); MacDuffle (1995); Osterman (1999,2000; Spermer et al. 
(1998). It was also noted by Ngo et al. (1998) that there is only limited theoretical 
guidance on precisely how HRM practices should be bundled together, so in this research 
we follow the above authors and conceptualise the constructs according to the established 
theoretical expectations (see Section 3.3 above). Thus, the three coherent HRM strategies 
identified comprise Traditional Social Welfare (TSW), Cost Minimisation (CM) and 
Human Resource Investment (HRI). 
It is proposed that these HRM strategies divide the sample into three distinctive groups of 
firms, according to the extent to which the strategic choices of a finn are dominated by a 
particular strategy. For a predetermined number of clusters (n =3 in this case), k-means 
cluster analysis 6, following the k-means clustering algorithm of Hartigan (1975), is used 
here to identify homogenous subgroups, which both minimise within-group variation and 
maximise between-group variation. To confirm that the above strategies discriminate well 
6 K-means cluster analysis uses Euclidian distance and attempts to identify relatively homogeneous groups 
of cases based on selected characteristics. Initial cluster centres are chosen in a first pass of the data, then 
each additional iteration groups observations based on nearest Euclidian distance to the mean of the cluster. 
Thus cluster centres change at each pass and the process continues until cluster means do not shift more than 
a given cut-off value or the iteration limit is reached. 
Euclidian distance is the distance measure, where a given pair of cases is plotted on two variables, which 
form the X and Y axes. The Euclidian distance is the square root of the sum of the square of the X difference 
plus the square of the Y distance (Garson, 200 1). 
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between the obtained bundles, stepwise discriminant analysis 7 was performed together 
with ANOVA 8 on each composite strategy variable. 
Table 16 below presents the results of cluster analysis that shows that these three strategic 
centroids are statistically distinctive. In particular, for firms dominated by Traditional 
Social Wetfare strategies, the TSJV bundle shows quite a high value for the TSW composite 
variable (0.802), a negative value for CM (-0.482) and a low value for the HRI strategy 
(0.301). Firms dominated by HRI strategies (HRI bundle) show low values for CM (0.273) 
and negative values for TSW, but for the HRI strategy this value is negative and high 
(-0.848). For the CM bundle the corresponding Strategic Options values are either low or 
negative. In the ANOVA results below, the smaller the Wilks' lambda, the more important 
the dependent variable to the discriminant analysis. Wilks' lambda is significant by the F- 
test for all variables and thus confirms the significance of the differences. 
' Discriminant analysis is used to classify cases into the values of a categorical dependent (usually 
dichotomous) with a purpose to investigate differences between groups, to reject variables which are little 
related to specific groups, to classify cases into groups and to test whether cases are classified as predicted 
(Garson, 200 1 ). 
8 ANOVA (analysis of variance) is used to uncover the main and interactive effects of categorical 
independent variables (factors) on an interval dependent variable. The key statistic in ANOVA is the F-test 
of difference of group means, testing if the means of the groups formed by values of the independent 
variable are different enough not to have occurred by chance. If the group means are not significantly 
different, then it is inferred that the independent variable(s) did not have an effect on the dependent variable 
(Garson, 200 1). 
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Table 16. HRM Composite Strategy Variables and Firm Clusters 
Cluster Means 
(standard deviation) ANOVA 
TW un ý CM ý HRI F Sig. B dle Bundle Bundle 1 1 Lambda 
TSW 
Strategi .c 0.802 -0.268 -0.524 0.211 328.449 0.000 
Option (0.43) (0.36) (0.37) 
Cm 
Strategic -0.482 0.205 0.273 0.123 270.016 0.000 
Option I 
(0.36) 
I 
(0.49) (0.69) 
HRI 0 301 585 0 -0 848 
0.116 187.361 0.000 
Strategic . (0.56) . (0.41) . (0.38) I 0 ption I I 
98 96 101 
From the results of cluster analysis it is possible to draw another important conclusion. All 
three TSW, CM and HRI strategic bundles have not been found to be ultimately and 
exclusively dependent on respectively Traditional Social Wetfare, Cost Minimisation and 
Human Resource Investment strategies. Although one strategy dominates, some elements 
of the other two alternatives are always present. This may be important from the 
theoretical perspective and is consistent with firms' "strategic experimenting" in the form 
of mixed HRM strategies, described in Subsection 3.3.4. However, we noted ibid that the 
process of mixing (or sequencing) HRM strategies is a balancing act between initiating 
actions that follow one strategy and then deviating from that strategy. It usually also takes 
years and highly skilled management to fully implement one strategy, before changing to 
another one, so with the real possibility that Russian managers may not be qualified well 
to promote these advanced, mixed strategies, and due to the constraints imposed by only 
one cross-section of data available, the issue of "strategic experimenting" is beyond the 
bounds of this thesis. 
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5.5.1 GOVERNANCE - STRATEGY 
A number of hypotheses were generated concerning composite strategies in relation to 
governance (see Section 3.3), analysed with heteroskedasticity-adjusted OLS regressions 
[9) and [101, described in the relevant chapter above. In particular, these hypotheses 
include Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 7. 
Following the theoretical discussion, many firms, rather than trying to adopt new 
strategies under transition, usually simply follow their founders' initial template for 
employment relations (Baron, et al., 1999). In Russia, many of the post-privatised firms 
also used the founders' traditional Soviet-style strategy, which primarily was based on 
lifetime employment, provision of many of the social needs of both current and retired 
employees, thus amounting to paternalism by corporations. For these reasons, and bearing 
in mind that workers and managers represent the main group of owners of Russian 
enterprises, Hypothesis 3 proposes that higher levels of insider ownership will be 
positively associated with higher levels of TSW provision for employees. 
At the same time, increased outside ownership and control, and withdrawal of the State, 
with its traditional system of social provision, faced many firms with the need to minimise 
social costs within recent years. The above discussion suggests that under this strategy (i. e. 
CM employees, as shareholders, could win, but as employees (concerned with their 
personal welfare and job stability, rather than the value of enterprise shares), they are more 
likely to lose. Remembering that the role of shareholders is rather new for Russian 
employees, they are more likely to oppose any strategy that reduces their stability as 
employees. Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 5 suggests that lower levels of 
insider ownership could be associated with active Cost Minimisation strategies in Russian 
firms. 
The last specific HRM hypothesis (Hypothesis 7), developed for Governance - Strategy 
examination, is founded on high-commitment "psychological contracts" between firms 
and workers, who contribute efforts on behalf of the firm that exceed any contractual 
obligations (Guest, 1998). This strategy may result in efficiency gains for enterprises 
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(Barberis et al., 1996; Buck et al., 2003; Fey and Bj6rkman, 2001). Thus, HRI strategies 
may promote value for insider shareholders and short term utility for employees. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that higher levels of insider ownership will be positively 
associated with the intensity of high-commitment Human Resource Investments. 
Table 17 presents the tests on these three hypotheses. It can be seen that the results for 
workers' ownership in relation to TSW strategy are inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, as this 
association is only weakly significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 17. Governance -Strategies 
Traditional 
Social 
Welfare 
Cost 
Minimisation 
Human 
Resource 
Investment 
Traditional 
Social 
Welfare 
Cost 
Minimisation 
Human 
Resource 
Investment 
Managers' -0.061 _-0.068 -0.046 Shares (-1.29) (-2.19)* (-0.80) 
Workers' 0.087 -0.097 0.064 
Shares (1.75)t (-2.96)** (1.04) 
Legal Forms: 
Partnership -0.029 -0.005 -0.015 
(-1.07) (-0.20) (-0.36) 
Closed JSC -0.015 -0.028 0.038 
(-0.50) (-1.26) (0.98) 
Open JSC 0.017 -0.004 0.050 
(0.65) (-0.19) _ 
Controls: 
Ln 0.039 0.004 0.028 0-0056 -0-001 0.053 
Employment (3.17)** (0.43) 1. 
ff8l 
1 
M** 
(-0.12) (6.24)** 
Part of Larger 0.00005 0.011 0 027 -0.027 -0.026 
;. 
0 -0.008 -0.002 Enterprise (0.00) (0.26) 
ý 
_0 . 35) -0 (-0.35) (-0.92) (-0.37) (-0.05) 
Food -0.080 -0.055 0.136 -0.047 -0.035 0.106 
(-2.04)* (-2.14)* (2.81)** (-1.70 
. 
(-1.72)t (3.17)** 
Light 0.026 0.016 0.110 0022 0.022 0.033 0.067 
(0.77) (0.69) (2.63)** 
P 
04) 04) (1.82)t (2.49)* 
Wood & Paper 0.019 -0.067 0.092 . 
ý22 
0.022 -0.048 0.080 
(0.27) (-1.45) (1.05) (0.62) (-1.82)t (1.54)t 
Chemistry -0.073 -0.004 0.068 0.006 -0.022 0.113 
(-1.58) (-0.12) (1.20) (0.18) (-0.92) (2.51)** 
Construction -0.040 -0.024 0.081 -0-052 -0.028 0.543 
Materials (-0.74) (-0.66) 
-(-1.48) 
_ (-1.26) (1.10) 
Constant 0.196 0.419 0.213 
_0-080 
0.406 0.024 
(2.35)* (7.63)** (2.07)* (1-99)* (12.82)** (0.47) 
Observations 128 128 128 295 295 295 
R-squared 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.27 0.06 0.17 
F-statistics 4.64 2.38 1.97 13.19 2.18 7.72 
(Prob>F) (0.000) (0.017) (0.042) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at the I% level 
As was hypothesised in Hypothesis 5, low levels of insider ownership (MO and WO) are 
significantly and negatively associated with active Cost Minimisation strategies. The result 
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is significant with both kinds of employees (managers and workers) refusing to support 
strategies that reduce their wages or other traditional benefits available. 
Finally, the results for high commitment Human Resource Investment (BRI) strategies, 
hypothesised to be positively associated with higher levels of insider ownership, provide 
no significant evidence in support of Hypothesis 7. 
As opposed to share ownership parameters, legal forms of enterprises for all three specific 
Governance - Strategy hypotheses (not reported in detail) prove to be insignificant. It will 
be argued later in this Section that legal forms have only a nominal influence on firms' 
HRM strategies, in the considered sample at least. 
As for tests on Hypothesis I and Hypothesis 2, a number of control variables were 
included in the regressions, to hold the non-hypothesised influences constant. Highly 
signiflcant (at the 1% level) and positive signs on the size control variable indicate that 
TSW and HRI, as welfare strategies, are more typical of larger firms in the considered 
sample. At the same time, the Food industry exhibits the highest number of significant 
coefficients. In particular, HRI investments may be generally accepted, whereas TSW and 
CM may be significantly opposed, by most of the Food industry employees. 
It has to be noted that, as for the Governance - Strategy tests in terms of Hypothesis 1, the 
considered sample for Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 7 estimations was 
restricted to those firms (128 out of the 295 sampled for this study), where ownership may 
be expected to change, i. e. open and closed JSCs. These restrictions follow Djankov and 
Murrell (2002), and are presented in Section 5.3 above and not reported here. 
Table 18 below summarises the above discussion for HRM specific Governance 
Strategy hypotheses for both different ownership structures and various legal forms 
examined. 
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Table 18. HRM Governance - Strategy Hypotheses Test Results 
Supported for 
One Indicator 
ejected for 
One Indicator 
For Different Ownership Structures 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 7 
For Different Legal Forms 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 7 
Our results shows that both Hypothesis 3, which predicts a positive association between 
higher levels of insider ownership and higher levels of TSW provision for employees (as a 
result of such association), and Hypothesis 7; predicting that higher levels of insider 
ownership are positively associated with the intensity of high-commitment HRI, are 
insignificant and provide no evidence for these associations in Russian enterprises. 
Only Hypothesis 5, which associates lower levels of insider ownership with active CM 
strategies, is supported, since the obtained coefficients are significant and show that 
managers and other employees refuse to support strategies that reduce their wages or other 
traditional benefits available. So, although downsizing and cost cutting, as FIRM policies, 
are popular strategies in the West (being highly recommended by Western economic 
advisors for Russia too), they do not seem appropriate for Russian employees, more 
concerned with their personal welfare and job stability, rather than enterprise value. 
Employees therefore oppose CM strategies as personally damaging their welfare 
(Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, Filatotchev et aL, 2000). Interestingly, this result shows that 
the CM strategy may be opposed by both groups of insiders - managers and workers. If 
managers are hired from outside, they may be more focused on raising shareholder value 
for the firm. However in our firms, managers are also likely to act as employees, rather 
than shareholders, and care about their personal welfare, though the effects of CM (and 
other strategies) on performance are yet to be examined. 
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The result for the TSW strategic bundle suggests, that having already become a rather 
unfashionable business strategy in Western firms (Wray, 1996), the former Soviet-style, 
paternalistic template of employee relations seems also to be ill-suited for the post- 
privatisation Russian environment. (However, the 10% significance level of association 
between TSW and WO might indicate that this strategy is still popular in some of the 
considered enterprises. ) Thus, the main outcome of these three individual HRM strategies 
suggests that insider ownership is negatively associated with the composite CM strategy, 
that directly opposes employee welfare, in the short run at least. 
For various legal company forms, all three Governance - Strategy hypotheses, described 
above, provide very low levels of significance in terms of the specific FIRM approaches, 
and thus were rejected. This finding can be interpreted in the way that the described legal 
structures have only nominal influence on firms' CG and HRM strategies, and act rather 
as cosmetic devices in Russian enterprises, superimposed on existing competences and 
routines. (Similar findings were obtained by Spenner et aL (1998) for Bulgaria). Similar 
results have already been described in this Chapter for individual benefits (see Tables II 
and 12 in Section 5.3), where the legal forms of enterprises were found to have no 
significant association with benefit strategies (except for the single association between 
the remuneration system and the partnership form of governance, Table 12). 
Regardless of these speculations, and following these Governance - Strategy findings, it is 
in any case interesting to establish which of the three hypothesised Strategy - 
Performance models is associated with improved firm performance. The next Section tries 
to provide the answers. 
5.5.2 STRATEGY - PERFORMANCE 
Following the Governance - Strategy examination, based on Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 5 
and Hypothesis 7, this Section proposes to test Strategy - Performance relations with the 
three HRM bundles. This estimation is based on Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 6 and 
Hypothesis 8, developed and justified in the theoretical Section 3.3 above. 
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In particular, consistent with Hypothesis 2 in relation to aggregate HRM strategies and 
firm performance, and based on the grounds discussed for traditional "Sovief' HRM 
system of welfare provision, we continue to assume that the provision of TSW benefits in 
the FSU is uniquely suited to the national culture and institutions in Russia. Thus we 
hypothesise (Hypothesis 4) that firm performance is positively associated with TSW 
provision for employees. 
It is also assumed that any form of cost-cutting in relation to employment stability and 
employee welfare runs contrary to the national culture, philosophy and institutions of 
Russia. So, contrary to the TSW strategy, and following the Ukrainian study by Buck et aL 
(2003) and by Spenner et aL (1998) on Bulgarian companies, the strategy identified here 
as Cost Minimisation is expected to have a negative effect on organisational performance. 
Hence, under the influence of private inside owners, we hypothesise that firm performance 
is negatively associated with "hard" CM strategies - Hypothesis 6. 
Subsequently, following Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), who empirically showed that Human 
Resource Investment strategies in foreign subsidiaries in Russia are positively associated 
with improved firm performance, and Buck et aL (2003), who found a similar association 
for high-commitment HR strategies in Ukraine, we hypothesise (Hypothesis 8) that firm 
performance is positively associated with new RRI investments. 
Table 19 below presents the results of the proposed Strategy - Performance analysis in 
relation to Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 8. For these tests the full sample is 
used and the analysis is based on regression [ 11 ] and logistic equation [ 12]. As for the first 
(general) approach, two sets of performance indicators consist of positive and negative 
ones, as described in Section 4.3, where percentage of sales exported within the CIS, 
percentage of sales exported outside the CIS, capacity utilisation and increase in volume 
of production were introduced as positive performance indicators; and percentage of 
wages paid non-monetarily, percentage of sales bartered and bankruptcy threat as negative 
performance indicators. 
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Chapter V. Results and Statistical Inference 
Contrary to the Governance - Strategy analysis in Subsection 5.5.1, and taking into 
account this specific composite strategy approach, our three strategic bundles were 
included as independent - as opposed to dependent in the earlier analysis - variables in 
regressions to test the hypothesised associations. 
Table 19 shows that of five significant (at the 5% level or better) coefficients, only three 
are of the hypothesised sign, and two oppose the above hypotheses. At that, the results for 
the HRI strategy are quite consistent with Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) findings for the 
performance of foreign subsidiaries in Russia, but otherwise, they are fairly insignificant. 
In particular, looking at "soft", TSW strategies, there is only one significant outcome, 
which is the positive association (significant at the 1% level) between this TSW bundle and 
the proportion of wages paid non-monetarily (a negative performance indicator). Thus 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported, and is rejected in relation to non-money wages. Perhaps, as 
discussed above, this latter variable may be viewed not as a negative performance 
outcome, relevant to employee shareholdings, but as just another feature of the TSW 
strategy itself, whereby enterprise managers tie employees to the firm with high- 
commitment HRM, but then exploit employees to some extent by under-investing in 
marketing resources, not paying money wages, and essentially giving employees the 
marketing problem of disposing of enterprise outputs. 
Second, results for the CM strategic bundle are uniformly insignificant, and provide no 
support whatsoever for Hypothesis 6. This is consistent with all kinds of speculative 
explanations, but the truth is that this result still represents a major mystery and an 
interesting area for further research. Besides, it also has to be remembered that the CM 
strategy may have been opposed by all groups of Russian insiders. 
Third, however, the high-commitment HRI strategy shows fairly consistent and significant 
results, with only one exception. In terms of two positive performance indicators (capacity 
utilisation at the 1% level of significance, and increase in production volume at the 1% 
level of significance) and one negative performance indicator (bankruptcy threat at the 1% 
level), the HRI strategy shows a positive association with the enterprise performance, and 
to this extent Hypothesis 8 is supported. However, HRI is also significantly (at the 5% 
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level) and negatively associated with export sales outside the CIS (though not within the 
CIS), and this contravenes this hypothesis. Interestingly, HRI strategies are positively 
associated with production-side performance measures (capacity utilisation, increase in 
production), but not export sales outside the CIS. This is reminiscent of experiences with 
earlier, centrally-planned enterprises, whose strategies could raise output but generally not 
quality of goods and services capable of competing on world markets. 
Although the HRI strategy obviously involves extra costs for the firm, in tenns of 
additional training costs, etc., it may be an important result that the bankruptcy threat (a 
negative performance indicator) is significantly and negatively associated with HRI, an 
outcome consistent with Hypothesis 8. With the exception of exporting outside the CIS, 
these results for HRI are broadly consistent with the earlier results of Fey and Bj6rkman 
(2001). 
Referring to the controls introduced for Strategy - Performance tests, firm size is mostly 
significantly related with firm performance, indicating that larger firms slightly 
outperform smaller firms in exporting, volumes of barter exchange and payment of wages 
(though in non-monetarily form). Following Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), it is also 
encouraging that the order (in terms of size) in which the FIRM bundles are correlated 
with firm performance is consistent with the order (in terms of size) of the betas in the 
regression equations. 
The following Table summarises the above discussion and distributes the three HRM 
Strategy - Performance hypotheses in relation to results. 
Table 20. HRM Strategy - Performance Hypotheses Test Results 
I II F-Supported for 
One Indicator 
Rejected for 
One Indicator 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 8 
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So, Hypothesis 4, stating that firm performance is positively associated with TSW 
provision for employees, is not supported at all and is rejected in relation to non-money 
wages. Hypothesis 6, which hypothesised a negative relationship between firm 
performance and CM strategies, is also rejected since the obtained results provide no 
evidence for this hypothesis, and the associations between the CM strategic bundle and 
different performance measures are uniformly insignificant. This insignificant outcome 
may not be without importance, however, and this is discussed in the final Chapter. 
Only Hypothesis 8, predicting a positive association between firm performance and new 
HRM investments, shows fairly consistent and significant results for both of the 
hypothesised associations -a negative perfonnance indicator is significantly and 
negatively associated with HRI, and positive performance indicators are significantly and 
positively associated with HRL 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has provided the main findings from the tests of the eight hypotheses, 
proposed for this Governance - Strategy - Performance research. These results will be 
addressed further in the next Chapter, which presents a Discussion and Future Work 
suggestions. 
Following the theoretical discussion of the Russian post-privatisation environment and 
Western strategies applicable for the FSU in general, the hypothesised associations 
between firm governance and strategies were established using such CG parameters as 
insiders' ownership proportions and legal forms of the enterprises. Subsequently, with the 
main interest of this research on employee welfare in Russian industrial firms, the 
association between strategies and performance focused on HRM strategies only. In 
particular, one of the approaches adopted here included hypothesis testing with the use of 
three distinctive HRM bundles, comprising Traditional Social Weffiare (TSW), Cost 
Minimisation (CM) and Human Resource Investment (HRI) strategies. Until recently, these 
bundles (or their modifications) have been identified mostly with research on high 
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technology Silicon Valley firms (e. g. see Baron et al., 1996). Besides, Buck et al. (2003) 
used similar strategic bundles for their Ukrainian study, and also Fey and Bj6rkman 
(2001), who examined Strategy - Performance relationships in foreign subsidiaries in 
Russia (with Employee Development, Feedback Systems and PaylOrganisation bundles). 
Like much previous research, our results are quite mixed and do not permit the immediate 
confirmation or rejection of our hypotheses. To guide the reader through our findings, four 
summary tables were introduced to review the outcomes. Leaving numerous discussions 
on revealed associations for the relevant sections below, we present only some core 
findings here. 
In particular, in Section 5.3 (see summary Table 13) it was found that in terms of 
Governance - Strategy mechanisms, transfers of funds into various benefits and bonus 
payments were significantly associated with worker ownership. Specifically, this could 
imply that workers impose discipline on managers to choose strategies that immediately 
favour employees. Within the Strategy - Performance analysis (see summary Table 15 in 
Section 5.4), the results are more mixed (and frankly disappointing), although some of 
them nevertheless suggest that some possible improvements in the overall situation in 
Russia have occurred. For example, higher wage payments were associated with improved 
export performance, for CIS exporters at least. 
In terms of the proposed HRM approach, probably the only firm conclusion that can be 
drawn from the outcomes, based on individual FIRM strategies (see summary Table 18, 
Subsection 5.5.1), is that insider ownership seems to have no consistent association with 
individual strategies that benefit or do not damage employees (i. e. on either TSW or HRI). 
However, insider ownership is negatively associated with the composite CM bundle, that 
directly reduces employee welfare, in the short run at least. It also seems that, on average, 
Russian enterprises are not homogeneous in terms of implemented HRM strategies. 
Perhaps they are trying to experiment with them, applying experience from Western 
enterprises in the context of current performance. 
Besides, our results also suggest (see summary Table 20, Subsection 5-5.2) that high 
commitment HRM, in its new HRI form C'harder" than the old paternalism of traditional 
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TSR), is a strategy that is broadly associated with positive perfon-nance outcomes in 
Russian industrial firms, as previously found by Fey and Bj6rkman (2001). 
Although many other results are mixed, they still provide a rich basis for discussion at 
greater length in the final Chapter. 
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6.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
This thesis presented an empirical examination of the relationships between corporate 
governance, strategies in relation to employee welfare and firm performance in Russian 
post-privatisation firms. A number of tests have been designed for the hypothesised 
associations. 
This study started with the examination of the situation in Russia after the mass 
privatisation programme, carried out between late 1992 and 1994 for most manufacturing 
firms. Russian MPP, as part of other economic and political reforms, was expected to 
replace the State in corporate governance with more effective owners and enterprise 
monitors. Hopes were entertained that improved CG would lead to appropriate strategic 
choices, especially in relation to human resources, arguably the most valuable asset of 
Russian firms. This in turn could lead to an increased capability of firms to compete on 
world product markets. However, for the bulk of privatised manufacturing firms. the 
outcome has been in the form of "employee-owned, manager-controlled" enterprises 
(Earle and Estrin, 1996), with only limited roles for outside investors. This created a 
danger that insider ownership by managers and workers may favour decisions that 
promote their own immediate sources of utility, and subsequently undermine the firm's 
financial performance and value in the long term. 
Through the definition of the research model, adopted from the field of Strategic 
Management, and formulation of the main sets of the research questions, it was argued 
that this thesis is an extension of two antecedent empirical studies on the FSU, one by 
Buck et al. (2003) on the influence of governance forms on HRM strategies in Ukraine, 
and another by Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) on Strategy - Performance relations in foreign 
subsidiaries operating in Russia. The originality of this research lies in the 
supplementation of the Strategy - Performance approach of Fey and Bjbrkman 
(2001) 
with a consideration of associations between Governance - Strategy - Performance on a 
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sample of indigenous Russian firms. In comparison with Buck et al. (2003), it studies 
Russia, as the most developed State after the collapse of the Soviet Union (EBRD, 2001). 
This offers the opportunity to generalise findings to the FSU as a whole. In addition it uses 
legal form governance variables, and alternative performance measures to the quantitative 
measures used by Buck et al. (2003): capacity utilisation and sales per employee. Fey and 
Bjbrkman (2001) argue the case for subjective performance measures. This thesis 
endorses their view and extends it by using negative performance measures, such as 
perceived bankruptcy threats and barter trading. 
An extensive analysis of the existing literature provided a detailed review of theories and 
previous empirical findings on Governance - Strategy - Performance relations, with the 
most interest paid to the FSU and other transition economies. In terms of the proposed 
Governance - Strategy - Performance model, this thesis focused on ownership 
proportions and legal company forms as two governance elements associated with HRM 
strategy, and on HRM strategies as a key bundle of strategy parameters, associated with 
firm performance. This analysis identified important gaps in the literature in relation to 
transition research, and set the stage for this study to contribute to filling these gaps and 
contributing to knowledge by examining Russia-specific CG and HRM strategies. In 
particular, three strategic HRM bundles, derived from Western theory, were identified as 
appropriate for Russia: Traditional Social Weýfare (TSW), Cost Minimisation (CM), and 
Human Resource Investment (BRI). 
With regards to methodology, this thesis followed some of the previous studies on 
transition and Western economies, and implemented methods of correlation and regression 
analysis (OLS and LOGIT) for tests on individual HRM elements, and methods of cluster 
analysis for examination of Governance - Strategy - Performance in terms of the three 
HRM strategic bundles. 
No attempt is made here to argue that this thesis fills all research gaps or finds the final 
answer to important research questions. The results of some of the tests are admittedly 
rather mixed, partially confirming and partially rejecting certain associations predicted by 
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the research hypotheses. The following Section proceeds with the analysis of these 
findings, and discusses their possible contribution to knowledge. 
6.2 INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
The results of tests of the eight main hypotheses were presented in Chapter V. They 
provide a rich basis for discussions on employee welfare in Russia in the context of 
Governance - Strategy and Strategy - Performance mechanisms, various ownership 
proportions and different HRM practices adopted. At a general level, these results are 
quite new, though Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) have studied the consequences of high- 
commitment HRM strategies on firm performance in Russia, though they embraced only 
foreign subsidiaries operating in Russia. To date there has been no large-sample empirical 
research on the influence of governance forms on different FIRM strategies, and of a 
variety of HRM strategies on performance, so this work has been able to identify some 
important associations of insider ownership in Russian firms with strategies influencing 
employee welfare, and has discovered some interesting associations between employee- 
favouring behaviour of the companies and insider ownership. 
As was mentioned in previous Section, this work is based on two approaches - one using 
individual HRM elements and another using composite HRM bundles. Each of these 
approaches is used to examine Governance - Strategy - Performance associations. When 
drawing conclusions, it must be remembered that, in reality, many influences on strategies 
and performance must have been omitted, governance may be expected to have a lagged 
influence on strategies, and strategies and governance may interact (Buck et aL, 2001). 
This casts doubt on the relevance of methodology, based on a single cross-section of data, 
and any results must be considered provisional at this stage. Nevertheless, we argue that 
these provisional results are important and useful for later research. 
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6.2.1 GOVERNANCE - STRATEGY 
While analysing the association between employee-favouring strategies and insider 
ownership, workers' shareholdings were found to be positively associated (as 
hypothesised) with the provision of the whole range of benefits. Also, workers' ownership 
(WO) is significantly associated with remuneration strategies, comprising wages and 
individual bonuses (though to workers only), which could be interpreted as workers 
having a consistent influence on remuneration strategies in their enterprises, with 
managers not seeming to seriously resist these strategies of workers. This result, together 
with the reported significant associations between workers' ownership and the range of 
benefits provided, can indicate some improvement in the governance in Russian 
enterprises, where workers, as shareholders, consistently influence certain FIRM 
strategies. 
Although it is recognised that successful American and British companies emphasise 
training and training-associated activities as strategies, resulting in improved company 
performance (Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999), no form of training was found to be significant 
among the strategies that direct resources towards employee welfare. Precisely, managers' 
shareholdings were found to be negatively associated with the provision of training, and 
also with the provision of the considered range of benefits to employees (like paid 
vacation, sickness benefit through paid health services, subsidised rent and kindergartens, 
retirement assistance, etc. ). In particular, the results suggest that the provision of training 
for employees is negatively associated with managerial ownership (MO), and this is 
consistent with the possibility that training conflicts with managers' immediate interests 
and is opposed by them. At the same time, WO is not significantly associated with any 
training strategy at all, thus probably suggesting that the issue is outside workers' 
competences and influences. 
This result for managerial ownership could imply that managers are not likely to invest in 
intellectual human capital of company employees, although the explanation could come 
from the choice of employees sampled by the ILO. Particularly, following Brown (1998), 
workers in the sampled enterprises could have low Productivity or skills that are not in 
159 
Chapter VI. Discussion and Future Work 
demand, thus the non-provision of training to employees may represent one of managers' 
cost-saving strategies, in the short run at least. 
In relation to benefits provision, it was theoretically justified in earlier chapters that 
managerial ownership may be associated with benefits for employees exponentially, firstly 
rising with increasing MO, but then falling, once MO passes some critical (threshold) 
level. Perhaps also, at low levels of MO, managers feel a need to collude with workers' 
requests for benefits provision from employees, but, when managers' ownership increases, 
they feel safe to challenge workers. However, empirical result suggests that coefficients 
for M02 are close to zero, and thus the possible degree of "exploitation" of workers seems 
negligible. 
These results are also consistent with some conflict of interests between workers and 
managers, both acting as shareholders, but perhaps favouring different strategies. However 
this difference is disputable if one looks at the results for composite strategic variables 
rather than individual elements of HRM strategies. Here, insider ownership (MO and WO) 
is found to be negatively associated with active Cost Minimisation strategies. 
Interestingly, this result is consistent with both kinds of insiders (managers and workers) 
refusing to support strategies that cut their traditional benefits, reduce their wages or 
eliminate jobs. Following Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Filatotchev et al. (2000), 
Russian employees oppose a CM strategy (popular in the West and recommended by 
Western economic advisors for Russia) as damaging to their individual welfare. It was 
already noted that once CM is opposed by both workers and managers, this implies that 
managers are likely to act as employees, rather than shareholders, and care about their 
personal welfare. This negative association between CM strategy and insider ownership is 
also supported by Buck et al. (2003) findings on the Ukrainian firms, where high degrees 
of insider ownership were found to be negatively associated with cost-cutting strategies. 
Together with similar results for Russia, this is highly suggestive of a universal 
mechanism in the FSU as a whole. 
While Russia's national culture of high uncertainty avoidance (Elenkov, 1998) was 
assumed to favour traditional form of employment relationship, the result for the TSW 
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strategic bundle suggests, that this paternalistic, former Soviet-style template seems now 
to be ill-suited for the post-privatisation Russian environment, as it has already become in 
Western firms (Wray, 1996). However, the 10% significance level of association between 
TSW and WO might indicate that this strategy is still popular in some of the sampled 
enterprises. 
In relation to the institutional feature of different legal forms of the enterprises, no 
influence was found on the proportions of benefits received, wage, training and social cost 
shares of production costs, layoffs and various forms of training. The Governance - 
Strategy hypotheses provided very low levels of significance in terms of the specific HRM 
bundles (and thus were rejected), and similar results were obtained for individual HRM 
approach, where the legal forms of enterprises were found to have no significant 
association with benefit strategies. Only the partnership form of governance was 
significantly associated with the presence of a remuneration system with basic wages and 
monthly bonuses and of training to upgrade, negatively in each case. These findings can 
be interpreted as indicating that legal forms in Russia have only a nominal influence on 
firms' actual HRM strategies and CG, and act as cosmetic devices, superimposed on 
existing competences and routines (Spenner et aL, 1998). This result vindicates the 
decision of Buck et aL (2003), made without recourse to the evidence, to exclude legal 
forms as governance variables. It would appear that significant associations between 
ownership and HRM strategies arise regardless of legal form. This is a strong result, 
suggesting, for example, that closed or open JSCs make little difference to chosen 
strategies. 
Probably the only conclusion that can be made from all these diverse outcomes for 
Governance - Strategv associations, is that insider ownership seems to have no consistent 
association with individual strategies that benefit employees. On the other hand, HRM 
strategies cannot be chosen as individual items from a long menu (Baron et aL, 1996). 
Strategies must interact, reinforcing and opposing each other. Therefore, this thesis makes 
a strong case on theoretical and empirical grounds for composite bundles of strategies as 
variables. In this context, the composite, low commitment Cost Minimisation strategy, was 
found to be negatively associated with insider ownership. The obvious explanation for this 
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association is the possible aversion of insiders to all retrenchment strategies, in the short 
run at least. 
It has to be remembered that the FSU comprised a unique institutional environment, in 
which idiosyncratic governance characteristics involving dominant employee ownership 
have been suspected of promoting strategic inertia and of prevailing restructuring (Buck et 
al., 2001). To some extent this is true for a modem Russia, since employee ownership is 
associated with less CM retrenchment. At the same time, the results here show no 
consistent association between the two high commitment composite strategies - 
Traditional Social Wetfare and Human Resource Investment - and governance, 
represented by ownership variables and different legal structures. The absence of support 
for TSW and RRI effects of HRM and governance alignment on strategic outcomes may 
come as a surprise, although it is often difficult to specify what constitutes good alignment 
in research across firrns and industries (Becker and Gerhart, 1996). Possibly, it could also 
be attributed to the strategic inertia associated with the influence of Russian employees. 
6.2.2 STRATEGY - PERFORMANCE 
The second part of this research was focused on the examination of Strategy - 
Performance associations in Russian enterprises. As with the Governance - Strategy, an 
individual HRM-element approach was supplemented by the, arguably more appropriate, 
composite strategy analysis, extending the works of Buck et aL (2003) and Fey and 
brkman (2001). 
It was hypothesised in the main Strategy - Performance hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), that 
firms' strategies that promote employee welfare will be positively associated with 
improved corporate performance. The results for individual strategies, summarised in 
Table 15, are very mixed and do not Permit one to confirm/reject this hypothesis 
straightaway, when for each performance indicator there are variables that support the 
association, and at the same time there are other variables that do not. As was noted, this 
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ambiguity may be attributable to the choice of regression parameters, taken from the one- 
year performance indicators of the ILO questionnaire. One cross-section of data may be 
insufficient to produce consistent patterns of results. 
Bearing in mind the speculative nature of any discussion about causation in relation to 
employee-friendly strategies, some of the results show support for the argument of there 
being some possible improvement in the overall situation with corporate performance in 
Russia. For example, higher wages, as a proportion of production costs, are positively 
associated with a higher percentage of sales exported outside the CIS; a higher capacity 
utilisation rate is associated with greater spending on initial training and fewer workers on 
unpaid leave. 
The association between higher wages and exports beyond the CIS may indicate that 
exported goods are of a better quality (what actually require better skills from workers) 
because of presumably tight economic competition and higher demands on outside 
markets. As a result, employees involved in the production of exported good are on 
average better paid. As was already argued, this result could indicate a need for 
manufacture retooling on production of those goods and services, that are in demand not 
only within the CIS, but outside also, though any drastic technological change requires 
substantial investments, and goes beyond the research interests of this welfare-focused 
study. 
Positive relationships between the capacity utilisation rate and the initial form of training 
may indicate a rise in the demand for a qualified work force in expanding or emerging 
enterprises. This latter interpretation is also supported by an increase in training provided 
in association with an increase in the volume of production. However, other performance 
indicators - non-money wages, barter sales, exports within the CIS - are negatively 
associated with training provision. The situation with training variables might look rather 
misleading also because of the results from Governance - Strategy analysis, where 
training may be either significantly opposed by managers or have no association with 
workers' shareholdings. So it is possible that a positive association between an increase in 
the volume of production, capacity utilisation rate and training is only mechanical, since 
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workers must be trained if production is to be raised. Therefore, once more, one can only 
speculate on causality. 
It is also worth mentioning that performance indicators, identified as negative for this 
study (e. g. the percentage of sales bartered or the percentage of wages paid non- 
monetarily), may, on the contrary, signalise positive economic performance, implying that 
enterprises are functioning and production continues within the limits imposed by an 
economy in crisis. 
For the strategic clusters in relation to Strategy - Performance, the relationship between 
the use of HRM practices and firm performance did not hold across all three bundles of 
HRM practices (Traditional Social Wetfare, Cost Minimisation and Human Resource 
Investment). After transformation from a command-administrative system of management, 
typical of the FSU, to a capitalist society, Russian managers started to implement various 
Western high-commitment HRM practices. Fey and Bjbrkman (2001) showed that HRI 
strategies in Russia were clearly associated with improved firm performance. Later, Buck 
et al. (2003) supported this result of Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) of a positive association 
between HRI strategy and performance in their Ukrainian study. The results here go along 
with these two outcomes, confirming them in terms of two positive performance indicators 
- capacity utilisation and increase in production volume - and one negative performance 
indicator (bankruptcy threat). Here, the HRI strategy shows a positive and consistent 
association with performance, and supports Hypothesis 8, stating that firm performance is 
positively associated with new HRM investments. However, HRI is also significantly and 
negatively associated with sales exported outside the CIS, and this contradicts Hypothesis 
8. 
It was noted, that HRI strategies are positively associated with production measures of 
performance - capacity utilisation or increase in production - but not sales (in the form of 
exports). So, this recalls the experiences of centrally-planned Soviet enterprises, where 
strategies were focused on output increases rather then quality improvements, thus making 
goods and services non-competitive on foreign markets. Predominantly positive 
associations between HRI strategies and firms' performance may be interpreted as grounds 
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for optimism. This outcome is consistent with the possibility that HRI may be particularly 
suited to Russian managers and other employees, culturally and institutionally accustomed 
to high-commitment HRM, and hostile to cost minimisation. In fact, results for the CM 
bundle (uniformly insignificant) provide no support whatsoever to the supposition that CM 
has to be associated with worse performance, though CM strategy may have been opposed 
by all groups of insiders, as inconsistent with Russian culture and institutions. 
As in the Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) study, where the relationship between the use of 
composite HRM strategies and firm performance did not hold across all bundles 
introduced, our results for the other two high-commitment HRM strategies - TSW and CM 
- also did not produce any consistent outcomes. In particular, the non-significant 
association between TSW and firm performance (with one exception of significant 
association between the TSW and the proportion of wages paid non-monetarily, though 
positive) in our findings, contradicts the predictions made on the basis of the Western 
HRM theory, that this traditional form of welfare provision may result in improved 
performance. 
Although this thesis has been restricted to HRM strategies, of course there may be a case 
for the State not contemplating further radical reform, allowing privatised firms to 
continue to make strategic choices (e. g. HRI) and let the market act as a referee in relation 
to their impact on performance. If this happens however, insider owned and controlled 
firms may have appropriate policies towards human capital, but may have to face more 
serious problems in relation to raising finance for investment in physical assets. 
6.3 NOVEL CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
This research analyses Russian industrial firms in the year 2000, and focuses on their 
corporate governance, strategies in relation to employee welfare and on firm performance. 
After the break-up of the FSU in 1991, Russia came through a period of transitional 
policies, promoting global integration, and three waves of mass privatisation that lead to 
employee-owned businesses as the dominant form of governance in manufacturing 
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industry. For Russia, Ukraine and Belarus this has already been described by Filatotchev 
et aL (2000) and Hoskisson et aL (2000). To date, however, the relationship between 
HRM strategies and firm performance in Russia has been analysed only by Fey and 
Bj6rkman (2001), who investigated 101 foreign-owned subsidiaries (Finnish, Swedish, 
US, German and British) in Russia. They found that greater HRM investments for 
managerial and non-managerial employees are positively related to firm performance. In 
addition to Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), Buck et aL (2003) analysed the influence of 
governance forms on HRM strategies in Ukraine, and found that insider ownership in 
Ukrainian firms is positively associated with high-commitment HRI strategies, and 
negatively associated with low-commitment CM strategies. The latter, in turn, are 
associated with weaker firm performance. 
This research extends the Fey and Bj6rkman (2001) and Buck et aL (2003) analyses by: 
(a) supplementing the Strategy - Performance approach of Fey and Bj brkman (200 1) with 
a consideration of associations between Governance - Strategy - Performance on a 
sample of indigenous industrial Russian firms; and (b) compared with Buck et aL (2003), 
by studying the most developed State, founded after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(EBRD, 2001), thus allowing some generalisation of findings for the FSU as a whole. 
As a result, the first stage of this research develops an HRM approach based on individual 
elements of HRM strategies, partly adopted from the Western literature for Russian firms, 
in order to state and test Governance - Strategy - Performance hypotheses. As a second 
stage, following the Western HRM literature on High Performance Work Organisations 
(Baron et al., 1999; MacDuffie, 1995; Osterman, 1999), on transitional economies (e. g. 
see Spenner et al., 1998, on Bulgarian SOEs research), and taking into account national 
culture and traditions of the FSU (in Ukraine, see Buck et al., 2003), three strategic 
bundles, representing Traditional Social Wetfare, Cost Minimisation and Human Resource 
Investment strategies were constructed for the examination of Governance - Strategy - 
Performance mechanisms. These bundles trace their origins. Thus, TSW was constructed 
according to the old Soviet-style template, involving costly resource commitments and 
amounting to paternalism by corporations. Being a rather unfashionable business strategy 
in Western firms (Wray, 1996), TSW is supplemented by two other, quite different 
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strategies - CM and HRL Being a "hard" HRM strategy, CM involves downsizing, cuts in 
expenditures, short-term or contractual working schemes with lower wage rates, and other 
market-related work practices associated with cost minimisation. The less radical, "soft", 
HRI strategy proposes mutual high commitments from both the firm and employees, 
involving team-based compensation, training, development of human resources, etc. The 
adoption of these three strategic bundles (modified versions of those proposed by Buck et 
al., 2003), their associated methodologies and statistical techniques amount to novelty in 
their design and application to studies on Russia. 
In addition, little emphasis in the Western governancelstrategy1performance literature or 
in the literature on transitional economies has been placed on the penalties for poor 
performance, which can be more significant in a national economic crisis. In this context, 
it is actors' perceptions and expectations of negative phenomena (like the perceived 
bankruptcy threat or sales bartered) that may be expected to influence attitudes towards 
HRM policies. This study claims a novelty in the design and application of negative 
performance indicators, thus extending the view of Fey and Bj6rkman (2001), who argue 
the case for subjective performance measures. As opposed to Buck et aL (2003), this study 
also uses legal forms as governance variables. 
So, based on its developed methodology, this research has been able to identify core 
associations between governance and HRM strategies, and, in turn, the association of 
strategies with firm performance, through the empirical analysis of employee-related data 
for Russian enterprises. 
As another novel feature, this research focuses on indigenous Russian privatised firms 
rather than foreign-owned subsidiaries only, thus giving a broader view of strategic 
response and inertia in the bulk of Russian firms, but providing complementary results. 
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6.4 SHORTCOMINGS OF THIS RESEARCH 
As with any research, this study has a number of shortcomings and limitations. While the 
commentary has speculated on causation, the cross-sectional data of course do not allow 
conclusions on causality or examination of lagged effects (e. g. lagged influence of 
governance on strategies). This can only be established with time-series data collected for 
several years for a panel of firms (Becker and Huselid, 1998). The output of this thesis 
emphatically indicates that single cross-sections of data must be extended to identify 
causation. Of course time-series of data and panel data introduce more environmental 
instability over time, and panels are notoriously difficult to establish. (Subsequent surveys 
of Russian firms by the ILO have produced samples and results that are impossible to 
compare over time. ) This all suggests an unavoidable trade-off, with the richness of data 
being sacrificed for methodologies designed to identify causation. 
Another shortcoming relates to the necessarily limited nature of performance indicators 
available and appropriate in a volatile, inflationary Russian environment, with weak 
accounting conventions and enforcement. For example, no data was available on company 
profits, rates of return, etc. This shortcoming severely handicaps meaningful comparisons 
between HRM strategies and financial performance, as conventionally measured. 
The estimation of associations between ownership, strategy and enterprise performance 
often involves the "implicit assumption that ownership structure is exogenous, i. e., not 
affected by performance itself' (Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001, p. 18). However, once 
ownership is affected by enterprise performance (e. g. managers receive compensation in 
the form of equity), this assumption can be questioned. In early research it was usual to 
ignore this problem, only mentioning the possibility of reverse causality between 
"independent" and "dependent" variables (e. g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McConell and 
Servaes, 1990) and to take all variables as exogenous. Subsequently, a number of authors 
have taken the issue into account when analysing the role of ownership structure (Brown 
and Earle, 2000; Earle, 1998) and in some cases, this has led to substantial changes in 
study results (Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001). As applied to ILO data and the results 
168 
Chapter VI. Discussion and Future Work 
obtained, there could be grounds for treating ownership variables as being partly 
endogenous. However, this again would demand more data. 
Certainly, this analysis was limited to enterprises from four regions and cities only, 
although initially it was intended by the ILO to cover eight of them. The surveyed regions 
can be described as central and well-performing ones, when comparing with the data from 
the official Russian statistics, but the analysed sample of almost 300 firms restricts us to 
the comments/recommendation for these companies and regions only. 
Finally, while the use of data collected and processed by professional staff of the ILO 
offered many advantages, it must be conceded that the lack of involvement in survey 
design and process led to sampling, questions and concepts in the questionnaire that could 
have been improved. This issue was addressed by using the three composite FIRM 
bundles, rather than directly observable characteristics. 
6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This work makes important contributions to the analysis of strategies of Russian firms in 
relation to FIRM in the context of Governance - Strategy - Performance mechanisms, and 
reveals new areas for future research. 
As was mentioned in the previous Section, panel studies can better address, though not 
irrefutably identify, causality in Governance - Strategy - Performance relations. To 
perform time-series analysis, new comparable data for a number of successive years is 
needed. A panel approach would give an opportunity to estimate cause-and-effect 
relations, to relate lagged enterprise performance to strategies applied in previous years, 
and to examine any lagged influence of governance on strategies. 
The preceding theoretical discussion on high-commitment HRM bundles (TSW, CM and 
TS9) suggests that instead of using one single strategy, companies may usefully choose a 
sequence or mix of strategies in an experimental way. It was argued that in this case the 
169 
Chapter VI. Discussion and Future Work 
simultaneous use of both (or mixed) HRM strategies is more likely to be the source of 
sustainable competitive advantage. However, as long as it takes a number of years (and 
highly skilled management) to fully implement one strategy, before changing to another 
one, time-series of data could provide an interesting ground for studying the specified 
HRM strategies in a sequence or mix. 
Although the choice of statistical approaches was justified for this research, rejecting other 
approaches and highlighting their limitations, it nevertheless could be useful to employ 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) techniques for the examination of relations between 
governance, HRM strategies, and firm performance. Being applied cautiously, SEM can 
offer an advance in comparison with multivariate regression analysis by providing an 
opportunity to study simultaneous inter-dependencies between governance, strategy and 
performance, though, of cause, some causality problems remain and the data demands of 
SEM are unrealistic in the Russian context. 
Finally, it also seems possible to extend this research beyond Russia, one of the most 
developed independent States emerged from the FSU. While, Ukraine has already been 
studied by Buck et aL (2003), other transition economies (particularly China) could be 
compared to judge the possible culture and institution-specific nature of the results 
reported here. 
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Russian Questionnaire 
Question 1: Industrial Sector 
I Basic metallurgy 
2 Precious metallurgy 
3 Engineering 
4 Food processing 
5 Textile 
6 Clothing 
7 Shoes 
Question 2: Region 
I Moscow 
2 Moscow region 
3 St. Petersburg 
4 Nizhni Novgorod 
Question 3: Property Form / 2000 
1 State, municipal, leasehold 
2 Partnership/production 
cooperative 
3 Closed joint stock 
8 Chemical 
9 Wood processing 
10 Construction materials 
II Medicine 
12 Paper production 
13 Leather processing 
5 Ivanovo 
6 Tatarstan 
7 Vladimir 
8 Chelyabinsk 
4 Openjoint stock 
5 Private (individual) 
6 Public organisation 
7 Other 
Question 4: Establishment Type 
1 Independent 2 Part of larger enterprise 3 Other 
Appendix I 
Question 5: Percentage of Shares 
June, 2000 
Workers' and Managers' 5.1 
Workers' 5.2 
State's 5.3 
Foreign 5.4 
Question 6: Percentage of Sales 
1999 
Exported Within the CIS 6.1 
Exported Outside the CIS 6.2 
Bartered 6.3 
Question 7: Percentage of Shares of Production Costs 
1999 
Wage Share 7.1 
Social Cost Share 7.2 
Training Share 73 
Question 8: Total Number of Workers / June 2000 
Question 9: Number of Workers on Administrative Leave 
June 2000 
Unpaid 9.1 
Partially Paid 9.2 
Full Paid 9.3 
QuestionlO: Turnover, Number of Workers /June 1999 -June 2000 
Total Resigned Dismissed 
Number of Workers 10.1 10.2 10.3 
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Questions 11-13: Earnings, in 000 Roubles / June 2000 
Number of 
Employees 
Average Wage Bonuses Benefits 
Managers 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 
Skilled 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 
Unskilled 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 
All 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 
Question 15: Foreign Investments in Enterprise 
I Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question 16: Initial Training 
I Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question 17: Retraining to Improve Job Performance 
I Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question 18: Providing Training to Upgrade 
I Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question 19: Change in Period Training Program / June 1999 - June 2000 
1 Decreased 2 No change 3 Increased 
Question 20: Paying for Special Training Institute / June 1999 - June 2000 
1 Yes, its own institute 5 Yes, grants 
2 Yes, transfer funds to an institute 6 Other 
4 Yes, each student 7 Not paying 
Question2l: Is Paying Practice Going on Now? 
I Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
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Question 22: Planning to Cut Financing the Training Institute 
1 Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question 23: Change in Volume of Production 
I Increase 2 No change 3 Decrease 
Question 24: Effect of Product Range Change on Employment 
I Increase 3 Decrease 
2 No change 4 Do not know 
Question 25: Effect of Technological Change on Employment 
I Increase 3 Decrease 
2 No change 4 Do not know 
Question 26: Effect of work organisation change on employment 
I Increase 3 Decrease 
2 No change 4 Do not know 
Question 27: Capacity Utilisation, %/ June 2000 
Question 28: Main Criteria of Wage Determination 
I Performance of establishment as a whole 4 
2 Work brigade/unit performance 5 
3 Individual performance 
Question 29: Percentage of Workers Paid Non-monetarily 
Question 30: Percentage of Wages Paid Non-monetarily 
2000 
Workers 30.1 
Workers' and Managers' 30.2 
Minimum Wage Law 
Other 
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Question 3 1: Percentage of Wage Not Paid on Time 
Question 32: Operating a Profit Sharing System / June 1999 - June 2000 
1 Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question 33: Remuneration System / Employees 
I Basic wage 4 
2 Basic wage with individual bonuses 5 
3 Basic wage with monthly bonuses 
Questions 34-35: Benefits 
Basic wage with quarterly bonuses 
Other 
Administrative Workers Regular Workers 
Paid Vacation 34.1 35.1 
Additional Vacation 34.2 35.2 
Rest Houses 34.3 35.3 
Sickness Benefit 34.4 35.4 
Paid Health Services 34.5 35.5 
Subsidised Rent 34.6 35.6 
Subsidies for Kindergartens 34.7 35.7 
Bonuses 34.8 35.8 
Profit Sharing 34.9 35.9 
Loans 34.10 35.10 
Retiring Assistance 34.11 35.11 
Supplementary Pension 34.12 35.12 
Possibility for Training 34.13 35.13 
Subsidy for Benefit for Meal 34.14 35.14 
Subsidised Consumer Goods 34.15 35.15 
Transport Subsidies 34.16 35.16 
Unpaid Shares 34.17 35.17 
I 
2 
Yes 
No 
3 Occasionally 5 Do not know 
4 N/A 
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Question 36: Main New Social Benefit Added / June 1999 - June 2000 
0 None 7 Social insurance 
I Subsidised catering 8 Subsidised kindergarten 
2 Subsidised transport 9 Vouchers, subsidised prices 
3 Subsidised housing 10 Profit sharing 
4 Payment for additional vacation II Financial assistance 
5 Medical service 12 Other 
6 Medical insurance 
Question 37: Main Social Benefit Excluded / June 1999 - June 2000 
0 None 7 Social insurance 
I Subsidised catering 8 Subsidised kindergarten 
2 Subsidised transport 9 Vouchers, subsidised prices 
3 Subsidised housing 10 Profit sharing 
4 Payment for additional vacation 11 Financial assistance 
5 Medical service 12 Other 
6 Medical insurance 
Question 38: Maintaining Social Facilities 
I Yes 2 No 
Question 39: Social Facilities Passed to Local Authorities / June 1999 - June 2000 
1 Yes 2 No 
Question 40: Providing Service Housing 
I Yes 2 No 3 Do not know 
Question4l: Going Bankrupt in the Next 12 Months 
I Yes 4 No 
2 Probably yes 5 Do not know 
3 Probably no 
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Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis seeks to identify homogenous subsets of cases in a population, i. e. cluster 
analysis seeks to identify a set of groups, which both minimise within-group variation and 
maximise between-group variation (Garson, 2001). 
The problem, solved by means of cluster analysis is in the distribution of the set of data I 
into in clusters (subsets of data) 1,, 12, ... , 1. so that each variable was belonging to one 
particular construct only. The idea is to determine whether or not the information can be 
summarised into a smaller set of constructs and to put alike objects into one clusters and 
diverse into different ones. The solution to the problem of cluster analysis lies in the 
distribution that matches to some criterion of optimality that consists of an optimal 
distance measure and a measure ofsimilarity. 
The distance measure is an Euclidian distance between two points x and y calculated with 
the following formula: 
in 
(X, - Y'), 
i=1 
It is also known that object with a description X is similar to the object from some set Y(Yd 
if a mean squared distance between point x and any point from a set Y is small. In other 
n' 
words, the point x is close to the set Y if d, 
2 (x, Y) Zd2 (X, yi) is small. 
ny j=1 
To be able to compare two different sets, it is necessary to estimate a mean distance 
between a pair of points, each being taken from a particular set. Thus for sets X and Y the 
I n, n, 2(Xi, yj) distance d(X, Y) is estimated with d'(X, Y) =E 2, Ed 
nxny i=l j=l 
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To estimate a density among points inside the sets, the following measure is used: 
I n, -1 n 
d'(X, Y) =E 3n_, 
1: d'(x,, yj) 
., 
(n,, j=1 j=i, l 
The smaller the result is, the closer are the points inside the set. 
In general, the idea of this approach is in transformation of a space of descriptions D into a 
space D% where all points from one set are allocated close to each other, and points from 
different sets arc distanced. 
To solve the problem of cluster analysis, it is necessary to define formally what is included 
into the term of similarity and into the term of difference. This solution lies in the 
distribution where the distance between xj and xj is small enough in one cluster, and the 
distance between x, and xj is rather big in different clusters. For these purposes it is 
possible to analyse any function, that satisfies to the following conditions (not only the 
Euclidian distance). 
The distance conditions: 
Any nonnegative real function d(xix) is called the distance function (or metric) if-. 
a) d(xix) >- 0 for any xi and xj; 
b) d(xjx) =0 if and only if xi = xj; 
c) d(xix) = d(xjxd; 
d) d(xixd :! ý d(xix) + d(xjxd for any xi, xj and xk. 
The measure ofsimilarity: 
Any nonnegative real function S(xjx) is called the measure ofsimilarhy if-. 
a) Os-S(xix) s'l for xi: A xj; 
b) S(xixd = 1; 
c) s(xix) = s(xixd. 
A pair of wasures ofsimilarity organise a similarity matrix: 
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l S12 
", SIn 
S= 
S21 I 
... 
S2n 
where the term Sy is called a coefficient of similarity. 
-SnI 
Sn2 
... 
l 
In statistical analysis the measure of linear similarity is used. It is calculated by the 
formula: 
n 
1: 
XkI Xkj 
r, k-) 7 and is called a coefficient of correlation. 
2n 
)2 
ki 
J]X2 
x kv 
The coefficient of correlation ry=l if and only if xj=kxj, where k is nonnegative. 
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